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My primary research question is ‘How have techniques of 
psychological measurement and statistical analyses been made 
to function as objective methods for determining the effects of 
child sexual abuse?’ This question has been developed through 
an understanding that research on the effects of child sexual 
abuse, both on children and on adults who were abused as 
children, is often performed as a scientific practice (the field 
has ‘crossed the threshold of scientificity’). This frequently 
involves measuring differences in psychological attributes 
between abused and non-abused individuals. The representation 
of the harm of child sexual abuse in a scientific style has been 
important for the recognition of the suffering caused by such 
abuse, yet there are implications in a disciplinary sense; 
subjecting individuals to the power/knowledge nexus of 
scientific reasoning also involves relations of power, which is a 
central problem in child sexual abuse itself.    
 
The ‘field of child sexual abuse’ is not one stable homogenous 
field. Developmental (scientific) psychology sits alongside a 
range of feminist analyses (I draw particularly on self-identified 
post-structuralist style of feminist styles of reasoning), 
contesting this space and its objects. I adapt the notion of 
‘diffractive reading’ to utilise these two traditions that are 
influential in and formative of the field of child sexual abuse.   
 
The historical origins of psychological measurement are 
located in the natural sciences, particularly physics. The 
specific scientific model in question can be named as a classical 
model, aspiring to objectivity and ascribing to an ontological 
commitment to causality. Current research texts on child sexual 
abuse consistently perform measurements, as well as statistical 
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analyses based on those measurements, and frequently and 
explicitly confirm commitment to these aspects of classical 
scientific ontology. I argue that objectivity, as a feature of 
scientific measurement, produces its object of knowledge while 
also disciplining the conduct of researchers and counsellors. 
Objectivity itself is analysed as a constructed and contested 
practice, and I outline some competing versions of objectivity 
in contrast to the classic scientific model on which much 
psychological measurement is based.   
 
I develop an analytical approach to this question drawing on the 
field of science studies on the one hand, and the Foucauldian 
informed disciplinary literature on the other. By understanding 
psychological measurement as a performative practice, rather 
than a neutral ‘window on the world out there’, it becomes less 
important to establish whether such measurements are strictly 
scientific. Instead, phenomenon of object construction and 
subjectification become the focus of analysis. 
 
I draw upon published research texts, and two small focus 
groups I held with counsellors working in the field of child 
sexual abuse. I report on how these investigations led me to be 
troubled by the production of the object of child sexual abuse in 
the research texts, and the implications for the subjectification 
of counsellors when engaging with practices of objectivity 
called for by measurement.  
 
I do not offer any prescriptive conclusions on how research or 
therapeutic practice ought to be done better, or propose a ‘way 
out’ of power relations for researchers and practitioners. 
Instead, this investigation has invited me to account as fully as 
possible for my entanglement in these taken for granted 
research and therapeutic practices. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
Without statistics, scholarly conversations about social 
problems become virtually impossible; effectively there 
would be no problem, or at least not one that can be 
talked about in public (Reekie, 1998, p. 45) 
 
Numbers do not merely inscribe a pre-existing reality. 
They constitute it (Rose, 1991, p. 676) 
 
In this thesis, I investigate ways in which practices of measurement 
and statistics have shaped the current field of professional 
intervention and research in the field of Child Sexual Abuse.  
 
The use of techniques of measurement (e.g. psychological testing) 
is mundane and commonplace in therapy and research with adults 
and children who have been subjected to child sexual abuse. My 
intention in this thesis is to disturb this sense of ordinariness 
associated with these practices, to highlight their contingency and 
make them appear ‘strange’. The thesis is guided by the following 
questions: 
 
1. How have techniques of psychological measurement and 
statistical analyses been made to function as objective 





1a. What relations of power/knowledge do practices of 
measurement require and produce? What are the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ for psychological measurement? 
 
1b. What kinds of individuals are ‘produced’ by psychological 
practices of measurement, in the study and treatment of child 
sexual abuse? 
 
2.  How do techniques of measurement govern the 
activities of counsellors1 in their work with children 
who have been sexually abused?  
 
A major theme emerging from this research is that these practices 
of psychological measurement are centred around measuring the 
harm of sexual abuse. I will argue that such measurements produce 
this harm in a particular way, and require harm to be rendered in a 
measurable form in order to ‘count’. Within a psychological 
discipline that commits to the scientific method, the harm of child 
sexual abuse is made visible through measurement. I trace the 
conditions that make this way of rendering the harm of child 
sexual abuse not only possible but to appear objective. In 
examining the mechanisms through which this harm is produced, 
the intent is not to argue that child sexual abuse is not harmful or 
abusive, but to interrogate the effects of the manner in which this 
harm is produced and treated through psychological measurement 
and statistical analyses. 
 
                                                 
1 The term ‘counsellor’ is the job title given to the professionals with whom part 
of this research was conducted. They included psychologists, social workers, an 
art therapist, and one who described their qualification simply as ‘counsellor’. 
Beyond their employment which legitimates their work in this capacity, the 
specific educational qualification of each counsellor bears little consequence for 
this research.    
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Why focus on measurement and statistics? 
 
As I suspect happens with many theses, the focus of this work has 
shifted in considerable and unexpected ways throughout the course 
of its production. My initial motivation (if I can refer to such a 
thoroughly psychological concept) emerged from a moral and 
ethical position about a very popular, specific aspect of knowledge 
about boys who had been sexually abused; namely, the notion of a 
‘victim to offender cycle’, the idea that a boy who has been 
sexually abused would be at a relatively greater risk of acting 
abusively towards others when he reaches adolescence or 
adulthood. I was concerned by the fact that much research and 
therapeutic practice with boys who had been sexually abused 
seemed to accept this notion of a cycle, often under the rubric of 
prevention. A number of authors urged that addressing the 
potential for future acts of violence ought to form part of a 
responsible therapeutic intervention into the lives of some, if not 
all, boys who had been sexually abused (Ryan, 1989; Bentovim et 
al., 1998; Salter et al., 2003; Wilcox et al., 2004; Noll, 2005; 
Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2007).  
 
I am not suggesting that all the literature cited posits a direct link 
between child sexual victimisation and adult/adolescent offending, 
or that it uniformly states that all boys who are sexually abused 
will go on to offend. Recent research has focussed on trying to 
identify specific circumstances or dynamics of childhood 
victimisation that are associated with a greater likelihood of later 
sexual offending. Examples of the variables studied include male v 
female perpetrator, familial v extra-familial perpetrator, severity 
and duration of the abuse, and responses to the abused child from 
within the support network (for a review see Thomas et al., 2009). 
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Nonetheless, the fact that research is devoted to such questions 
illustrates the persistence of the explanatory power of the ‘victim 
to victimiser’ cycle. 
 
I believed (and still do) that this notion of a cycle—and its truth-
effects—is deeply problematic for a range of reasons, not least 
because of the limitations such boys may be incited to place on 
their own lives. The victim to offender cycle is an insidious form 
of victim blaming and secondary victimisation, implicitly 
suspecting boys who have been sexually abused of being 
perpetrators who are yet to commit their crimes. I wanted to 
confront the cycle discourse and deprive it of its power to make 
counsellors, parents, and children (and adults abused as children) 
regard such children in this way. Thus, part of my motivation was 
to contribute to what I believed would be more liberatory and 
ethical forms of therapeutic practice with boys who had been 
sexually abused. 
 
I also held objections to what this type of idea implied about why 
sexual abuse2 happens. It seemed to me that ‘the cycle’ served to 
minimise the influence of broader political questions of gender and 
power. If it is thought that the cause of an individual’s sexually 
abusive behaviour is a product of personal history, surely this 
invites analyses of acts of sexual violence and abuse which are 
individualistic and depoliticised. This grated against my 
commitment to the perspective informed by my reading of feminist 
theory and work on gender and masculinity, which broadly held 
that men’s sexual violence is structured around inequalities of 
                                                 
2 I say ‘sexual abuse’ and not ‘child sexual abuse’ here because the ‘cycle’ 
posits these boys as potential perpetrators of a range of abusive sexual acts, not 
just child sexual abuse. 
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power between men, women and children, and the particular forms 
of masculinities that men and boys are incited to take up (see 
Boyd, 2007, for a more detailed examination of the lack of 
influence such theories hold in current regimes of treatment with 
men and boys who commit sexual abuse). 
 
I wanted to know how the victim-to-offender cycle was able to be 
so influential even within those contexts where a broad feminist 
analysis of sexual abuse, and the importance of stressing the 
innocence of the child victim of abuse, was espoused. Here I am 
referring to the field of child sexual abuse counselling, in which I 
was employed at the time I began this thesis. One line of enquiry 
that was possible at that juncture, perhaps the most obvious one, 
would have been to follow trauma, particularly the notion of 
traumatic sexuality developed by child sexual abuse expert David 
Finkelhor (Finkelhor, 1988). Trauma has become the premier 
conceptual tool through which the effects of child sexual abuse are 
to be understood in research and therapeutic practice. Although the 
trauma path is not the one I have taken here, I believe that it would 
be extremely valuable to undertake an analysis of trauma’s place in 
shaping understandings and practices in the field of child sexual 
abuse, perhaps taking the work of Ruth Leys (2000) as a starting 
point. This would stress the productivity of the concept of trauma, 
as opposed to establishing or debating the reality an objective 
referent, trauma.   
 
I am now going to attempt to justify here why I did not take that 
path, by describing the path I have taken. My reading of the texts 
that supported the cycle discourse did not generally say that there 
is a one-to-one correlation between being subject to child sexual 
abuse and becoming a perpetrator. (There are some examples that 
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come close to this position; for example, Freda Briggs’ From 
victim to offender: How child sexual abuse victims become 
offenders (1995)). More commonly, child sexual abuse was 
identified as a risk factor that may contribute to some individuals’ 
later perpetration of sexual abuse onto other children, usually in 
combination with other risk factors. This is consistent with Castel’s 
(1991) notion of the risky individual. The risky individual is 
distinct from the dangerous individual. Where the dangerous 
individual was a person deemed potentially violent or criminal 
based on an intimate knowledge of that person, the risky individual 
is more a result of a collection of various risk factors he/she has 
accumulated which are statistically correlated to the likelihood of 
offending.   
 
‘Strong’ studies in this area are said to utilise “…measurement of 
other variables (e.g., “force”) [that is] standardized, objective, and 
behaviourally specific” (Thomas et al., 2009, p. 383).  In these 
texts, trauma often provides an explanation for this possible 
progression from victim to perpetrator, but it is the notion of risk 
that makes this explanation necessary. In other words, there was 
another technique at work, one that had already established the 
need for an explanation. This technique was correlation.  
 
At its simplest, correlation means that if a happens, then b is more 
likely to happen than if a had not happened. If b happens to be a 
bad or undesirable thing, then the notion of risk might become 
relevant. Correlation per se is not a psychological concept, even 
though it appears everywhere in psychological texts. It is a 
statistical concept, as is risk. I became intrigued about how these 
statistical concepts found their way into psychology, to the extent 
that they seemed, not only to be everywhere in the research on the 
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effects of child sexual abuse, but tied to claims of objectivity. If I 
wanted to understand the influence of the victim to offender cycle, 
I would have to develop an understanding of the function of 
statistics. This is stated clearly in some of the research literature on 
how the risk of the victim-to-offender cycle should be approached 
for boys who have been sexually abused: “…a statistical model 
and, ultimately, an actuarial risk-assessment method should be 
aspired to” (Thomas et al., 2009, p. 385). 
 
If statistical techniques are ‘black boxes’ (Latour, 1987) that are 
capable of producing calculations of risk (input---->[black box]----
--->output), where does the input come from? A black box is a 
metaphor for a tool for producing knowledge that, once 
established, becomes ‘closed off’ from the need for further 
explication. Gravity is a prime example of a black box in the field 
of physics. In much the same way, statistical processes work as 
black boxes in psychological research papers. One might find 
descriptions of or justifications for the use of a particular statistical 
technique, but it would generally be regarded as quite redundant to 
go back and ‘open’ a black box, to re-establish its legitimacy. This 
has become almost literal in that much statistical processing is 
done by computer programs; the BASC (Behavioural Assessment 
System for Children) which the counsellors in my research use 
comes with computer software. 
 
Statistics is a number processing technology, taking the ‘input’ 
numbers and turning them into ‘output’ numbers. While the output 
numbers are a result of statistical processes or operations 
performed on the input, the input numbers must come from 
somewhere else. They come from another technique, that of 
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measurement. This is where things get interesting enough to form 
the basis of a thesis. 
 
To recap my path so far: the victim-to-offender cycle is 
problematic. Why is it so influential despite these problems? Is it 
because of the power of the concept of trauma? This is too far 
down the track already- why is an explanation like trauma needed 
in the first place? Because statistical correlation has shown that 
there is an increased risk of victims becoming offenders. What 
kind of things are correlation and risk? They are statistical things. 
What do statistical things need in order to work? They need 
measurement. 
 
At this point the reader may be asking why I am referring to 
correlation and risk as statistical ‘things’. This is a central 
epistemological question that will get more detailed treatment in 
Chapter 2. At this point it might be useful to say simply that I will 
be treating tools for knowing as material and constructed objects. 
Statistical procedures are one such tool; psychological tests are 
another, as are theoretical concepts (Barad, 2007) such as trauma. 
None of these tools are invisible windows for seeing the effects of 
child sexual abuse ‘as they really are’, nor are they naturally 
occurring; they have all been built over time, either within the 
discipline of psychology or from other scientific disciplines. 
 
I will go back one step: How did statistics manage to get 
themselves everywhere in the psychological research on the effects 
of child sexual abuse? By the time the effects of child sexual abuse 
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became a discrete area of psychological research3, statistics were 
everywhere in psychology. Statistics were actively ushered in to 
the discipline, because statistics were established as a hallmark of 
science, and it was in psychology’s interest to be a science. In 
terms of strategies of power, psychology historically needed 
statistics in order to make itself stronger in the face of doubts about 
the validity of the knowledge it produced (John, 1992; Michell, 
1999). Statistics on the other hand would survive quite well 
without psychology (being firmly in place in other disciplines such 
as biology, physics, economics, demographics, etc.), but it would 
welcome the chance to expand its territory of influence. The 
alliance was and is productive for both psychology and statistics. 
 
For statistics to enter psychology, it needed numbers to process. It 
is no use giving statistics qualitative descriptions; it needs numbers 
in order to work. Psychology needed to provide statistics with 
measurements of psychological attributes and phenomena 
(Comrey, 1968). The putting into practice of this requirement to 
measure psychological attributes was very much an achievement, 
in that it was not taken for granted or merely discovered that 
psychological attributes could be meaningfully measured. Michell 
(1999, 2011) argues that the debate over psychological 
measurement is still very much alive, despite the ubiquitous claims 
by psychology to be measuring psychological attributes. 
 
These questions about psychology as a science, and the attendant 
need for measurement, led me to a range of literature falling 
broadly under the banner of ‘science studies’. This included 
                                                 
3 The first edition of the Journal of Child Sexual Abuse in 1992 provides some 
indication of the establishment of this ‘field’, although research on child sexual 
abuse was growing throughout the 1980s. Finkelhor’s Child sexual abuse: new 
theory and research (1984) provides another landmark. 
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feminist critiques of scientific principles such as objectivity and 
neutrality (e.g. (Harding, 1986); studies of the formation and 
construction of scientific facts and objects (Latour, 1986); 
Foucault’s work on how some knowledge claims attain the status 
of objectivity or truth while others are subjugated (Foucault, 1970, 
1980); and critiques of classical scientific ideals of measurement 
from ‘newer’ scientific disciplines such as quantum physics 
(Barad, 2007). These texts and others provided the tools to develop 
the first major question of this thesis:   
 
1- How have techniques of psychological measurement and 
statistical analyses been made to function as objective 
methods for determining the effects of child sexual abuse?; 
and the attendant sub-questions:  
 
1a. What relations of power/knowledge do practices of 
measurement require and produce? What are the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ for psychological measurement? 
 
1b. What kinds of individuals are ‘produced’ by psychological 
practices of measurement, in the study and treatment of child 
sexual abuse? 
 
On a simultaneous, secondary journey, my reading also took me 
into the realm that could be characterised as the “social 
construction” of sexual abuse. This lead to the formulation of 
questions such as: What does it mean for a child or an adult to be 
called a ‘victim of child sexual abuse’? How did this come to have 
specific meanings, far beyond the idea of a victim as one who is 
assaulted? How did the victim of sexual abuse come to be 
constituted as an object of psychological expertise? I became 
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aware that the ability to speak about child sexual abuse as a 
domain of psychological expertise was contingent upon a number 
of historical categories. For example, there had to first be children 
and adults as distinct kinds of people (Ariés, 1960). There had to 
be a category of behaviour called ‘abuse’. 
 
There also has to exist the category of sexuality, and this domain 
had to be amenable to psychological knowledge. In fact, it has 
been argued that this category of sexuality was wholly produced by 
‘psy’ disciplines—see Foucault (1978) and Davidson (2001). 
Measurement plays and has played a central role in establishing 
sexual norms in a scientific and objective manner, thereby 
producing ‘abnormal’ categories of sexuality to be corrected by 
therapeutic interventions (Downing, 2004). 
 
There are many other categories that will be introduced throughout 
this thesis. Not all of these categories are exclusively psychological 
productions. It is unthinkable, for example, that our current 
discourse about child sexual abuse would be possible without the 
political activism of large numbers of feminist women. The 
framing of sexual abuse as an issue defined primarily as an abuse 
of male or patriarchal power remains an integral element of 
modern discourse that cannot be attributed to psychological 
categories alone: although, this definition of child sexual abuse is 
not always present in psychological research, and is sometimes 
explicitly eschewed (see, for example, Khalily et al., 2011). My 
interest in this thesis is primarily with those categories that allow 
psychological measurement and associated therapeutic practices to 
produce the effects of child sexual abuse as objects of scientific 
knowledge. Feminist writers of various persuasions have many 
differing things to say about psychological measurement in relation 
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to child sexual abuse, as well as raising questions of whether 
feminist discourses on child sexual abuse are ‘part of the 
discipline’ (Bell, 1993; Scott, 2001). 
 
These insights about the historically contingent nature of child 
sexual abuse as an achieved category raised some ethical 
dilemmas. If one argues that the ‘victim of child sexual abuse’ is in 
some fundamental way a social achievement, does this imply the 
view that such people are not ‘really’ victims?; that the suffering 
instantiated by sexual abuse is merely a fiction of psychological 
discourses of development or trauma (or, indeed, feminist 
understandings of power)? This would be a deeply problematic 
position to take, and at no point in this thesis do I wish to minimise 
or dismiss the suffering experienced by individuals who have been 
subjected to sexual abuse. (Here is a positioning statement 
intended to persuade you, the reader, of that intent; during the time 
it has taken to produce this thesis, I have worked as a 
counsellor/advocate with children and adults who have been 
subjected to child sexual abuse, and have been a witness on a daily 
basis to their accounts of suffering and the subsequent legacies in 
their lives). Having said that, at times I have had to ‘bracket’ these 
concerns in order to pursue my enquiry into the effects of child 
sexual abuse as an object of scientific enquiry.  
 
It is not my intention to argue for one correct or truthful frame for 
understanding how child sexual abuse influences a person’s life. A 
crucial claim for the development of this thesis is that 
psychological studies of the effects of child sexual abuse makes 
these effects into objects of science. This claim is extremely 
productive for two major reasons:  
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1- it allows me to draw on the methodological insights of 
practitioners of science studies, such as Bruno Latour, Karen Barad 
and Sandra Harding among others, who provide guidelines as to 
how to study objects of science as practical (Latour), material 
(Barad) and political (Harding) achievements. Thus, I have 
referenced studies of such things as hormones, DNA and quantum 
physics, by following the principle of scientism (applying 
techniques from one area of scientific study to another- I hope that 
I will be allowed the play on the term ‘scientific study’ to 
incorporate the study of scientific activity); and  
2- Child sexual abuse is contested territory in the sense that 
decidedly non- or anti- scientific elements of feminist practice and 
theory make competing claims about what child sexual abuse is 
and how best to understand and respond to it. This second point 
allows me ‘somewhere to stand’, a well worked out and relatively 
stable analytical ground through which to read these scientific 
practices and claims.  
 
The purpose of the thesis 
 
Given the sensitive nature of the topic of child sexual abuse, I want 
to make one immediate clarification. This research is not intended 
to support the idea that ‘child sexual abuse’ is simply a fictional 
construct of psychological discourse, or that (consequently) the 
abuse (or use) of children, by adults, for sexual purposes should be 
legitimated. Rather, the general purpose is to interrogate the 
disciplinary functions of contemporary forms of knowledge about 
child sexual abuse. This will involve questioning some taken-for-
granted assumptions about child sexual abuse, its impacts and how 
these are researched, and therapeutic responses to sexually abused 
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children and adults who were sexually abused as children. It 
involves recognising that ‘psy’ knowledge about sexual abuse, and 
expert responses to it, are just as infused with relations of power as 
abuse itself, albeit of a different kind.  
 
Another way of saying this is that I experience two co-existing 
responses to the problem of child sexual abuse. I hold a deep 
seated conviction that a whole range of actions named as child 
sexual abuse can contribute to immense distress, suffering and pain 
to a great number of individuals, sometimes for the course of a 
person’s entire life. At the same time, I hold a radical uncertainty 
about how this ought to be understood and responded to by people 
such as myself whose professional positions authorise us to act in 
the name of therapy and/or research. In naming this uncertainty, it 
is not my aim to become more certain. In many ways, I believe 
radical uncertainty to be an ethically helpful position when 
considering how to act in realms that may entail real effects for 
people who experience ongoing suffering and distress. This 
connects to some of the substantive issues raised throughout this 
thesis. It is a truism stated by some feminist critiques of science; 
that attempts to impose understanding and order can be a form of 
violence in their own right, and often serve the interests of those 
doing the ordering. In this thesis, I am interested in producing 
problems, not answers. I attempt to de-order, or destabilise, ways 
of knowing and acting in response to child sexual abuse which 






The emergence of child sexual abuse 
 
Child sexual abuse has not always been recognised as a problem in 
Australian society or other ‘Western’ societies. The ‘uncovering’ 
of child sexual abuse is usually attributed to both Freud (who has 
also been the focus of some strong attacks that claim he later 
backed away from his original ‘seduction theory’ to protect his 
professional status (Masson, 1984)), and to the women’s 
movement, especially of the 1970s.4  
 
I argue in this thesis that the effects of child sexual abuse have 
become an object of legitimate scientific study and therapeutic 
practice for professionals. Claims from professionals that child 
sexual abuse does not exist or is not harmful are rare in 2012.  In 
contrast, in 1984 the Australian researcher Dr Jocelyn Scutt could 
say, in a report commissioned by the then South Australian 
Government Minister of Health J.R. Cornwall, that there was a 
very different professional response to child sexual abuse: 
 
“…a deliberate refusal of those in positions of power 
to acknowledge the truth. A “truth” manufactured by 
psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers, counsellors and 
other “experts” has made for more comfortable 
living—for them….It is easier for those in positions of 
power to believe that incest does not occur” (Scutt, 
1984, p.iii).  
 
                                                 
4 In Australia since white invasion, issues of sexual assault more broadly have a 
longer history. The management of adult male rape was an important concern 
for administrators of early penal colonies- see Foster, 2005.  
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Since that time, both research into child sexual abuse, and 
therapeutic services for those subject to such abuse, have become 
part of the professional landscape for social workers and 
psychologists in Australia. In Melbourne, Victoria, CASAs 
(Centres Against Sexual Assault) provided therapeutic services for 
children who were the victims of recent sexual abuse since the late 
1970s, and today receive funding from the Victorian State 
government to provide this service in many regions across the state 
of Victoria, as well as services to adults who were sexually abused 
in their childhood. Also in Melbourne, in 1986 Australians Against 
Child Abuse (now the Australian Childhood Foundation- ACF), 
started providing counselling for children who had been sexually 
abused (Worth, 2008). The Child Sexual Abuse Treatment 
program was established by the Children’s Protection Society in 
1993 (Scott et al., 2002), now still operating as the Sexual Abuse 
Counselling and Prevention Program (SACPP), providing 
therapeutic services for children and adolescents5. The 
establishment of these services reflects that recognition of the 
problem of child sexual abuse was a joint effort of child protection 
advocates and the women’s movement.       
 
In terms of recognising child sexual abuse as a legitimate topic for 
research and evidence collection, the National Child Protection 
Clearinghouse (NCPC) was established by the Australian 
Government Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs in 1995, with child sexual abuse 
being one of the areas of child abuse identified 
(http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/about.html). In 2003, the Australian 
                                                 
5 Some CASA’s, the SACPP program, and ACF now also provide therapeutic 
services to adolescents who have sexually abused other children, SACCP and 
ACF since the mid-late 1990’s and CASA’s from the mid 2000’s (Worth, 2008). 
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Government, through the Office of the Status of Women, 
established the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault 
(ACSSA: http://www.aifs.gov.au/acssa/about.html). With a 
primary focus on issues related to the sexual assault of women and 
girls over the age of 15, ACSSA also identifies “adult survivors of 
childhood sexual abuse” as a “key area of interest” (Tomison, 
2003).  Both ACSSA and NCPC are situated in the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies. Internationally, the peer-reviewed 
Journal of Child Sexual Abuse was first published in 1992, 
although individual research papers were being published earlier 
than this in other psychology journals. The work of David 
Finkelhor is widely regarded as reference point for the 
establishment of the contemporary field of psychological research 
on child sexual abuse (Finkelhor, 1984, 1986).   
 
These achievements are the result of both social/political activism 
(primarily the ‘women’s movement’) to situate child sexual abuse 
as a crime and an abuse of adult (male) power over children, and 
the efforts of researchers to establish not only the prevalence of 
child sexual abuse, but the harm that it can cause.  
 
In regards to the latter question, there is evidence of an 
epistemological shift in how the harm of child sexual abuse is to be 
established, and this shift involves psychological measurement and 
statistics. This shift has been accompanied by resistance and 
tensions within the field. Understanding these is the primary focus 






To illustrate the problematic context of the role of measurement 
and statistics in child sexual abuse research, I will briefly discuss 
two exchanges that ran in two separate journals during the 1990s. 
Each event produces a slightly different problem regarding 
measuring the effects of child sexual abuse. 
 
a- Russell and Levett 
 
In the South African feminist journal Agenda, a series of articles 
appeared in response to an initial paper by established researcher 
Ann Levett6 (Levett, 1990), which she stated was a “postpositivist 
deconstruction” (p. 38) of the ways that the trauma of childhood 
sexual abuse was commonly researched and understood, 
particularly in relation to normative ideas of development and the 
accompanying neglect of socio-political factors that shape identity 
and inform sexual abuse. She was concerned to question whether 
“…certain kinds of research, intended to be humanitarian and 
progressive, can also actually serve as an ideological tool which 
perpetuates oppressive social structure” (p. 38). She noted that 
“The notion that some children and adults are reported to be 
unaffected by the experience of sexual abuse is not popular and is 
unusual within the current literature” (p. 43), an observation that 
carries particular prescience in the light of the next controversy I 
discuss (Rind, Tromovitch and Bauserman, 1998 ).7  
 
                                                 
6 Ann Levett sadly passed away at the age of 70 in 2006, one year after I began 
this thesis.  
7 However, I would argue that Levett and Rind et al would have differed on the 
meaning they ascribed to this observation. 
19 
 
Levett’s article prompted an ‘outraged’ response from Diana 
Russell (Russell, 1991), who argued that Levett’s work 
‘trivialized’ the suffering of women and children who had been 
sexually abused. Russell’s response was based largely on her 
perception that Levett was arguing that many women who have 
been subjected to child sexual abuse are not harmed or damaged 
(‘damaged’ becomes a problematic word in this debate). Whether 
or not Russell’s reading of Levett is correct is not my main concern 
here (although I tend to agree with Levett (Levett, 1992) that 
Russell is situated within an entirely different epistemological 
tradition which results in her having “…completely failed to grasp 
the central arguments of my research” (Levett, 1992, p. 68)).  It is 
in this article that Russell began to define what constitutes ‘quality’ 
research from poor research, suggesting that Levett failed to 
discriminate between them. This begins to crystallise the relevance 
of this debate for my thesis. Russell stated: “I do not know of a 
single study in which an adequate control group is used which fails 
to find sexual abuse and those who did not (sic). In my own study, 
several statistically significant differences emerged when I 
compared those women who reported an experience of incestuous 
abuse with those who did not” (Russell, 1991, p. 49). Statistical 
concepts—control groups, statistical significance—are introduced 
as indicators of ‘superior quality research’. Russell also mentions 
other statistically derived research tools she uses in her own 
research, (e.g. probability samples).   
 
In her response, Levett (1992) unpacks the notion of ‘facts’ as they 
are presented in Russell’s research, and unsettles the idea that facts 
are transparent, referring to real things and identifiable by 
empirical means. Part of this epistemological package includes 
committing to cause-effect relationships. “Establishing cause-
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effect chains is an important focus of this framework: here is 
sexual abuse, there is the trauma. Such logical positivistic research 
has taken us a good way along the road in contemporary 
technological achievements and to statistically inferred relative 
'truths' about social conditions” (Levett, 1992, p. 70). Levett names 
“objective rationality” as a part of this Enlightenment-tradition 
way of knowing, and links this to New Right conservatism. Citing 
Foucault, Levett characterises such empirical research as a 
dominant discourse, producing its own, unreflective regime of 
truth.8 
 
Levett cites the critiques of feminist science studies authors such as 
Sandra Harding who “…have identified liberal, positivistic 
research as fundamentally patriarchal” (1992, p. 71), although 
stops short of saying that Russell’s work itself is patriarchal (which 
would, obviously, be the harshest of insults). However, there is 
some suspicion regarding the use of these ‘positivistic’ methods 
for feminist purposes, and Russell (1993) reported her experience 
of a generalised tendency within strands of feminism to be 
suspicious of scientific and quantitative research (see also Oakley, 
2000).  
 
In the context of the Agenda debate, Ann Mayne interviewed 
prominent UK feminist Liz Kelly to provide a commentary on the 
exchange (Mayne, 1993), in which one of Kelly’s criticism was 
Russell’s reliance on statistical and quantitative research methods. 
As Russell (1993) points out, the criticism of her work was not that 
she made ‘bad’ or mistaken use of statistical methods, but simply 
                                                 
8 This itself becomes a source of further dispute- in 1992, was the claim that 
child sexual abuse is harmful a ‘dominant discourse’? Levett clearly states it is, 
Russell would perhaps agree with Jocelyn Scutt’s comments cited earlier.  
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that she used quantitative methods at all to research sexual abuse. 
Russell described encountering a “…virtual consensus that 
quantitative research is male and patriarchal” (Russell, 1993, f.n.5) 
within some feminist study circles. 
 
I will leave Russell and Levett for now, having shown that debates 
about measurement and statistics in child sexual abuse research 
(and their implications for therapy) have something of a history 
within feminist-informed work. The issues I want to highlight here 
are: the association of quantitative methods with patriarchy; the 
presumption that questioning research about the harmful effects of 
child sexual abuse can lead to accusations of minimising or 
trivialising suffering; and the problematic place of facts, 
objectivity and cause-and-effect ontology. 
 
b- Rind,Tromovitch and Bauserman (1998) 
 
The second ‘controversy’ is in relation to the Rind et al. meta-
analysis of child sexual abuse studies (Rind et al., 1998). This 
paper generated disputes explicitly centred on the themes of 
science, measurement and the impacts of child sexual abuse in 
psychological research. Rind and his colleagues conducted a meta-
analysis of 59 studies using college samples, on the long-term 
impacts of child sexual abuse. Rind et al. found that statistically, 
across the 59 studies reviewed, the long term negative effects 
(harm) of ‘childhood sexual encounters with adults’ (sic) were not 
as inevitable or substantial as commonly stated. In addition, they 
found that much of the effect could be attributed to other 
problematic events or situations (e.g. having been subject to 
physical abuse as a child), not just child sexual abuse. The article 
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was published in a prestigious academic journal Psychological 
Bulletin, a journal of the American Psychological Association. 
Subsequently, after a rather long and intriguing set of events that 
makes for a story in its own right, the study was condemned by the 
United States Congress (see Lilienfeld, 2002 for an extended 
discussion; Davis, 2005, p. 285, footnote 20). The Rind et al. paper 
and the ensuing texts which commented on it constituted a 
significant moment in the use of scientific and statistical methods 
to research the harm of child sexual abuse. 
 
In contrast to the debate between Russell and Levett, the Rind et al. 
study reverberated well beyond the pages of a specialist journal. 
They were not criticised for their use of patriarchal methods; 
however (like Levett), they were accused of minimising the long 
term harm of child sexual abuse, and even of attempting to justify 
child sexual abuse. In relation to this last point, it presumably did 
not reflect well on the authors when the North American Man-Boy 
Love Association promoted the study’s conclusions (Lilienfeld, 
2002). Rind et al. were also criticised from within the scientific 
community, where the focus was more on whether the methods 
used actually were scientific, rather than the contentious nature of 
the conclusions.   
 
The perceived potential that the study could be used to argue for 
the legitimisation of child sexual abuse made it the subject of 
ethical and moral condemnation from within the discipline of 
psychology and from external sources, including political and 
religious bodies. Rind et al. had proposed that: 
 
A willing encounter with positive reactions would be labelled 
simply adult–child sex, a value-neutral term. If a young person felt 
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that he or she did not freely participate in the encounter and if he or 
she experienced negative reactions to it, then child sexual abuse, a 
term that implies harm to the individual, would be valid (Rind et 
al., 1998, p. 46) 
 
The informative phrase here is ‘value-neutral term’, placed 
alongside the phrase “adult-child sex”. It seems odd to even 
encounter the suggestion that ‘adult-child sex’ would be read as a 
value neutral term, regardless of the child’s apparent consent. 
Children cannot give consent to sexual acts with adults, whether 
from a discourse of morality, legality, or developmentalism. This 
highlights the problems of consequentialism or the scientific 
principle of causality; because the harm of the adult-child sexual 
encounter was found to be often minimal or sometimes positive in 
Rind et al.’s study (and the child ‘consented’), they redefined the 
encounter as not abusive. 
 
In response to the criticisms they received, Rind et al. cited the 
well-known child sexual abuse research pioneers Brown and 
Finkelhor (Brown and Finkelhor, 1986, cited in Rind et al., 2000), 
warning against the exaggeration of the effects of child sexual 
abuse. In the cited quotation, Brown and Finkelhor had explicitly 
advocated that child sexual researchers adopt a “…posture of 
objectivity and balance” (ibid., p. 4, my emphasis).      
 
Rind et al.’s comments are based on a definition of abuse they 
claim is scientific:  
 
“In science, abuse implies that particular actions or 
inactions of an intentional nature are likely to cause 
harm to an individual…Classifying a behaviour as 
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abuse simply because it is generally viewed as immoral 
or defined as illegal is problematic, because such a 
classification may obscure the true nature of the 
behaviour and its actual causes and effects” (Rind et. 
al., 1998, p. 45).  
 
This is consistent with Canguilhelm’s identification of causality as 
a requisite feature in conventions of scientific explanation 
(Canguilhelm, 1978). Rind et al. go on to illustrate their point by 
highlighting historical examples of sexual behaviours that have 
been viewed as pathological: “…masturbation, homosexuality, 
fellatio, cunnilingus, and sexual promiscuity” (1998, p. 45) and 
mentioning that masturbation has been previously called ‘self-
abuse’. They asserted that the moral condemnation of these 
categories has been overcome by scientific research demonstrating 
that they do not have harmful effects. 
 
The study attracted attention not only from within psychology; 
some of the criticisms of the study emerged from outside the field 
of psychology. Rind et al. (2000) point out that some of the loudest 
critics of this aspect of their study were socially conservative 
groups and individuals interested in protecting values associated 
with the nuclear family, who seemed primarily concerned with 
what they perceived as the apparent normalisation of pedophilia, 
and by association through the notion of perversion, 
homosexuality. However, it is mainly the within-discipline 
critiques that I am most interested in here. 
 
The criticism from other psychologists and researchers centered on 
Rind et al.’s selection of samples, the psychological constructs 
they analyzed, and the statistical techniques employed (Dallam, 
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2001; Dallam et al., 2001). At stake was whether or not the Rind 
study was scientific. Stephanie Dallam concluded that the study 
was “…an advocacy article that inappropriately uses science in an 
attempt to legitimize its findings” (Dallam, 2001). Ironically, this 
is precisely what Rind et al. had claimed of previous studies which 
they argued over-stated the effects of child sexual abuse. 
 
What interests me in this thesis is the claim that child sexual abuse 
research should be scientific. I will attempt to draw out what this 
claim means, and identify specific practices and principles that 
qualify as scientific. Through this, I present an argument about the 
privileged role of psychological measurement and statistical 
methods in child sexual abuse research.    
 
Two main points are of interest, which I will outline briefly here. 
Firstly, Rind et al. (2000) claimed that consequentialism or 
causality is the only scientifically valid principle for assessing 
whether an action should be considered abusive or not. Another 
way of saying this is that scientific enquiry is in the business of 
establishing causal relationships between events or phenomena. If 
child sexual abuse does have harmful consequences, scientific 
enquiry should reveal a causal connection. Given that their study 
revealed limited long term negative consequences of child sexual 
abuse, Rind et al. advocated for a review of what constitutes child 
sexual abuse. 
 
Secondly, objectivity is frequently evoked in child sexual abuse 
research. While objectivity is prized as a sign of validity and 
accuracy, it is rarely defined. I argue that the use of psychological 
measurement often serves as a proxy for objectivity in 
psychological child sexual abuse research. I intend to examine this 
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connection more closely, both in terms of the production of 
knowledge about child sexual abuse, and the conduct of 
researchers and practitioners in their work.   
 
Somewhat unusually, given their commitment to scientific method, 
Rind et al. (2000) make the argument that “the true nature” of 
abuse cannot be decided upon by any objective measure, that such 
matters are always matters of political and social contestation. 
They cite a list of historically situated constructions of sexual 
behaviours and the knowledge/power relations that governed them 
(for example, homosexuality and masturbation). Unless the reader 
is invested in a narrative of scientific progress towards ever more 
truthful understanding (and perhaps Rind et al. assume this to be 
the case), their list simply evidences the contingent nature of 
scientific claims regarding sexuality, which would seem to 
undermine their project, which is precisely to establish objectively 
the true impacts of child sexual abuse. 
 
Taking the Rind et al. controversy and the Russell/Levett debate 
together, the themes of objectivity and causality appear as 
important constructs. The perspectives on these constructs are 
slightly different across the two sets of texts. In the Rind et al. 
texts, objectivity (mostly) appears as a desirable scientific practice 
that should be adhered to by researchers, particularly from ‘within 
discipline’ (as opposed to those coming from religious groups). 
Yet, whilst emphasising the importance of objectivity, Rind et al. 
(2000) also state that child sexual abuse cannot be understood 
through objective means. Levett’s and Russell’s exchange adds 
another dimension to the problem of objectivity, in that objectivity 





What interests me in this thesis is how objectivity is accorded such 
an important position. I argue that psychological measurement in 
the field of child sexual abuse research has flourished partly 
because of this commitment to objectivity. 
 
The construct of causality likewise supports practices of 
measurement. If child sexual abuse causes harm, the way of 
establishing this cause-effect relationship is through measuring 
psychological attributes before and after, as it were. Given before 
and after measurements are not feasible in this case, substitute 
statistical means such as comparison to a norm or control group are 
used. The point of interest here is that commitment to, or resistance 
to, the scientific principle of causality shapes research practice. 
  
The harm story 
 
As we sift through and try to make sense of the 
suffering to which we are called on to respond, we 
implicitly and explicitly sort out, measure, and give 
shape to it (Spelman, 1997, p. 1) 
 
The developmental consequences of childhood sexual abuse have 
been the subject of enormous amounts of research. A meta-analysis 
by Paolucci and Genuis (2001) found 860 articles and conference 
papers published between 1976-1996 investigating the effects of 
childhood sexual abuse. Maniglio, in his review of reviews 
published between 1995 and 2008 on the health impacts of child 
sexual abuse, found reviews of 587 studies on the topic (Maniglio, 
2009). A common focus of such studies is to ‘document and 
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catalogue’ the harmful effects of child sexual abuse, following the 
program suggested by David Finkelhor (cited in Davis, 2005).  
 
O’Dell critiques the universalism implicit in what she dubs ‘the 
harm story’, arguing that it obliterates differences of class, gender, 
sexuality and ethnicity (and individual agency). She states: "[B]y 
storying the harmfulness of child sexual abuse through a discourse 
of 'development', women, children and men affected by child 
sexual abuse are positioned as remaining a product of their past 
abusive experiences" (O'Dell, 2003, p. 132). She argues that ‘the 
harm story’ frames all choices after abuse, especially choices about 
sexuality that are constructed as deviant (e.g. homosexuality, 
celibacy, promiscuity) as effects of the abuse, rather than as 
“conscious, informed decisions”. Such choices become symptoms 
of pathology, and further, deviant sexuality may be constructed as 
being ‘transmitted’ by sexual abuse. Children can become 
stigmatised for their loss of ‘innocence’ (Kitzinger, 1992, cited in 
O'Dell, 2003, p. 138; Davis, 2005), as their experience of abuse 
marks them as having deviated from the course of normal, healthy 
development. Such children have historically been managed in 
child protection/welfare systems in terms of the risk they may pose 
to the innocence (read ‘childhood’) of other children (Smart, 
1999).  
 
It is possible that psychological discourse would find nothing in 
this analysis to object to, and would claim this deviance as the 
proper territory for its own practice. It is perhaps too broad to 
argue that psychological knowledge about children’s development 
does not “highlight particularity and difference” (Burman, 1992, p. 
48), as suggested by this critique. The reverse position is fruitful 
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for analysis; psychological techniques of measurement and 
assessment which establish the norm also produce difference 
(Meadmore, 1993). The difference produced by developmental  
psychology is not the same difference which is celebrated by 
O’Dell and other feminist authors influenced by various strands of 
post-structuralism or constructivism (e.g. Levett, 1990; Burman, 
1992; Warner, 2009); it is a deviant difference, or an indication of 
a self that is in some way deficient (Gergen, 2007). However, this 
deviant/deficient difference is no less valued by developmental 
psychology, as it provides a legitimate object on which 
psychological expertise can operate. In this sense, particularity and 
difference are essential to the psychological enterprise. The effect 
of this psychological expertise is first to produce difference, to 
evaluate this difference as deficiency or deviance, then to 
normalise it; psychological expertise is necessary for both aspects 
of this work.  
 
To reiterate, what is under contention in these two discourses about 
difference is the meaning to be made of difference. In O’Dell’s 
narrative, psychology and the harm story obliterates a diversity 
which cannot (or ought not) be conceptualised in terms of 
pathology. In the ‘psy’ narrative, difference is produced in order to 
be normalised. It is important to state here that both the critique 
offered by O’Dell, and the analytic of developmentalism, posit 
(different) normative ideals of childhood. The distinction, 
however, is that the developmental approach attempts to naturalise 
its subject normal child, whereas the critical approach 
acknowledges childhood and the impacts of child sexual abuse as 




It has been convincingly argued by some feminist authors that the 
field of child sexual abuse treatment, in its deployment of 
developmental psychology, has produced a discourse and practice 
of therapeutic concern lacking in critical political analysis. They 
state that the co-opting of feminist discourses of “choice, power 
and liberation” by therapeutic discourse has resulted in responses 
to child sexual abuse that are depoliticised (Armstrong, 1996; 
Lamb, 1996; O'Dell, 2003) and individualised (Warner, 2009). An 
analytics of discipline would complement this argument, by 
pointing to the manner in which political problems of control are 
recast as technical, scientific problems to be addressed by experts 
(Hook, 2007). A politicised approach to understanding child sexual 
abuse considers power relations between adults and children, 
highlighting the extent to which adults are considerably more 
powerful than children thus rendering sexual ‘relations’ inherently 
abusive. Child sexual abuse is problematic because it is an abuse of 
power. This makes room for analysing adult-child relations by 
bringing attention to the strategies that children employ to resist or 
utilise power relations. This position produces children who are 
active agents, as users of discourse and subjects within relations of 
power (Burman, 1992), while still leaving room to acknowledge 
that adult-child relations are contingently, though perhaps not 
essentially, relations of inequality. 
 
The developmental paradigm and the harm story have effects 
beyond childhood; as well as attributing to childhood sexual abuse 
a causal status in current actions and lives of adults, there are 
broader political issues at stake. The harm story tends to exclude 




If child sexual abuse continues to act as a causal 
narrative in accounts of sexual violence and 
problematic sexual relations in adult life, the very 
organisation of heterosexuality remains unexamined, 
and men and women's subject positions are 
'naturalised' (Butler, 1993) within a regulatory notion 
of heteronormativity (Reavey, 2003, p. 157) 
 
The notion that adult women and men who fail to conform to such 
powerful regulatory ideals must in some way be ‘damaged’ or 
deficient is supported by the harm story. The irony for Reavey is 
that it is precisely ‘normal’ arrangements of heterosexuality that 
produce the gendered relations of dominance that are conducive to 
sexualised violence and abuse. 
 
Victim of child sexual abuse as a category 
 
Sexually abused children and adults who had been sexually abused 
in childhood surely existed prior to the psychological invention of 
these categories or ‘kinds’ (Hacking, 1995). Yet when child sexual 
abuse as a problem crossed the “threshold of scientificity” 
(Foucault, 1972), a different way of conceptualising (and thus 
governing) these children—and later, adults—became possible. In 
much the same way that Davidson states that there were no 
‘perverts’ prior to a psychiatric style of reasoning in the late 
nineteenth century (Davidson, 2001), our contemporary 
psychological subjects ‘the child victim of sexual abuse’, or ‘the 
adult victim/survivor of child sexual abuse’ were not objects of 
psychological knowledge prior to the psychologisation of child 
sexual abuse. It is important to note that the survivor of sexual 
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abuse also became a political category produced through radical 
feminist theory and political activism on men’s sexual violence 
towards women and children (Warner, 2009).    
 
The harm story, which frames sexual abuse of children as harmful 
due to the adverse impact it has on the child’s development 
(including into his/her adulthood), was strategically crucial to the 
aim of establishing the criminality and seriousness of child sexual 
abuse. Carol Smart, in her work on the historical discursive 
struggles over child sexual abuse within UK legal and medical 
discourses between 1910 and 1960 (Smart, 1999), shows how 
feminist legal and medical activists deployed the harm story to try 
and protect children from sexual abuse; these efforts met with 
resistance from the ‘male establishment’, within the legal 
profession particularly. Citing archival documents from the period, 
Smart shows how the claim that sexual abuse (or what we now 
consider to be sexual abuse) is harmful to children was not easily 
accepted. There were a number of competing discourses about girls 
and sexuality in particular, such that girls were often described as 
‘wicked’ and inciting sexual attacks from boys and men. Another 
discourse about children was that childhood was not a particularly 
important or formative stage of life; “childhood was a phase of 
both resilience and insignificance” (Smart, 1999, p. 403). The 
effect of this was that children, and especially working-class girls 
(who were often the victims in cases of sexual crimes), did not 
matter a great deal, especially in relation to the rights of the 
breadwinning men accused of the crimes (Smart, 1999). 
 
Paradoxically, whilst childhood itself was not seen to be of great 
significance, the sexually abused girl was regarded as a potential 
source of moral contagion to her peers, likened to a leper (Smart, 
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1999). It was not lawyers who expressed concern about contagion, 
but the ‘rescue workers’ concerned with the welfare of children.9 
Such children were no longer ‘innocent’ and so protecting them 
became less of a concern than protecting other children from them. 
“In this discourse, the abuse of the child was recognised as 
harmful, but the victim of the abuse became a non-person as a 
consequence of the harm done to her” (ibid: 404). This difficulty 
of understanding harm and innocence in the context of protecting 
children was of crucial concern in the 1920s-1930s amongst 
reformers. The evidence of this struggle is apparent in the 
contemporary context, with workers speaking about ‘protecting the 
innocence’ of the sexually abused children they work with, 
meaning that they attempt not to introduce sexual knowledge to 
children of which the child was previously unaware.  
 
The social category and the psychological category were not the 
same thing, and in a process that Hacking refers to as the ‘looping 
effect’ (Hacking, 1995) the two categories (or, the kind and 
knowledge of the kind) mutually interact and change each other. 
Perhaps some sexually abused children are unaware of the social 
implications of their clinical status, although this is far from certain 
(Mudaly et al., 2006). But there are profound effects for such 
children in terms of the kinds of responses and treatment they elicit 
from others. For example, the parent or carer of the sexually 
abused child, or child who experiences or witnesses other forms of 
interpersonal violence (especially boys), is subject to a moral 
incitation to seek intervention in the interests of preventing future 
violence. The notion that the child sexual abuse victim is a risky 
individual (Castel, 1991) traverses this field in a myriad of ways, 
                                                 




including in the victim-to-offender cycle for boys. For a local 
example, see the document Preventing violence before it occurs 
(Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2007), where the parents 
of boy victims of child abuse (including sexual abuse) are incited 
to seek therapy with the goal of preventing the boy from 
committing violence against women in the future. 
 
Additionally, adults who have  been sexually abused as children 
have available to them an identity construction - the adult survivor 
of childhood sexual abuse - which offers its own life-shaping 
narrative of ‘victim-survivor-thriver’ (Armstrong, 1996; Davis, 
2005). Along with this identity comes what Rose calls 
‘responsibilization’ (Rose, 1999); the moral obligation to take up 
expert knowledge and act upon oneself.  
 
Thus, the harm story has historical and current strategic importance 
in problematising child sexual abuse and establishing it as an issue 
of public concern. It also has problematic, if unintended, 
consequences of its own for children and adults, and for broader 
understandings of sexual abuse and sexuality. 
 
Some initial comments regarding the trajectory of this thesis 
 
In attempting this thesis I have tried to remain attentive to the 
shifts in my own analytic approach. I have not started with a solid, 
immovable structure or framework and proceeded to analyse my 
problems from a single viewpoint. Much of the theoretical material 
I have drawn upon demands being open to engagement, including 
the possibility of myself being changed. This is partly a feature of 
work often categorised under the banner of ‘post-structuralism’ or 
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constructivist theory, but it also derives more directly from my 
chosen topic. A key question I have sought to understand is 
regarding measurement, including scientific practices of 
measurement. Exploration of this question led me to the notion of 
‘diffractive reading’ (Barad, 2007), which is a practice drawn from 
work in the field of physics. Physics is, in an historical sense, the 
disciplinary home of measurement, particularly for psychology. 
Diffractive reading demands an acknowledgement of the 
‘entanglement’ inherent in measurement, but also demands the 
same of any attempt to understand the world. This necessarily 
includes my own attempts in this thesis. In this next section, I will 
outline some points regarding both constructivist theory around the 
problem of child sexual abuse, and the notion of diffractive 
reading. This is with the hope of preparing the reader for the sense 
of instability and movement that occurs throughout the body of the 
thesis.     
Potential problems of constructivist approaches to the study of 
child sexual abuse  
 
As Hacking (1999) points out, to say that something is a 
‘construction’ is not necessarily to say it is bad or false (although 
this often is the agenda of constructivist work). Scientific 
knowledge is constructed, and this insight does not demand that 
the knowledge it produces be reject or opposed (Latour, 1986, 
1987, 1999, 2005). Thus, as a social and scientific achievement, 
the recognition of child sexual abuse as a problem, as a traumatic 
experience, allows for the legitimation of claims of suffering by 
individuals subject to abuse (Davis, 2005). The fact that this has 
been achieved through activism and through research does not 




This thesis does not seek to question whether this legitimacy is a 
‘good thing’ (I do think recognition of abuse and the suffering it 
can contribute to is a good thing). Nonetheless, legitimation does 
come with potentially unforeseen and unintended consequences. 
Judith Herman makes a similar point in Trauma and Recovery 
(Herman, 2004), when she points out that war veterans fought to 
have the harm of their experiences recognised through the 
legitimation of PTSD, at the cost of submitting to the authority of 
the expert gaze of psychiatry, and an acceptance of an identity as a 
‘sick’ person (see also Young, 1995).  
 
Hacking points out the distinction between child abuse and the 
concept of child abuse, one having always been around and the 
latter responsive to and constituted by what is said and done 
(Hacking, 1991). That is to say, children have no doubt always 
been (what is now called) sexually abused throughout history and 
across cultures, even though the term itself may be relatively 
recent; but what qualifies (in law, in sociology, in the ‘psy’ 
disciplines) as child sexual abuse, what is said and done about acts 
so categorised, and what is done to the victims and perpetrators of 
the acts, is manifestly subject to a great deal of change. It is one 
thing to say that children ought not to be abused by adults 
(providing some agreement can be made about what this means; 
for an example of the difficulty of this see (Archard, 1999)); it is 
something different to say that such children (and later, adults) 
ought to be the focus of psychological intervention for their own 
good (Armstrong, 1996; Rogerson, 2001; Warner, 2009).  
 
In this thesis, I am interested in how the effects of child sexual 
abuse become available for scientific study. I have no interest in 
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questioning the fact that child sexual abuse occurs, or that it 
impacts on the lives of many people. Nonetheless, upon engaging 
with the constructivist literature around child sexual abuse, one is 
confronted with a jarring question: Why is it harmful or wrong for 
an adult to interact sexually with a child? What makes it ‘abuse’? 
Indeed, what is child sexual abuse? While these questions seem 
almost too obvious to warrant an answer, they must be engaged 
with if one intends to utilise the theoretical insights of the 
constructivist literature. After all it is the calling into question of 
the ‘taken for granted’ that is one of the hallmarks of social 
constructivist criticism (Hacking, 2004).  
 
There is more than one way of saying why child sexual abuse is a 
problem. I attempt to show in this thesis that within the scientific 
discipline of psychology, child sexual abuse is abuse if it causes 
harm and this harm can be demonstrated. This scientific principle 
of causality is similar to the ethical principle of consequentialism. 
In contrast, a deontological ethical position is concerned primarily 
with the act itself (Slaney, 2001; Lilienfeld, 2002). This invites 
interrogation of the ‘harm story’ (O'Dell, 2003) of sexual abuse. In 
this story, all child sexual abuse is always harmful because it 
disrupts or distorts the natural or normal development of a child 
(Anderson, 2008). A critical engagement with the harm story 
prioritises different issues. 
 
When the historically contingent nature of current practice and 
knowledge (discourse) concerning child sexual abuse is 
recognised, some care is needed not to imply that the ‘constructed’ 
nature of all these categories renders them somehow less real. To 
quote Nicola Gavey’s position on social constructionist arguments 






  ...I would counter that these constructionist 
arguments do not imply that the suffering caused by 
sexual abuse is not real; but they do suggest that the 
particular shape of this suffering, and the form of its 
ongoing incorporation into any person's identity is also 
shaped by the cultural frameworks available for 
making sense of the impacts of sexual abuse (Gavey, 
2003, p. 203) 
 
I am interested in the ‘also’ of Gavey’s statement. Does this imply 
a pre-discursive suffering that functions prior to being thought or 
made sense of (‘shaped by cultural frameworks’)? On what basis 
(either ontologically or ethically) can this pre-discursive suffering 
be distinguished from that ‘shaped by cultural frameworks’? 
Perhaps it is not a case of either/or, and in fact the suggestion of an 
either/or may itself be a legacy of a constructed nature/culture 
distinction (Butler, 1993; Oksala, 2005).  
 
In summary, because this thesis joins with the problematisation of 
this equation of normal with natural/healthy/unharmed, and 
because deviance from the norm is the established method of 
framing the harm of child sexual abuse, alternative theoretical and 
ethical arguments against the sexual abuse of children are needed, 
without recourse to naturalistic or essentialist ideas about the 
nature of bodies, childhood and harm. To put it another way, the 
question is how to understand the harm of sexual abuse, if what is 
regarded as ‘healthy’ or ‘normal’ is, in first instance (i.e. ‘pre-
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abuse’), already founded on a kind of violence, the violence of 
discourse and regulatory norms.  
 
Reflection and diffraction 
 
Given that an important element of some feminist critiques of 
science is the perceived claim of a ‘view from nowhere’ inherent 
in scientific method, the identification of two distinct positions 
through which to understand child sexual abuse (that I, not 
unproblematically, call post-structuralist feminism and scientific 
psychology) allows for what Barad (2007) calls a ‘diffractive 
reading’. The two traditions can be read through each other; post-
structuralist feminist knowledge claims about child sexual abuse 
can be read through scientific practices and vice-versa. What I try 
to avoid is to claim for myself an ‘objective’ position (however, 
there are some useful re-workings of objectivity that will be 
explored which differ somewhat from the classical notion of 
objectivity). 
 
Having just stated that there may be somewhere stable to stand, I 
need to immediately contradict myself and warn the reader that 
each attempt I make to stabilise a point of reference comes undone 
to some extent as this thesis proceeds. This can be disorientating 
and frustrating, however I will attempt here to give an explanation 
of this process.  I have been influenced by the analytical 
metaphor/tool of diffraction, which entails ethical, epistemological 
and ontological implications (or, as Barad (2007) would have it, 




What do I mean by diffraction? The intra-actions between topics, 
styles of analysis, authors and points of reference produce what I 
have conceptualised as diffraction patterns (after Barad, 2007). 
With each encounter a series of effects is facilitated. My hope has 
been to remain open and alert to these effects, as opposed to the 
practice of imposing a fixed structure or framework upon a 
multiplicity of thoughts and practices. Diffraction insists that we 
acknowledge the entanglement of ourselves and our objects of 
study, within our attempts to investigate the world. My attempts to 
understand the problems I pose in this thesis change both me and 
the problems. According to an ethics of diffraction, I (and my 
frameworks for enquiry) cannot remain unchanged by my 
encounters, any more than the effects of child sexual abuse could 
remain stable regardless of the investigative methods used to 
produce them as an object of enquiry. The ethical imperative is to 
attempt to account for these changes. 
 
For social workers in particular, a useful counter-point to the 
notion of diffraction is that of reflection. Reflective practice (or 
reflexivity)10 is regarded as an essential social work skill. 
Reflection and diffraction are both optical/visual metaphors. 
However, diffraction also conveys a sense of embodiment, the felt 
instability produced by encounters with conflicting, competing, 
complementary and co-existing forces.    Reflexivity is widely held 
to be a distinguishing feature of the human sciences that 
demarcates it from the natural sciences. However, such a statement 
foregoes the extent to which reflexivity itself can be historicised, to 
be “reflexive about reflexivity itself” (Smith, 2005, p. 1), the task 
                                                 
10 It would be possible to delineate diverse meanings for these terms (reflective 
practice and reflexivity). I have chosen not to because; a) as noted by D’Cruz et 
al. (2007), the terms are often used interchangeably in the literature; and b) both 
terms convey the visual sense I am interested in here. 
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undertaken by Foucault in The order of things (Foucault, 1970; 
Smith, 2005). Morawski (2005) argues that despite some attempts 
by a small number of psychologists, the discipline in general has 
displayed a “disregard for the problems of reflexivity” (p. 78); 
although others argue that reflexivity has been an important part of 
psychological research through the history of the discipline 
(Cohen-Cole, 2005). Social work has its own traditions of 
reflexivity—even if it is not always clear precisely what this term 
might mean—such that reflexive practice is widely regarded as a 
fundamental social work skill (D'Cruz et al., 2007). 
 
Reflective practice in the helping professions is sometimes 
described in contrast or opposition to the supposedly automaton-
style of quantitative knowledge (e.g. Taylor et al., 2000). This 
would be one way to critique psychological measurement, however 
I suggest this would be inadequate. I suggest that it is inaccurate to 
state that psychological measurement is an unreflective practice, 
either in research or practice settings. This applies in a superficial 
way to the scrutiny which any instruments themselves undergo 
before becoming accepted, as well as to the practice of performing 
measurement. It is in fact only after lengthy and detailed scrutiny 
that any particular instrument becomes accepted in a field of 
research. Instruments used to measure children’s trauma responses, 
for example, are scrutinised and compared to each other for their 
reliability and validity (Crouch et al., 1999). A close reading of the 
research papers that undertake quantitative knowledge making do, 
in fact, evince a kind of reflexivity in the conduct of measurement 
(I explore this more closely in Chapter 7).  
 
More cogently, against the notion that measurement is not a 
reflective practice, within Barad’s schema of reflection/diffraction, 
42 
 
measurement relies precisely on the metaphor on reflection. It 
requires that one stands at a distance from an object, and the use of 
a measuring device (in the case of this thesis, a psychometric test) 
is part of the enactment of this distance or cut (Barad, 2007), used 
in order to see things as they really are.    
 
One of the meanings of reflexivity identified by D’Cruz, et. al. 
(2007) is “a critical approach to professional practice that 
questions how knowledge is generated and, further, how relations 
of power influence the process of knowledge generation” (p. 77). 
When professionals speak, they are actively ‘making knowledge’ 
(Taylor et al., 2000). This gets at part of the kind of analysis I am 
attempting here, but misses the question of how this 
knowledge/power nexus constitutes counsellor as a subject 
position.  What a diffractive analysis of subjectification allows is 
to ask how the discursive rules or conditions of practice and 
research (whether these are called scientific or not) not only create 
or disrupt the proposed boundaries between researcher/practitioner 
and the natural world/human mind/client, but also, how these 
conditions and practices fabricate the possibility of a subject 
position like counsellor/psychologist/social worker/researcher at 
all. In other words, the counsellor is not taken as a pre-existing 
individual who then deploys scientific (or non-scientific) methods 
to discover their client or object of research, but it is through these 
practices themselves that the counsellor ‘becomes’.  
 
Barad’s discussion of the implications of quantum physics (Barad, 
2007) points us to the notion that a given phenomenon has 
determinate properties only by virtue of the apparatus used to 
measure or observe it. As all such apparatus necessarily exclude 
some other properties, then the phenomenon cannot be perfectly 
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knowable in its entirety; in fact Neils Bohr’s theory of 
complementarity states that the more knowable one property of an 
object under examination, the less knowable other properties are. 
According to Barad, thinking was Bohr’s favourite exemplar of 
this notion of complementarity.  
 
“[Y]ou need to make a choice between two 
complementary situations: either you think about 
something, in which case that something is the object 
of your thoughts, or you examine your process of 
thinking about something, in which case your thoughts 
about what you are thinking (about something), and 
not the something itself, are the object of your 
thoughts” (Bohr, cited in Barad, 2007, p. 21). 
 
What marks Barad’s arguments as being of particular interest is 
that objects of knowledge themselves are constructed by the way 
we know about them. The issues are ontological as well as 
epistemological. In fact this very distinction starts to break down in 
the notion of ‘agential realism’. This distinction is sometimes held 
to be at the centre of misrepresentations of social constructionist 
theory (e.g. Hacking, 1999; Taylor et al., 2000), with the ‘saving’ 
of relativism consisting of pointing out that social constructionists 
do not believe that objects themselves are socially constructed or 
not real. Whilst Barad is not a social constructivist in this sense, 
she does argue that it is only in specific material arrangements that 
objects are “disclosed” (2007, p.361), that scientific practices are 
an intra-action with the world that inevitably contribute to the 
marking and shaping of reality. The agential cuts between agents 




I have encountered the notion of diffraction directly through 
engaging with the problem of measurement. This in itself is a good 
example of the phenomenon I am trying to account for. Rather than 
dismiss classical ideals of measurement—which includes, amongst 
other things, an insistence on the inherent separateness of the 
measuring agent and the measured object—a diffractive reading 
invites closer examination; of the ‘cuts’ between object and agent, 
of the genealogy of the measurement situation, of the material 
arrangements involved, of flows and relations of power, and so on. 
In being invited into these questions in relation to the measurement 
of the effects of child sexual abuse, I am also invited to interrogate 
my own investigative practice. The only consistency I can adhere 
to is to be consistently entangled with the material I engage with, 
and try to account as transparently as possible for the order that I 
impose on things in the process. This involves continuous 
destabilisation.    
 
As a secondary effect, diffractive reading also provides a response 
to the methodological dilemma posed by genealogical and 
archaeological methods. Where these latter methods look to past 
events for historical epistemic conditions which cannot be 
perceived ‘from within’, diffractive reading asserts the existence of 
multiple, simultaneously existing, differentiated sources of 
knowledge production, while acknowledging that these sources 
still share a larger set of historical epistemological conditions. 
Thus, while there are no doubt aspects of my account that I cannot 
account for (Butler, 2005; Barad, 2007), I can attempt to identify 
these sources of knowledge which shape and are shaped by the 





An outline of the chapters  
 
Following this introductory chapter, I outline the key 
methodological and conceptual tools the thesis uses to develop and 
explore the main research questions. Chapter 2 involves outlining 
the key concepts that I draw upon to develop my research 
questions, based on Foucauldian concepts of discipline and 
governmentality. This follows Rose’s suggestion that the focus of 
analysis ought to be the ways in which psychological testing 
produces truths about humanity, rather than simply as attempts to 
describe such truths.  
 
Psychology is potent because it can appear to shift 
such judgments [about human difference] from a 
sphere of values, prejudice, or rule of thumb to the 
sphere of human truths, equality of standards, cogently 
justifiable choices and objective criteria of efficacy 
that should reign in a democracy (Rose 1998:90) 
 
I also attempt to trace some of the debates within feminist 
literature on the ethical quandaries posed by the work of Foucault. 
It is sometimes claimed that Foucault’s work is not necessarily 
sensitive to problems of sexual violence and abuse, and even that it 
can be used to justify and enlarge the problem of men’s sexual 
violence to women and children. Given that I am invested in the 
belief that ‘sexualised interactions’ between adults and children 
should be regarded as abusive, I attempt to justify my position 
whilst responding to the problems and questions thrown up by 




Chapter 3 outlines more specifically the analytic practice I have 
deployed in reading research texts, how to understand texts and 
speech as discourse, and developing a way of using both published 
research texts and the focus groups I conducted in a way that is 
consistent with these conceptual frameworks and tools. I document 
the way in which my original intention for ‘focus groups’ as an 
investigative practice become deformed and reassembled through 
my engagement with critical theories of a kind of discourse 
analysis and theories of measurement. This shift largely came 
about through the points I discussed above in relation to diffractive 
reading, particularly noting the parallels between the ethical, 
epistemological and ontological dilemmas involved in 
measurement and interpreting text and speech.    
 
Chapter 4 interrogates measurement and statistics as scientific 
technologies. I will trace how statistical and measurement ideas 
from scientific fields other than psychology have been utilised in 
psychology, a movement made possible by the claim that 
psychology is a science and therefore deploys scientific methods (a 
notion sometimes called scientism). I will argue that what is called 
psychological measurement in the research on the effects of child 
sexual abuse is based on one specific model of scientific 
measurement, and discuss other available models of measurement 
(or more accurately, of understanding measurement). This chapter 
establishes that scientific measurement is in fact a heterogeneous 
concept formed by local practices, and is not a monolithic or stable 
entity.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the role of the statistical production of normal 
in researching the effects of child sexual abuse. Through this 
analysis I identify the notion of normal as an important concept 
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performed by psychological measurement, and I analyse this in 
relation to child sexual abuse specifically. I examine how the 
statistical construction of a normal child or a normal 
developmental pathway is used to construct the abnormality of 
those subject to child sexual abuse. I also interrogate the 
relationship between therapy and calibration to the norm, and 
engage with the tension experienced by the counsellors I spoke 
with in regards to this problem. 
 
Chapter 6 addresses the question of objectivity in measurement, 
sharpening the focus from psychological measurement generally to 
show how measurement operates as technique of power/knowledge 
in the field of child sexual abuse research and therapy. This will 
entail a detailed examination of psychological/scientific research 
literature on child sexual abuse, supported by extracts from two 
focus group discussions I conducted with a team of child sexual 
abuse counsellors. In counter-posing research literature with the 
talk of counsellors, I intend to highlight the lack of hegemony of 
psychological measurement in problems of child sexual abuse, 
whilst also attempting to identify the way measurement can shape 
what is visible and sayable, and what is elided. My intention is to 
examine what kinds of knowledge are produced when techniques 
of psychological measurement are applied to the problem of child 
sexual abuse. Under what conditions is objective knowledge about 
child sexual abuse possible, and what are the effects of these 
practices? 
 
In Chapter 7 I discuss objectivity in relation to the conduct of 
research and therapy from the point of view of the researchers and 
counsellors themselves. I argue that objectivity, as a reified feature 
of scientific measurement, produces its object of knowledge while 
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also disciplining the conduct of researchers and counsellors. 
Objectivity itself is analysed as a constructed and contested 
practice, and I outline some competing versions of objectivity in 
contrast to the classic scientific model on which psychological 
measurement is based.    
 
I conclude the thesis by recapping the main findings and exploring 
the productive elements of psychological measurement and 
statistics for knowing about and responding to child sexual abuse, 
and for alternative modes of understanding child sexual abuse that 
actively resist or marginalise the practice of psychological 
measurement.   
 
Summary of Chapter 1 
 
In this chapter I have outlined the key research questions and 
situated these in a historical context in relation to the field of child 
sexual abuse research. I have reviewed debates about the 
scientificity of child sexual abuse research, specifically identifying 
measurement, causality and objectivity as important 
concepts/practices. I have described some of the political and 
critical concerns raised by these practices, whilst acknowledging 
that presenting child sexual abuse research as scientific has 
strategic purposes for the acknowledgement of suffering. 
 
Having established the relevance of the key questions raised in the 
thesis, in the next chapters I describe in greater detail the 
epistemological and analytical resources I draw upon.  
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Chapter 2- Epistemological and 
methodological considerations   
 
My intentions in this chapter are twofold: 1- to provide a 
context for both the ostensible topic of this thesis (the 
importance of measurement and statistics in the study of child 
sexual abuse), and the style of analysis being attempted; and 2- 
to convey both the method of gathering and generating the 
‘data’ I have analysed (including how I have defined data), and 
the conceptual framework I have employed to analyse the data. 
In both cases, I highlight that this framework has not been 
stable over the course of the thesis and this is reflected as the 
thesis progresses. There is a lot of criss-crossing or weaving in 
and out of discussions about the epistemology for this thesis 
and the research questions themselves. After all, in many ways 
this is a thesis largely about epistemology. I would ask the 
reader to bear this in mind when things seem ‘a long way from 
home’, when questions of psychological measurement or the 
effects of child sexual abuse seem far away. Of course, I will 
try to indicate the signposts/stepping stones/breadcrumbs I have 
followed as fully as possible.   
 
I will begin by discussing the ways that my thesis has been 
informed and influenced by a number of aspects of the work of 
Foucault. I have chosen to do this to reflect something of the 
way that the conceptual framework has developed. Whilst the 
thesis draws upon a wide range of authors and perspectives, my 
encounters with Foucault’s work played an influential role in 





As the thesis has progressed and come to its conclusion, I found 
myself becoming less concerned with understanding all the 
intricacies of Foucault’s theories and methods11, and engaging 
with a wider range of authors in the somewhat fuzzy field of 
science studies. I have become more and more interested in the 
ways that claims about child sexual abuse get consolidated into 
scientific facts and the work of fact construction this entails on 
the part of researchers (Latour, 1986). Accordingly, I will 
elaborate on the conceptual and analytical tools I have 
borrowed from authors in the science studies field in the 
following chapter.  
 
What does Foucault’s work have to offer? 
 
Foucault’s work subverts and challenges a certain 
modern version of Enlightenment, made up of 
morally and intellectually validated schemes of 
social improvement, therapy and order, which 
operate by identifying and correcting various forms 
of individual deviation from a norm (Gordon, 2000, 
p. xvii)  
 
The invocation of the name of Michel Foucault is more or less 
obligatory in a contemporary thesis on issues regarding 
sexuality and the ‘psy’ disciplines. While Foucault’s writing 
has been productive in thinking about the problem of child 
sexual abuse and its therapeutic management, and references to 
his work will appear throughout the text, there are important 
ways in which this thesis might be said to not be ‘Foucauldian’. 
While I do not want to get caught up in attempting to follow a 
                                                 
11 Which can become a dangerous pre-occupation, leading to complex 
considerations of issues such as the use of quotation marks in Foucault’s 
work on the ‘human sciences’ (Visker, 1995).  
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(non-existent) pure Foucauldian method (Graham, 2005), in 
what follows I will outline some key aspects of Foucault’s 
writing that have informed this thesis, as well as discussing 
some of the difficulties involved.  
 
I will now discuss the key features of Foucault’s ‘analytics of 
power’ and the formulation of problemetisations that have 
informed this research.  
 
Epistemology, archaeology, genealogy 
 
Davidson (2001) provides a helpful clarification between 
epistemology, archaeology and genealogy as interdiscursive, 
intradiscursive and extradiscursive sites of analysis 
respectively. Epistemology is concerned with the internal logics 
of a scientific discipline, its own rules for producing statements 
which may be candidates for truth or falsity. Statements that do 
not conform to these discursive rules are classed as 
nonsensical- they do not even enter the scientific conversation 
within the discipline. I argue that the application of 
psychological measurements is an example of a rule for 
producing scientific truth claims about child sexual abuse in 
contemporary psychological discourse (see, for example, Freyd 
et al., 2005)12. 
Archaeology is concerned with broader ‘conditions of 
possibility’ of knowledge that cuts across any particular 
discipline. For example, in The order of things, Foucault (1970) 
described how the distinct scientific disciplines of biology, 
economics and linguistics shared the same èpistèmé of the 
classical era, which determined the rules for the formulation of 
                                                 
12 Of course, there are also non-scientific discursive practices about child 
sexual abuse that do not require measurement. 
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scientific statements. Scientific disciplines may manifest or 
articulate the èpistèmé in distinct ways, however all scientific 
disciplines will be governed by the same, generally unspoken, 
hidden or implicit, rules. 
As for this thesis, it is this archaeological notion of the èpistèmé 
that leads me to explore practices of measurement from physics 
and how they relate to psychological measurement. As Hacking 
notes, practices and theories of measurement applied in diverse 
scientific disciplines may share a common formation of 
scientific discourse: “Social statistics and quantum mechanics 
look like apples and oranges…but they are, from the point of 
view of the archaeologist, part of the same formation” 
(Hacking, 2006, Introduction, no page number). 
Both approaches are useful when undertaking a critical study of 
therapeutic and research practices linked to child sexual abuse. 
I will mostly be limited in this thesis to a more epistemological 
level of analysis. However, I will be trying to delineate two 
approaches to child sexual abuse (scientific psychology and 
post-structuralist feminism), and attempting to analyze how 
both discursive formations have a certain legitimacy in 
contemporary discussions of child sexual abuse. 
The third approach, genealogy, is most concerned with how 
knowledge is put into practice, and therefore described by 
Davidson (2001, p. 205) as extra-discursive. I will now discuss 
genealogy in more detail as it is a key methodological resource 
for the latter part of this thesis.          
Genealogy is a term used to describe Foucault’s approach to 
research during a particular period. It is generally specified by 
commentators as the period following his ‘archaeological’ 
work. In this typology, the major genealogical works are said to 
include Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977a) and The 
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history of sexuality: Volume 1 (Foucault, 1978), while the 
archaeological works include Madness and civilization 
(Foucault, 1965) (which is a heavily abridged English 
translation of Histoire de la folie; it is only recently that the full 
book has been translated and published in English), The birth of 
the clinic (Foucault, 1973), as well as the methodological 
works The order of things (Foucault, 1970) and of course The 
archaeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1972).  
The differences and similarities between these approaches are 
the subject of much debate amongst Foucault scholars. Some 
make clear distinctions between these periods (as well as the 
later work concerned primarily with subjectivisation, a period 
of Foucault’s commonly referred to as relating to the ‘ethics of 
the self’), whilst others argue that the oeuvre of work must be 
understood as a whole (a position which Foucault was critical 
of- see What is an author? (Foucault, 1977c), although see also 
the article penned under Maurice Florence (1994), where it is 
apparent that Foucault is discussing his own work as a whole). 
In some instances Foucault seems to give archaeology a 
definition that resembles the definition that some commentators 
appear to give genealogy, in order to distinguish the two; for 
example: “The archaeology of the human sciences has to be 
established through studying the mechanism of power which 
have invested human bodies, acts and forms of behaviour” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 61). This gives credence to the claim that 
the two methods are not exclusive or even necessarily distinct. 
Yet Foucault also states that archaeology is related to the 
analysis of ‘local discursivities’ and genealogy related to the 
‘tactics’ whereby knowledges are brought into play (Foucault, 
1980, p. 85; Rogerson, 2001). Elsewhere, just before he had 
coined the term ‘genealogy’, he stated that “in comparison to 
what I call archaeology, the discursive analysis of power would 
operate at a level…that would enable discursive practice to be 
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grasped at precisely the point where it is formed” (Foucault, 
2006/1973-74, p. 13).  
The difficulty of untangling these two terms (archaeology and 
genealogy) has produced a great deal of secondary commentary 
with a range of assertions about their differences and 
commonalities. Of interest here, however, (this complexity 
notwithstanding) is that ‘archaeology’ is generally concerned 
with the historically contingent ‘conditions of possibility’ 
associated with knowledge, while ‘genealogy’ is generally 
thought of as the approach that highlights the importance of 
practices (discursive or otherwise) involving power and 
knowledge, especially within the ‘human sciences’ (Davidson, 
2001). Following Allen (1999), it can be said that generally, 
archaeology is concerned with knowledge, while genealogy is 
focused on power. 
Another characteristic feature of genealogical enquiry is a 
certain style of historical enquiry- ‘a history of the present’. 
Genealogy differs from traditional historical enquiry in that it 
does not take the present to be an inevitable or evolutionary 
outcome of the past (Foucault, 1977b).   
 
Genealogy and social work 
 
The contribution of the tradition of genealogical enquiry to 
social work is, partly, in examining the ways in which the 
expertise and interventions associated with the fixing of 
problems contributes to the very production of those problems. 
This is not meant in the traditional radical view that social work 
interventions are ineffective or create dependency amongst the 
targets of intervention, or are part of an administrative regime 
that reinforces rather than relieve oppression (Lavalette, 2011). 
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Rather, that the capacity of a problem to be ‘thought’, or 
‘rendered visible and knowable’, relies upon the same 
discursive regimes from which their solutions are derived.  
Genealogical enquiry is not necessarily directed at prescribing 
improvements in knowledge production or developing 
improved techniques for the implementation of the human 
sciences in practice. “What marks genealogy… is its inability 
to provide solutions” (Colwell, 1997). This is, indeed, a 
problem for genealogy in finding receptivity in the profession 
of social work, and perhaps part of the reason why the work of 
Foucault and other Foucauldians has been largely neglected 
until relatively recently in English language social work 
literature, despite its obvious thematic relevance. Recently a 
greater interest has become apparent.13 Social work is 
increasingly in the business of being seen to fix problems (or, 
in the discourse of evidence-based practice, delivering 
outcomes). The concern with “keeping an eye on the practical”, 
and being seen to do so, extends to critical social work theory 
(Lovelock et al., 2004). Theoretical work which does not 
contribute to the development of practical techniques to attain 
specified ends (whether such ends be managerialist outcomes 
or a liberatory social work practice) struggles for legitimacy in 
such an environment, but neither this orientation, nor a 
‘rational’ argument with it, is the problem of the style of 
analysis practiced or informed by Foucault’s work. If anything, 
                                                 
13 Social work writing drawing on Foucault is emerging, at a much slower 
rate than other disciplines such as cultural studies, feminist studies and 
philosophy. Some of the emerging literature crosses disciplinary boundaries. 
The Foucauldian analyses I have found most helpful, and the approaches 
which seem most epistemologically consistent, tend to take/constitute social 
work as the object of enquiry. Others attempt to use such enquiry as a 
method for developing or improving social work practice. Recent work on 
social work and Foucault includes: Chambon, Irving and Epstein (eds) 
1999; Critchley, 2003; Foster, 2005; Joy, 2003; Lovelock and Powell., 




this approach tends to produce more problems, to problematise 
the taken for granted.  
One cannot help but feel that the social work dictum 
(transplanted from medicine) ‘First do no harm’ is a paralyzing 
absurdity if social work practices are examined from a 
genealogical perspective. All knowledge, including social work 
knowledge, is, if not bad, at least dangerous (Dean, 1999). It 
comes as no surprise to learn that Foucault stated, on at least 
one occasion, that paralysis among social workers (specifically, 
those working in prisons) was an intentional effect of his work 
(Foucault, 1991c). He distinguishes between paralysis and 
anaesthesis, stating his intention that his work would contribute 
to the former, to a sense amongst social workers that they 
“…no longer know what to do, so that the acts, gestures, 
discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying 
become problematic, difficult, dangerous. This effect is 
intentional” (Foucault, 1991c, p. 84). The very paralysis that 
Foucault celebrates is often decried in the social work literature 
as an obstacle to effective practice, linked to the perceived 
nihilistic relativism of post-modern theory (D'Cruz et al., 
2007).   
An interesting way to explore what is done in genealogical, as 
well as archaeological, enquiries is through an oft-asked 
question; is it critical? Can it be a methodology by which one 
can conclude that one way of doing things is better or worse 
than another? Visker (1995) explores the difficulties of using a 
genealogical approach for ‘critical’ purposes. It is often argued 
that genealogy, without a normative reference point, can only 
describe and in the end reinscribe and validate the existing 
conditions. If it does describe a normative reference point, this 
threatens the philosophical premise of genealogy. That is to 
say, the philosophical premise is that the individual is 
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historically constituted, and there is no ‘human condition’ prior 
to constitution. Therefore, one cannot say that one way of doing 
things or speaking of things is more ‘true’ to human nature than 
another; the very idea of ‘human nature’ itself is a historically 
specific achievement. 
 
Thus, there appear to be no grounds within genealogy on which 
to justify resistance to any practice at all. This is one of the 
criticisms of Foucault particularly from liberal theorists; 
“…without introducing some normative reasons for why 
resistance is preferable to submission, Foucault cannot explain 
why anyone should resist” (Pickett, 2005, p. 34). Habermas 
puts it more directly- ‘Why fight?’ (cited in Pickett, 2005). 
Horowitz (1987) points out that this lack of a pre-constitutional 
(or essentialist) subject makes Foucault’s work prone to 
colonisation by a liberal, democratic project. Citing particularly 
the work of William Connolly, Horowitz describes how such 
theorists are able to conclude that the best solution that 
Foucault can offer for societal change is to ‘slacken’ the order, 
to expand the range of behaviours and ways of being that fall 
outside the realm of governance and discipline. Pickett (2005) 
suggests that this liberal democratic ‘colonisation’ of Foucault 
is particularly prominent amongst American theorists, who 
champion the Enlightenment vision of the free, ungoverned, 
rational individual. 
 
Visker (2005), in contrast, suggests that Foucault did have a 
preferred mode of ‘subjectivization’. Visker notes a shift in 
emphasis in History of sexuality volumes 2 &3, from 
subjectification (linked to practices of domination) to 
‘subjectivization’ (acts performed on the self) (see also Hook, 
2007, Paras, 2006). Subjectivization is conceptualised as in 
response to power forces external to the individual, but 
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subjection and subjectivization cannot operate independently. It 
is “the difference between being accorded a subject-position, 
and what it might mean to take on, to assume or personalize, 
such a subject-position” (Hook, 2007, p. 31). Visker puts 
forward that, particularly in the History of Sexuality volumes 2 
and 3, “Foucault wishes to release ethics from any form of 
legality and he believes that, to do this, he must break the hold 
of religious, scientific or metaphysical authority on the self” 
(Visker, 1995, p. 96). The self is not pre-given, it must be 
made; and the preferable mode of doing this would be as a 
work of art, as in classical Greece. This reference to the self as 
a work of art simply refers to the belief that there is no essential 
truth to be discovered about the self to which one ought to 
calibrate their being, but rather, the self is actively produced is 
thus able to be worked on as a project. It is helpful to think of 
an expansive attitude as opposed to an introspective one. 
 
Without a normative framework, decisions about what to resist 
and in what fashion to resist them cannot help but be arbitrary 
(so goes the criticism). Pickett discerns in Foucault’s writing 
that whilst he overtly eschews normative frameworks, he also 
depends upon some moral or political basis to inform 
involvement in particular political projects. The ‘modern 
Foucault’ is essentially aligned with the goals of the 
Enlightenment (freedom, autonomy, equality etc.) (Paras, 
2006), but is constantly suspicious of how these values are 
practiced. Rather than seeing history as a steady progression 
towards these goals, he is constantly alert to the power-








An objection to this line of criticism is that it assumes that the 
only basis for resistance would be a conviction that a particular 
practice (e.g. psychological measurement) distorts or 
misrepresents some authentic aspect of human nature (Joel 
Michell’s (1999, 2000) work on the question of whether 
psychological attributes are quantitative, and therefore 
measurable, is of this order. I will refer to Michell’s work later, 
particularly in Chapter 3). Todd May states that “Foucault 
nowhere argues that there is no value to a discourse or 
discipline being true. Instead, he shows that there are effects 
which discourses have regardless of their being true or false, so 
that the truth of a discourse is no longer a sufficient defence for 
it to claim in the face of criticism” (May, 1993, p. 27). The 
truth of psychological explanations is in a sense immaterial14. 
Thus, a genealogical approach is not concerned with 
establishing the truth or falsity of a discourse or practice, and 
this is not the basis for resistance to any particular practice.  
 
Foucault offers an alternative version of resistance. For him, 
the basis of resistance is not some idea of an essential human 
nature, but precisely the opposite. Practices and discourses 
which limit or proscribe possibilities for human experience are 
to be resisted on the very basis of the exclusions they produce 
and require (Horowitz, 1987; see also Foucault, 1997a). 
Simultaneously, it is these exclusions that ensure resistance to 
any dominant discourse. Since exclusions are inevitable, so too 
is resistance (Hook, 2007).  
                                                 
14 Immaterial is perhaps not the best word here. The effects of ‘psy’ 
practices and regimes of knowledge are clearly concrete in the use to which 
they are put in the governance of bodies and lives. What is meant here is 
that a genealogical approach is not epistemologically orientated to the 
question (or the possibility) of whether a particular set of statements 




Pickett (2005) draws a distinction between the ‘Nietzchean 
Foucault’ and the ‘modern Foucault’ (who emerges particularly 
in the later writings, but is discernible throughout Foucault’s 
writings). The Neitzchean Foucault is the target of those critics 
who argue that Foucault cannot make any reasoned decisions 
about what one stands for, other than resistance to the way 
things are. They argue that to resist with no teleological 
framework is simply arbitrary and meaningless. The counter to 
this is that to resist does not necessarily imply how things ought 
to be, but simply the possibility things could be otherwise. 
Foucault advocated, to the frustration of numerous 
commentators, that critique be celebrated as a valid intellectual 
activity in its own right, that it need not be tied to particular 
visions of how things ought to be. Such a dictate was dismissed 
as ‘blackmail’ and as ‘ministerial cabinet talk’ (Foucault, 
1991c, p. 84). One quote will suffice to illustrate the point here:  
 
“Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which 
concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an 
instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse 
what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and 
confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the 
law for the law. It isn’t a stage in programming. It is a 
challenge directed to what is” (Foucault, 1991c, p. 84).15 
 
Foucault’s resistance is not located in some essential notion of 
humanity which struggles to be liberated from oppressive 
regimes (Foucault, 1978). Rather, the powers of discourse are 
                                                 
15 This is not to say that Foucault was not politically active: he was publicly 
involved in a number of political campaigns during his life. However there 
was a general insistence that his involvement in these campaigns was based 
on his participation as a citizen, and that what he offered as an intellectual 
was not a general kind of wisdom but a limited expertise of thinking about 
particular problems (Gordon, 2000). 
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never total, there are always competing discourses and thus 
available subjectivities, and it is from there that resistance 
emanates. It is not, then, resistance against a particular regime 
of subjectivity, but rather that any regime of subjectivity will 
necessarily produce its own resistance (Pickett, 2005). It is not 
necessary (or in a sense, possible) for a subject to choose 
resistance- the multiplicity of discourses ensures resistance. 
Whilst clearly political, such a view of resistance does not 
require a moral decision. There is no necessity, in a grand 
theoretical sense, to argue that ‘what is’ is wrong; it encounters 
resistance regardless. 
 
Some feminist authors have approached the question of 
resistance in Foucault’s work from a somewhat different angle. 
Haber (1994) argued that as a result of the disruptions to 
identity in much 'post-modern' or post-structuralist theory, such 
theories fail to offer a satisfactory means of resistance to 
domination. Haber argues that Foucault, in developing his 
critique of modern identity, eschews effective subjectivity 
altogether, partly as a consequence of his individualistic 
conception of the subject. To this, Haber poses a solution in 
terms of 'solidarity', based on the understanding that identity is 
formed in community, and this interconnectedness provides the 
basis for collective action towards a shared end. In this notion 
of solidarity, essentialist kinds of identity are unnecessary. 
Similarly, Allen (1999), in her analysis of models of power in 
feminist and (broadly speaking) post-modernist theory, defines 
solidarity as “the ability of a collectivity to act together for the 
agreed-upon end of challenging, subverting, and, ultimately, 
overturning a system of domination” (p. 127). Similarly to 
Haber, she argues that this notion of solidarity (a sub-category 
of what she calls ‘power-with’) does not have to rely upon an 
essentialist notion of identity; rather, drawing on the work of 
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Arendt, she argues that identity categories are political facts in 
a given situation. Thus the kind of ‘identity’ required for 
‘power-with’ actions is political, towards an agreed upon 
goal.16 
 
While avoiding the essentialist identity problems of other 
models of resistance and political action in general, Allen’s 
discussion does not, I suggest, make explicit the normative 
distinctions on which this model of ‘solidarity’ is based. Allen 
does make explicit that solidarity is a specific application of 
power-with; using the example of a military group, she points 
out that power-with can serve purposes of domination or 
injustice (although, she does not make explicit the normative 
statement in this instance).  Her definition of solidarity (cited 
above) is potentially problematic; many military groups would 
define their actions in this way; as aimed towards “overturning 
a system of domination”. Think also of extreme right 
Nationalist groups who claim that their position is one of being 
subjected to a relation of domination by immigrants—would 
their collective actions be called ‘solidarity’? More to the point, 
what about so-called ‘men’s rights’ groups who claim that they 
experience systematic discrimination in relation to women in 
the family court? They could also claim that their collective 
actions are instances of solidarity. The normative aspects of the 
distinction made between solidarity and other kinds of power-
with remain unclear, other than the general “kind of solidarity 
in which feminists are interested” (Allen, 1994, p. 127), 
somehow assuming this is inherently known and agreed upon.   
 
Butler provides a further way of thinking about resistance and 
identity. In Psychic life of power (1997a, especially chapter 5), 
                                                 
16 Note the contrast with Foucault’s more open-ended project of critique, 
which some would argue is nihilistic or pessimistic, but others (e.g. 
Deleuze, 1988) would see as less restrictive. 
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she suggests that a culturally dominant identity (gendered, 
heterosexual) depends upon a pre-emptive disavowal and 
internalisation of a barred object of desire. In terms of my 
discussion here, this implies that there is a sense in which a 
dominant subjectivity is always already founded upon a 
socially disallowed set of identifications. This would 
effectively reverse the relation between dominant and resistant; 
rather than resistance equating to the protest of a less dominant 
against a more dominant, the dominant is instead seen as a 
resistance to a less powerful subject position.  
 
So, genealogy is useful in the sense that it raises these 
important questions regarding power, resistance and regimes of 
thought associated with specific therapeutic practices and 
practices of knowledge. In relation to the current study, then, it 
might be argued that there can be no ‘objection’ as such to 
psychological measurement, at least not on the grounds that 
such practices falsely represent or distort ‘true’ human nature 
or experience. One might, however, investigate (or 
problematise) psychological practices of measurement on the 
grounds that they not only shape, but actively produce the 
objects of expert knowledge- the victim of child sexual abuse, 
and the harm of child sexual abuse. It is also possible to 
investigate the ways in which measurement produces individual 
difference (Meadmore, 1993); i.e. it is not a matter solely of 
identifying what kinds of limitations are placed on lives, but 
reversing the question to ask what possibilities for subjectivity 
are enabled through psychological testing and measurement.  
 
This is the value of a genealogical approach for this thesis. I am 
not aiming to argue that psychological measurement is ‘wrong’ 
and researchers and counsellors ought to adhere to ‘better’ 
ways of knowing and practicing. What I do attempt is to 
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identify that psychological measurement has produced this 
object of scientific knowledge- the harm of child sexual abuse. 
Thus, rather than take for granted the ontological and 
epistemological practices and tools which have established this 
scientific object, I investigate more closely the practices and 
tools themselves, and the effects of their work in the field of 
child sexual abuse research and therapy. In saying this, I do not 
argue that psychological measurement and the associated 
practices of enquiry are the only means through which this field 
has been produced, but that they are particularly influential.    
 
Part of this thesis is to also ask this question in relation to 
counsellors; what subjectivities are made available to 
counsellors via psychological testing and measurement, and 
how are these possibilities taken up, resisted, and otherwise 
understood? How do the practices of psychological 





The form of power enacted through this nexus of 
knowledge/power is what is referred to as ‘disciplinary power’. 
This is best understood in opposition to sovereign power, a 
model of power which emphasizes the repressive and inhibiting 
aspects of authority (most obviously, as in the right of a king to 
hold the power of death over his subjects). Disciplinary power 
is, by contrast, productive, in that it acts upon individuals so as 
to incite them to conduct themselves in particular ways. These 
preferred modes of conduct are frequently linked (through 
knowledge and expertise, especially that of the human 
sciences) to the betterment of the population and maximization 




In other words, psychological testing does not simply repress 
possibilities for understanding and action by an individual (the 
child or adult client, the parent or teacher, the counsellor), but 
actively produces such possibilities. Furthermore, the 
knowledge produced through the practice of measurement 
provides a kind of lens by which those individuals can frame, 
understand, and act upon their own situation. It is not simply a 
matter of such change being demanded or forced by some 
oppressive external force (although this can, of course, be part 
of the situation); the crux of the power/knowledge formulation 
is that individuals take this knowledge and act upon themselves 
in the name of psychological health and well-being.  
This conception of the individual subject is in contrast to the 
“rational, autonomous individual [that] is central to liberalism” 
(Ashenden, 2004, p. 42). In this liberal view of subjectivity, 
individuals are fully formed, atomistic entities upon which 
social forces generally act in a repressive manner. Individual 
subjects are held to exist ‘prior’ to power. This is especially so 
in regards to the area of sexuality, as Foucault argues at length 
in The history of sexuality (1978). In contrast to the liberal view 
of the individual subject, Rose (1998) argues for an approach in 
which no theory of the subject or metapsychology is necessary. 
Rose discusses the idea of infolding (taken from Deleuze). 
"The fold indicates a relation without an essential interior, one 
in which what is 'inside' is merely an infolding of an exterior" 
(Rose, 1998, p. 37). Thus the subjectification of persons occurs 
not through the shaping of an essential inner space, but the 
inner space itself is a result of infolding of external authorities 
(subjectivization). One of Rose’s central concerns is to show 
that what he terms the ‘psy’ disciplines constitute an important 
66 
 
‘external authority’ through which individuals become 
subjects17. 
The implications for this thesis are quite clear. Rather than try 
to argue about why psychological measurement is repressive or 
a distortion, it is more helpful to ask what it produces, what it 
allows, and so on. Indeed, in important ways the social 
acknowledgement of child sexual abuse as harmful was made 
possible by psychological measurement and statistics. This is 
not to say that all ‘productive’ aspects must be embraced or 
celebrated; for example, psychological measurement and 
statistical techniques have also made it possible to make 
normative judgments about individuals who have been 
subjected to child sexual abuse (Warner, 2009). It is a question 
of analyzing the range of truth effects that are produced when 
scientific research (through the use of measurements and 
statistics) produces the effects of child sexual abuse through 
objective means of enquiry. The aim is to identify what makes 
such a mode of enquiry possible and desirable in the field of 




‘Power/knowledge’ is a concept that appears throughout the 
work of Michel Foucault (particularly Discipline and Punish 
(Foucault 1977a), and the writings included in the book titled 
Power/Knowledge (Foucault, 1980), especially in relation to 
what he calls the ‘disciplines’ or the ‘human sciences’. Such 
                                                 
17 Although acknowledging Rose’s use of ‘the fold’, Hook (2007) remains 
insistent that this interior must still be factored into an analysis of 
subjectivity. He argues that the processes of subject formation are not as 
rational as Rose depicts them to be, and that some account must be given of 
the irrational or unconscious processes of subject formation. A similar 
argument was advanced earlier by (Flax, 1990) 
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disciplines include social work, psychology and psychiatry. 
(Psychoanalysis is in some ways an exception, a challenge to 
psychiatry and the notion of the stable, coherent subject. 
However, even psychoanalysis performs a normalising function 
upon individuals and their relationships (Foucault, 1980)). To 
say that psychological measurement is a practice involving 
‘power/knowledge’, is to rely on a specific meaning that this 
phrase signifies in the Foucauldian literature. It does not 
suggest that knowledge is deployed (by an oppressive State, for 
example) in order to exercise power, or as an act of oppression. 
Nor is it meant that “power is knowledge” (Ransom 1997). 
Rather, it is part of a mutually reinforcing process of 
individualization and expert intervention in the subjectification 
of troublesome and deviant individuals:  
 
“Knowledge, as a modality of power… produc[es] 
profiles of troublesome persons and related 
behaviours, while simultaneously refining the 
techniques of measurement, comparison and 
surveillance able to render such problematic 
individuals in ever more detail” (Hook, 2007, p. 
15). 
 
Issues of sexuality have historically been particularly dense 
focal points for the operation of power/knowledge in scientific 
constructions of normalcy and deviance. For example, both 
physical and psychological measurements have been deployed 
during the first half of the 20th century to research the 
‘constitutional factors’ associated with homosexuality 
(Peterson, 1998) and paedophilia (Bowman, 2005).  
 
The ‘power/knowledge nexus’ consolidated in the ‘psy’ 
disciplines can be understood as a means of governing 
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individuals. This is not to propose that individuals would be 
‘free’ if they were not the objects of psychological discourses 
and practices; indeed, as Rose (1998) and Dean (1999) point 
out, the effectiveness of the ‘techne’ of governance is premised 
on the individual exercising their freedom in order to maximise 
their own life. The client of therapy is to be active in 
monitoring, evaluating and adjusting their thoughts, behaviours 
and feelings (Hook, 2007). That is, individuals are incited to 
use their freedom to act upon themselves, to ‘calibrate’ 
themselves to psychologised constructions of health and well-
being.  
The purpose of deploying the concept of governance in this 
thesis is not to propose a route of escape from the gaze of 
psychology or the quantitative social sciences for the problem 
of sexual abuse. There is no suggestion that one could be 
‘ungoverned’. The aim is rather to produce a problematisation 
of the victim of child sexual abuse, and the child sexual abuse 
counsellor, as constituted by specific regimes of measurement 
authorised by therapeutic (psychological, scientific) expertise. 
Again, this is not to deny that other practices or discourses of 
therapy are at work, but to open up for investigation the 
conditions and effects of psychological measurement as a 
scientific practice.  
 
According to this idea of a power/knowledge nexus, knowledge 
is possible only because of the operations of power, particularly 
on the body. Foucault argued that power is necessary condition 
for knowledge, especially in the human sciences.  
 
Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it. 
If it has been possible to constitute a knowledge of 
the body, that has been by way of an ensemble of 
military and educational disciplines. It is on the 
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basis of power over the body that a physiological, 
organic knowledge of it became possible (Foucault, 
1980, p. 59).  
 
This is in contrast to the idea that power corrupts knowledge, or 
that true knowledge is innocent from the effects of power. The 
point of interest is in how individuals as subjects constitute 
themselves, are constituted through regimes of knowledge 
“…in one specific form or another, as a mad or healthy subject, 
as a delinquent or non-delinquent subject, through certain 
practices that were also games of truth, practices of power, and 
so on” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 290). Power’s ‘strength’ derives 
from the fact that is does not simply operate to repress, but 
subjects take up knowledge as means of acting upon 
themselves (Foucault, 1980).  
 
A key function of the concept of the power-knowledge nexus in 
Foucault’s work is to dispute the status of knowledge claims as 
value-neutral and free of power relations (Visker, 1995). Again, 
the truth or otherwise of psychological explanations does not 
discount their significance. May argues that knowledge is 
always accompanied by operations of power: “What is 
important is that the emergence of this knowledge is entwined 
with the exercise of this power” (May, 1993, p. 44). In other 
words, it is not that there would be a ‘real’ truth about 
individuals if knowledge was divested of its connection with 
power. It is the operation of power that enables knowledge to 
be produced at all. The point of analysing psychological 
knowledge from this perspective is not to correct prior flaws in 
research and evolve towards a purer view of reality; it is to 
analyse the techniques and practices which “…support…the 
power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and 
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subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” 
(Foucault, 1977, cited in McNay, 1992, p. 28). 
 
Why engage in a problematisation of the psychological 
measurement of individuals, specifically? Psychological 
measurement of human attributes and problems is integral to 
the ‘art of governance’. According to Rose, the psychological 
test: 
 
…was the most important contribution of the 
psychological sciences to the human technologies 
of the first half of the twentieth century…It has 
become an indispensable part of any modern 
programme for the government of individual 
differences (Rose, 1999, p. 143).  
 
Psychological measurement is a prime example of examination: 
the technique that produces the data to be quantified, the 
measurement that I referred to in my introduction as a 
requirement of statistics, a combination of hierarchical 
observation and normalising judgement. As May states: 
 
Both a ritual of power and a procedure for the 
establishment of truth, the examination is the 
culminating, if recurrent, event in the disciplinary 
process. Moreover, by introducing documentation 
into the normalising process, the examination both 
constituted individuals as describable objects and 
opened up populations for measurement and 
comparative study (May, 1993, p. 43).  
 
This alludes to the manner in which counsellors, in producing a 
document based partly on the results of the measurements, 
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produce a text (an assessment report) which becomes a textual 
representation of the child. In addition, many psychological 
tests come equipped with software that produces a computer 
printout of a graph demonstrating exactly where an individual 
is within or out-of the bounds of statistical normality. Within 
the bounds of disciplinary knowledge, such textual fabrications 
are in a sense more ‘real’ than the actual children they purport 
to describe (Rose, 1999). It is these documents that are acted 
upon, revised, subject to examination and which inform the 
reflections and analysis of the counsellor as to the proper 
intervention. The counsellors I spoke with for this thesis 
utilised the results of psychological measurements to prepare 
their assessment reports on individual children (although this is 
a fraught and contested practice, as I will show later, especially 
in Chapter 7). Likewise, researchers conduct psychological 
measurements on their subjects to produce their findings which 
form the basis of their publications 
. 
Problems and problematisations 
 
The notion of ‘problematisation’ is derived from the tradition 
of genealogical enquiry, from the intellectual legacy of 
Foucault (who in turn was inspired by Nietzsche) (Foucault et 
al., 1997). Colwell provides a neat distinction between 
problems and problematisations, likening the latter to an 
awareness that a situation is an unfolding event rather than a 
fixed set of circumstances: 
   
Problems, as such, always have specific and singular solutions. 
"A problem always gets the answer it deserves." Events, on the 
contrary, remain problematic; they do not have solutions or, 
more to the point, they do not have solutions except insofar as 
they are actualized. This is a function of their temporal nature 
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as …always in a state of becoming. The problem is a reduction 
of this becoming to the present tense, an actualization of the 
virtual, infinitive structure of the event which allows for a 
singular solution that can be repeated without (much) 
difference. (Colwell, 1997) 
 
The situation being problematised here is the conversations that 
the counsellors were able to convene about their work, and the 
literature produced by researchers. Rather than taking for 
granted these conversations and publications, attention will be 
focussed on tracing the contingencies of knowledge production 
and circulation that ‘make possible’ such conversations. 
 
This shifts the focus away from defining and defending a 
position in relation to any particular model of measuring the 
effects of child sexual abuse, or debating the accuracy or 
otherwise of any claims based on such measurements. What I 
will be trying to understand is the situation that allows—and 
perhaps even requires—psychological measurements in order 
to establish the harm of child sexual abuse. 
 
Sexual abuse therapy/counselling can be understood as part of 
the ‘power/knowledge nexus’ discussed earlier, and thus as a 
means of governing individuals. It is not a question of pitting 
‘therapy’ against ‘power’, as the argument being developed 
here is that therapy is a practice of governance, invariably 
involving the deployment of power and resistance. To say that 
there are deployments of power in therapy, is not to say that 
therapy can never be helpful, or contribute to a kind of freedom 
in people’s lives. As has been discussed in relation to the 
concept of governance and disciplinary power, power does not 
always repress freedom; some practices of freedom can involve 
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(or even depend on) the exercise of certain kinds of power 
(Rose, 1999).  
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to propose a route of escape 
from the gaze of psychology and social work for those sexually 
abused as children; such a project would be futile, and may in 
fact not be desirable. The aim is rather to produce a 
problematisation of the ‘victim of child sexual abuse’, as 
constituted within practices of measurement authorised by 
scientific research and therapeutic expertise. 
 
Statistics and governmentality 
 
Statistics, the science of the state, emerged in 16th and 17th 
century Europe where population became the object of 
government, with ‘apparatuses of security’ (e.g. health, law, 
welfare) the essential mechanism (Foucault, 1991a, 2007). 
Where sovereign power is concerned with the continuation of 
the sovereign’s sovereignty (as it were), and discipline 
concerned with the conduct of conduct, ‘government’ in this 
emerging sense was concerned with the management of 
population, framed as a problem of economics and health. (The 
problems of sovereignty and discipline did not ‘disappear’, but 
become crucial questions within the rationality of government). 
A crucial shift involved the family; where the family had 
served as a model for government, the notion of population 
exceeded this model. The family becomes not a model of good 
government, but a segment of population and an instrument in 
government. The emergence of population, rendered 
governable through statistics, is associated with an economic 
rationality of government. ‘Statistics’ is literally knowledge 
(savior) of the population, to be put to use towards the ends to 
which government is directed (chiefly; prosperity, security, 
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health of the population). Importantly, the notion of governance 
here refers to the aim of maximizing the health and well-being 
of the population, and in this context Latour says that statistics 
were “the major science of the mid-nineteenth century” (1988, 
p. 21).  
 
Numbers facilitate more efficient management of people, from 
the broad arenas of populations of nations, to the management 
of individual deficiency (Rose, 1991). This can be 
conceptualised as an administrative imperative, in contrast to a 
scientific one (Porter, 2003, p. 244; Hand, 2004). There are two 
related streams of statistics in this regard; that of populations—
surveys and censuses—that feed into economics and sociology 
(Foucault’s ‘bio-politics’), and the more mathematical tools of 
statistical inference that feed into psychology and medicine 
(‘anatomo-politics’ of the individual). (Foucault, 1978; 
Gastaldo, 1997). Psychology has its own names for the 
distinction between measurements of populations (nomothetic) 
and of individuals (idiographic) (Hand, 2004). Governing these 
two ‘poles’ has been described as the “two pure functions of 
modern societies” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 61), and both are involved 
in measuring the societal and harm of sexual abuse.   
 
The quantification of human problems and characteristics is 
important to the art of governance. One of the operations of 
disciplinary power is that it…  
 
…measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes 
in terms of value the abilities, the level, the ‘nature’ 
of individuals. It introduces, through this ‘value-
giving’ measure, the constraint of a conformity that 
must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will 
define difference in relation to all other differences, 
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the external frontier of the abnormal (Foucault 
1977a, p. 183)  
 
Hierarchisation, segregation, and normalisation. Through 
history, these practices have been conceived in religious, legal, 
medical or psychological terms. However, whilst “the 
explanations may have changed…the process of creating 
structures with which to measure and contain human behaviour 
have not” (Hutton, 1988, p. 128). Individuals whose 
psychological measurements show them to be statistically 
different from the norm in a range of psychological attributes 
become legitimate subjects of therapeutic interventions. At the 
same time, such statistical differences are used to gather 
political support to make child sexual abuse a visible problem 
by scientifically proving its harmfulness and establishing its 
prevalence.  
 
Numbers about sexual abuse  
 
Measurement as a practice of power/knowledge has a 
significant historical role in contemporary productions of, and 
regimes of management of, problems of sexual violence and 
abuse. Statistics and psychological testing (of populations and 
individuals) have been implicated in the establishment and 
management of the social problem of sexual abuse, the proving 
of the harmfulness of sexual abuse, the ascription of motivation 
to individuals who sexually abuse, and the invention and 
practice of intimate interventions into the lives of both victims 
and offenders. The list of the types of numbers about sexual 
violence includes (but is certainly not limited to):  
x the establishment of the numbers of victims of abuse in 
various populations (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
76 
 
1996; Mouzos, 2004; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2006);  
x the measurement of the harm caused by sexual abuse 
(Spaccarelli, 1995; Rind et al., 1998; Maniglio, 2009), 
including the calculation of the likely long- term effects 
of victimisation on individuals, most notably 
predictions about the 'cycle of abuse' and other kinds of 
'dysfunction' (e.g. Wilcox et al., 2004); 
x forensic assessments of the risk posed by individuals 
who have sexually abused (for an overview, see Gelb, 
2007); 
x calculations of the economic costs of sexual violence 
(Mayhew et al., 2003);  
x measuring the attitudes of populations to sexual 
violence (Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 
2006); and 
x evaluations of the effectiveness of various models of 
treatment for both victims and offenders. 
 
Statistics and measurement thus contribute to the ways that 
problems of sexual abuse are produced and discussed. These 
number-producing activities consequently influence research 
and therapeutic practice with sexually abused children and 
adults sexually abused as children.  
 
Such numbers about sexual abuse as those referenced in the list 
above are often presented as truths about the problem, or as a 
step on the way to the truth. The numbers are said to reflect 
something about the reality of a problem which already exists. 
In contrast to this representationalist view of statistics, Gail 
Reekie (1998), in her study of social measurements of 
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illegitimacy, stated that her concern was not to use “… 
statistics of illegitimate birth or single parenthood to signify the 
presence of an underlying and deterministic demographic 
reality, my concern is to analyse the contribution of statistical 
and demographic discourses to the constitution of illegitimacy 
as a social problem” (p. 18).  
 
That is to say, the problem does not necessarily pre-exist the 
measuring; rather, the measurements per-form the problem as a 
scientific object. I stress this aspect of what I have called a 
performative model of measurement (after Barad, 2007- see 
Chapter 4) to make clear what this does not mean; it does not 
mean that children were not sexually abused prior to this being 
acknowledged through statistical research. I am suggesting that 
techniques such as collecting and circulating statistics on child 
sexual abuse, and psychological measurement, constitute the 
effects of child sexual abuse as an object of scientific 
(psychological) knowledge. This is not the same as saying that 
children were not subjected to sexual abuse by adults before it 
became an object of scientific enquiry, only that the effects 
became produced through different styles of reasoning and 
amenable to new forms of intervention.  
 
Discussing the post-modernist critique of representationalism 
(or the ‘language-as-a-mirror of reality’ practice of modernism- 
analogous to the classical model of science)- Alvesson (2002) 
states that “In pragmatic contexts, such as the composition and 
use of train timetables and the counting of people, the view of 
language as a mirror of reality has practical advantages and 
functions” (p. 64, italics added).18 This acknowledgment of 
                                                 
18 Clearly train-related phenomena have served as a paradigmatic case of 
numbers that has endured for over 150 years. Some imaginative speculation 
about the place of train accidents in the development of trauma theory 
78 
 
‘practical advantages and functions’ still begs the question of 
whether counting people is an innocent practice. For example, 
Hacking (2004) shows how the apparently straightforward act 
of counting people in census-taking requires that defined 
categories of people be ‘made up’ before the counting can take 
place. In a sense, types of people are thought of as such because 
they are counted, and counted because they are considered a 
type (or a ‘kind’) that can legitimately be represented by a 
number. Thus, the inclusion of groups in a census (such as 
individuals identifying as gay or lesbian) becomes a matter of 
political recognition (Henrickson et al., 2008).  
 
More pertinent for my thesis, counting abused children is never 
a neutral practice (McCallum, 2008). Changes to systems of 
administrative recording of numbers of abused children, as well 
as to the definition of abuse, are implicated in sometimes 
dramatic changes in the ways problems are understood. This in 
turn involves new ways in which child sexual abuse is to be 
managed and responded to. For example, the often cited 
statistics—that 1 in 3 women and 1 in 6 men are subject to 
sexual abuse—enables sexual abuse to be constituted as a 
fundamental social or political problem, rather than a rare and 
aberrant misfortune that occurs to an unlucky few and is 
committed by individual perverts or deviants. Numbers, 
measurements and statistics do not operate as innocent or 
neutral representations about the world and the people who live 
and die upon it (or within it, or as part of it, depending on your 
point of view). The concept of governmentality requires 
recognizing just that ‘counting people’ is not a mirror-of-reality 
knowledge-practice, but it produces knowledge as well as kinds 
of people and kinds of things. 
                                                                                                        
(Leys, 2000), and its connections to the current research questions could 
prove productive, but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Nikolas Rose (1998) discusses the psychological test as a 
'techne' of psychology that ‘renders individuals calculable’. 
Rather than joining with the humanist objections to testing 
(which claim that testing reduces people to numbers and 
crushes their unique individuality), Rose suggests an alternative 
approach. He suggests that the focus of analysis ought to be the 
ways in which testing produces truths about humanity, rather 
than simply describe such truths.  
Psychology is potent because it can appear to shift 
such judgments [about human difference] from a 
sphere of values, prejudice, or rule of thumb to the 
sphere of human truths, equality of standards, 
cogently justifiable choices and objective criteria of 
efficacy that should reign in a democracy" (Rose 
1998, p. 90) 
 
Testing does not obliterate human difference and individuality, 
rather the converse; it produces it19. Further, this production of 
individuality and truths about human nature is legitimated 
because it is derived not from moral prerogatives or emotive 
prejudices, but scientific method. 
 
To borrow from/paraphrase Rose (1999), a psychological test 
might usefully be thought of as a kind of ‘census of the soul’. I 
find this metaphor productive in two senses. First, it allows the 
visual image of an individual as a space or territory that is 
populated by various psychological attributes, much as a census 
enumerates different kinds of people and attributes of a 
population to be governed towards the health, wealth and 
stability of that population (Foucault, 2007). Discussing the 
emergence of statistics as the science of state through 18th 
                                                 




century Europe, Rose characterises population as a “…domain 
to be known and charted through statistics” (Rose, 1985, p.42). 
I argue that the development of psychological testing through 
the 20th century to the present regards the individual as a 
similarly calculable domain. Second, the numbers generated by 
the psychological measurement of any one individual only 
become meaningful or significant in reference to a larger 
population, primarily through reference to the norm. I want to 
emphasize this inseparability of psychological measurement 
and statistics of population. The scientific practice of 
measurement is influential only in the context of comparison to 
a population.  
Here, it can be seen that practices of psychological testing and 
measurement are implicated in the government of victims of 
child sexual abuse (and their parents and partners). Further, 
these practices and forms of knowledge implicate the 
counsellors of these victims in certain ways of working. That is 
to say, the kinds of knowledge produced by psychological 
measurement also prescribe particular ways in which 
counsellors should understand their work. This includes 
engaging with clients through a relation of power associated 
with their expertise knowledge about the client, in relation to 
the latter’s experience of sexual abuse. These truths, 
techniques, knowledges and practices are all directed towards 
the health and well-being of the child or adult who has been 
subjected to child sexual abuse. The notion of ‘expertise’ is 
important to this process. 
These regimes of practices give rise to and are 
informed by and reshaped by various forms of 
knowledge and expertise such as medicine, 
criminology, social work, therapy, pedagogy and so 
on. Such forms of knowledge define the objects of 
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such practices (the criminal, the unemployed, the 
mentally ill, etc.), codify appropriate ways of 
dealing with them, set the aims and objectives of 
practice, and define the professionals and 
institutional locus of authoritative agents of 
expertise (Dean, 1999, p. 22) 
A recent example of this position of expertise can be found in a 
2011 article published in the Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 
(Khalily et al., 2011). The authors report the words of a young 
woman (the focus of their case study—itself a practice of 
establishing an ‘agential cut’ (Barad, 2007) between agent and 
object of knowledge) who had been subjected to child sexual 
abuse. The woman’s description of her own experience is 
described as subjective, whilst the authors position themselves 
as having the capacity to perceive and describe her experience 
objectively: “Subjectively she described her mood as “down”; 
however, objectively, she presented as normothymic but 
anxious.” (Khalily et al., 2011, p.340). Through a disciplinary 
analysis, such a statement is read as a relation of power 
authorised by expertise.   
Thus, an aim of my thesis is to examine how psychological 
measurement, applied to victims of child sexual abuse, plays a 
productive role in the constitution of the effects of child sexual 
abuse as an objective form of knowledge. What forms of 
‘governance’ of such effects are facilitated by such practices, 
and how do they govern the activities of counsellors? What are 
the broader effects of this power-knowledge regime for the 





Measurement and governmentality 
 
In this chapter I am discussing a way of analysing measurement 
and statistics which is complementary to the scientific 
approaches outlined in the next chapter. This approach draws 
on the broader notion of numbers and quantitative forms of 
knowledge as instruments involved in governmentality (or the 
conduct of conduct). This approach is not so much concerned 
with whether measurement is accurate or truthful, but what it 
enables power to do.  Although scientific and disciplinary 
analyses of measurement can be conceptually distinguished 
from each other, they are also entangled. Like the 
representationalist model of measurement, the performative 
model has been developed in other fields of scientific research 
(i.e. it has not been a product of psychology itself). Barad’s 
development of a performative model of science (2007) 
explicitly draws upon insights from the disciplinary literature, 
particularly that of Foucault and Judith Butler. In Chapter 4 I 
will be arguing that a performative model of measurement can 
join up with the insights of a disciplinary analysis to produce 
some reconfigurations of how to understand statistics and 
psychological measurement in relation to child sexual abuse. 
 
The analytical tools of disciplinary power and governmentality 
(or the conduct of conduct), allow me to develop the 
connections between statistics, psychological measurement, 
power, and the problem of child sexual abuse. One of my 
reasons for doing this is that power is central to contemporary 
understandings of sexual abuse. However, the understanding of 
what power is (or how power is, or what power does) is not 
consistent across the various discursive arenas I have been 
drawing upon (i.e. science studies, disciplinary analysis, child 
sexual abuse research).  
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I can summarise and simplify my starting point like this: the 
field of child sexual abuse asserts that power can be possessed 
by one individual over another, and that it harms and prohibits 
freedom when misused; a performative model of measurement 
asserts that power is inherent in phenomenon and scientific 
arrangements (not with individuals), and produces its own 
objects; whilst a disciplinary model of power contends that 
power is an action and that its primary feature is it’s 
productivity. My intention here is to tease out these diverse 
powers, to attempt to develop a notion of power that will 
successfully move through all the parts of the problem I am 
constructing in this thesis. My touchstone will be, as 
throughout the thesis, the measurement of the effects of child 
sexual abuse. 
 
Power or domination? 
 
The regimes of knowledge through which individuals are 
fabricated (Rose, 1998), and understand themselves, open up 
particular possibilities in terms of how such individuals may be 
governed, or included in relations of power. As described by 
Dean (1999), the Foucauldian concept of governmentality 
describes: 
 
… any more or less calculated and rational activity, 
undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and 
agencies, employing a variety of techniques and 
forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by 
working through our desires, aspirations, interests, 
and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable 





In this nexus of knowledge/power, psychological testing and 
measurement are implicated in the governance of child and 
adult victims of child sexual abuse, along with their parents and 
partners. The relations of power and knowledge constitute 
counsellors as ‘authoritative practitioners of a technological 
truth regime’ about their clients (Slaney 2001), however these 
practitioners are simultaneously bound to particular forms of 
conduct themselves.  
 
To say that there are deployments of power in therapy is not to 
say that therapy can never be helpful, or contribute to a kind of 
freedom in the lives of children or adults (Lupton, 1997, in 
relation to medical intervention). Some practices of freedom 
can involve, or depend on, the exercise of certain kinds of 
power (Rose, 1999). In this thesis I will not be arguing ‘against 
power’; as I hope I will make clear, there is no possibility of an 
absence of power. (Domination, as opposed to power, is 
another matter altogether which I will also discuss). I am 
instead interested in the ways that power is productive and 
generative, rather than solely a limiting force. 
 
One way of thinking about the ‘power differences’ between 
child sexual abuse and psychological interventions as modes of 
governance, is to make a distinction between relations of 
‘domination’ and ‘power’. Several texts (e.g Allen, 1999) 
concerned with Foucault’s analysis of power refer to an 
interview (Foucault, 1997b) in which he described domination 
as the state in which power relations are frozen, blocked, or 
congealed. “The former [situations of domination] allow no 
room for effective struggle, whereas the latter [power relations] 
are contestable and alterable” (Sawicki, 1994, p.312, n18).  I 
would suggest that in child sexual abuse, especially perhaps in 
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intra-familial abuse, that this term ‘domination’ is a better one 
than the complexities involved in the Foucauldian concept of 
power. Some instances of child sexual abuse may best be 
understood as a situation of domination, because “…power is 
only power (rather than mere physical force or violence) when 
addressed to individuals who are free to act in one way or 
another” (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). Foucault described the necessity 
of freedom for the exercise of power as follows:  
 
It should also be noted that power relations are 
possible only insofar as the subjects are free. If one 
of them were completely at the other’s disposal and 
became his thing, an object on which he could 
wreak boundless and limitless violence, there 
wouldn’t be any relations of power (Foucault, 
1997a, p. 292).  
 
Bell (1993) highlights that domination is not a pre-given state 
of static power relations, but is ‘built-up’ by tactics and 
practices of power. For example, the adult-child relation, which 
is one of dominance, is built up and maintained by two modes 
of power; “the authority of the Father figure (juridico-
discursive power) and the disciplinary tactics” (p. 72). This 
dominance is “…an asymmetry built upon the constant practice 
of power” (p. 72). Intra-familial child sexual abuse is in this 
sense a ‘disciplinary tactic’ that produces and maintains a 
situation of dominance. The child has little capacity to ‘contest 
and alter’ in such a situation, given their dependence on the 
adult. Such a situation can have the effect of naturalizing the 
child’s subjectivity (including, for example, the adaptive 
strategies they may employ to survive) by obscuring the power-
infused and constructed context in which they are required to 
per-form their selves (Warner, 2009). (It is commonplace for 
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sexual abuse counsellors to say things like “It is not you that is 
sick or crazy, it is the situation that you survived that is sick”, 
in an attempt to contextualize a client’s lived experience of 
him/herself as crazy).  
 
An alternative possibility would be to think of child sexual 
abuse as an operation of sovereign, rather than disciplinary, 
power. The power that restricts, restrains, injures, and 
minimizes possibilities is the kind of power that is generally 
accorded to the state in political theory. The ability of one 
subject to harm another through the exercise of power in this 
way requires a kind of transfer of sovereign power (Butler, 
1997b). This way of thinking about child abuse by adults would 
be supported by the notion that adults possess the power of life 
and death over children, which holds for individual instances as 
well as more broadly as a social phenomenon. Even Foucault 
noted that the workings of disciplinary power required the 
transfer of some of the functions of sovereign power to the site 
of the family, the father in particular (Foucault, 2006/1973-74).  
Thus it may be unhelpful to think of power as either being 
sovereign or disciplinary. They are perhaps two forms of power 
that say little about the nature of power itself and more about 
their concrete arrangements and operations.  
 
In contrast, I think there is more room for resistance in 
children’s interactions with counsellors. I am not proposing that 
children and their counsellors can share ‘equal’ relationships, 
despite the earnest and well-intentioned efforts of some 
counsellors to do so. But power, I suggest, works in a different 
way to the situation of domination or of outright sovereign 
power that I have identified with child sexual abuse. Indeed, it 
is this room for ‘contestability and alterability’ that many 
counsellors may work with; they rely on the child to assert an 
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active subjectivity (to ‘practice their freedom’ (Rose, 1998)). 
Psychological techniques, whether in the form of self-help 
manuals or direct therapy, tend not to work through a program 
of subordination, but through exercising ‘free will’ in order to 
achieve autonomous individuality (Maasen, 2007). 
 
Powerlessness in child sexual abuse 
 
The analysis of child sexual abuse as an abuse based on 
unequal power often runs alongside the ‘harm story’, but it is a 
different story. According to this analysis, the problem with 
adults and children having sexual interactions lies in the fact 
that these two social groups do not share equal power and 
status. (This analysis implies a relation of sovereign, rather than 
disciplinary, power. That is, power is spoken of as 
‘possessable’). In such a situation of inequality, there can be no 
authentic consent. The child’s lack of power can be attributed 
to either (or both) her social position as a child vis a vie adults, 
or it can be understood as a dependency inherent in the state of 
childhood. The former view relies on a sociological view of 
adult/child relations, whilst the latter is derived from ideas 
about development. Some authors have questioned the effects 
of this view of children’s powerlessness, raising the question of 
children’s agency and to what extent this can or should be 
accounted for in child sexual abuse (Angelides, 2004). 
Angelides points out that, if sexual relations are to be deemed 
abusive on the basis of unequal power, then all hetero-sexual 
activity ought to be classed as sexual abuse. According to most 
strands of feminist theory, women and men are in positions of 
unequal power (sociologically viewed). Andrea Dworkin’s 
classic Intercourse makes the claim that all sex between men 




Judith Butler (1997a) outlines this question when she argues 
that the very formation of a child’s subjectivity necessarily 
emerges within a relation of dependence.20 In being 
subjectivised through this very dependence, if it is possible to 
talk of a child’s agency it must be recognised that a child may 
desire their own subordination21, as a very condition of her 
psychic existence (or her subjectivity, or indeed survival). 
Thus, the model of child sexual abuse in which an adult 
imposes his adult sexuality unilaterally upon the child (who is 
innocent, powerless and completely asexual) is, according to 
Butler, incomplete. It is not that the child can be said to have 
brought the abuse upon herself; but that the child is not a 
passive object who has no subjective sense of agency; and 
further, the dependence inherent in the adult-child relation, 
which forms the condition of the abuse, is a dependence upon 
which the child’s very subjectivity depends. In sum, Butler is 
suggesting that child sexual abuse involves relations of power, 
rather than domination, but it is not clear whether any situation 
of domination is conceivable from her analysis. 
 
A useful contrast to Butler is the work of psychologist Jennifer 
Freyd, particularly her notion of betrayal trauma (Freyd, 1996; 
Freyd et al., 2007). For Freyd, it is not the conditions of 
dependence that are problematised, but the betrayal of the child 
by the adult who abuses her or him. The child is radically 
dependent on the familial adult for the material conditions of 
survival, as well as the psychic necessities (encapsulated by the 
notion of attachment). Thus, the abused child is in a position of 
                                                 
20 Butler uses the word ‘attachment’, but my reading is that she means this 
in a more common sense than the technical meaning it takes on in childhood 
developmental psychology.  
21 To say the child’s very subjectivity depends on their relations of 
dependence with adults is not to say that the child wants to be hurt or 
exploited in any way; simply that the conditions which make such abuses 




having to continue to attempt to elicit attachment-giving 
responses from the abusive adult. If they did not, they would 
have no way of meeting their basic survival needs. However, to 
do so requires ‘forgetting’ the abusiveness of the adult. This 
suggests, however, that the situation is not one of domination 
but of power relations, because the child is clearly an active 
agent in the context of the abusive relationship to the extent 
that they must ‘forget’ and attempt to get their survival needs 
met. 
 
At stake between Butler and Freyd is the degree of 
contestability, or at least the possibility of asking broader 
political questions, about the conditions of dependence and 
subordination themselves. From a strictly developmental 
framework (such as Freyd’s), the dependence of the child on 
the adult is an unalterable fact (a black box, if you like), 
whereas this dynamics of power is precisely what Butler seeks 
to open up for analyses. Despite this difference, both share an 
acknowledgement of the fact that children actively negotiate 
their survival in contexts of abuse, and therefore are involved in 
relations of power, not simply domination (using a 
Foucauldian/disciplinary notion of power). It is important to 
note that arguing for the presence of this power in no way 
justifies, minimizes the harm of, nor makes the child in any 
way responsible for the sexual abuse. To the contrary, some 
therapists stress the importance of acknowledging the ways in 
which individuals subject to abuse have resisted and survived 
as crucial to healing (Wade, 1997). 
 
Angelides (2004) examines the consequences for child 
sexuality of the ‘feminist’ child sexual abuse discourse22. 
                                                 
22 Angelides’ paper focuses on a narrow range of ‘dominant’ feminist 
discourses of child sexual abuse. There are multiple feminist analyses of 
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According to Angelides, in the feminist analysis of child sexual 
abuse, by constructing children as totally powerless, the adult-
child opposition is reinforced and confirmed. This is a product 
of the judicial view of power held in the feminist analysis of 
child sexual abuse; i.e. that adults ‘possess’ power and hold it 
over children, and that children are completely powerless. 
Angelides suggests a Foucauldian informed understanding of 
power as exercised through practice, and recognising that 
children do exercise power, or at least have a sense of 
exercising power, if their understandings of their own 
experiences of sexual abuse are listened to. He criticises the 
therapeutic maxim to convince the child of their complete 
innocence and powerlessness, which is aimed at minimising a 
sense of guilt or self-blame for the abuse, arguing that this 
inadvertently reinforces and normalises the child’s sense of 
powerless, and diminishes children’s capacity to make choices 
about sexuality.    
 
To give Angelides’ argument it’s fuller context: Angelides 
reviews some of the pre-1980’s psychological literature, which 
tends to highlight the child’s complicity or agency in sexual 
contacts with adults. This was a possible position to hold 
because it was generally accepted, through Freud and 
psychoanalysis, that children had sexual impulses, urges and 
desires, in addition to sexual imagination and fantasy. Thus the 
proposition that children might not necessarily be harmed, or 
may even enjoy, aspects of what would now be considered 
sexual abuse, was a ‘makeable’ claim. In contrast, Angelides 
stresses that his argument is not against the problematisation of 
adult exploitation of childhood sexuality, but that the absolute 
emphasis on child sexual abuse as an abuse of power 
                                                                                                        
child sexual abuse, (e.g. the contributors to Warner & Reavey, 2003), some 
of which do not fall within Angelidies’ apparent definition. 
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effectively had the consequence of precluding 
acknowledgement of children’s sexuality per se.23 
 
One of the shortcomings of the judicial view of power, and its 
deployment as an argument against child sexual abuse, is that 
there are few relations between individuals that are not infused 
with relations of power. Additionally, there are many domains 
of life where adult power over children is accepted and even 
expected to be exercised, even where children themselves may 
object to this deployment of adult power (school attendance 
must be a prime example). “…if inequalities of power are 
thought only to corrupt sexual and parent-child relations, then 
there can be no ethical sexual or parent-child relations” 
(Angelides, 2004, p.151). In other words, the ‘feminist’ (sic) 
analysis of child sexual abuse creates an impossible ethical 
telos where consent can only occur in unachievable situations 
of equality (understood as the absence of power relations). 
Angelides point is that there are no relations between any 
individuals where power is absent.  
 
If I am going to be consistent and carry through on this analysis 
of power in the context of child sexual abuse, there are some 
implications for how to understand psychological measurement 
in a research or therapeutic situation. The classical model of 
measurement in research would be consistent with the idea of 
domination; there is only one powerful actor (the researcher in 
the research situation) who observes and describes, through the 
proficient use of a measuring instrument, properties of a 
                                                 
23 The use of the term ‘erasure’ in Angelides’ title (Feminism, child sexual 
abuse, and the erasure of child sexuality) is potentially misleading, 
considering Foucault’s general point in History of Sexuality vol. 1; neither 
the feminist nor psy discourses on child sexual abuse erase child sexuality 
so much as produce a body of knowledge that constitutes child sexuality in 
particular forms. To argue that such knowledge regimes erase child 
sexuality could be taken to imply that ‘child sexuality’ has a certain nature 
or form that is improperly (un)represented.  
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passive object of study. The entire arrangement is understood to 
be a direct result of the will of the one with power (Barad, 
2007). In taking on board a disciplinary model of power, 
however, that recognises the entanglement of power relations 
and the agency (however minimal) of all actors in the 
arrangement, then such a clean split is not possible. 
 
This articulation of the complexity of power relations enables 
me to recognise that it is possible to talk about power relations 
in research and therapy, and power as a defining feature of 
child sexual abuse. It is the complexity of these diverse powers 
that is the point, not the achievement of a single model of 
power I had hoped for at the beginning of the chapter!  
 
Foucault and the regulation of ‘adult-child sex’ 
 
To what extent does Foucault’s work demonstrate any 
objection to the sexual (ab)use of children by adults, or sexual 
abuse in general? If it does not, or is ambiguous, this represents 
a significant methodological/ethical dilemma for my thesis. 
What is at stake is not the question of whether Michel Foucault 
was an uncaring person or a ‘bad’ philosopher, but whether the 
work of Foucault can be usefully turned to these questions of 
child sexual abuse. I make no apology for being cautious on 
this issue. Although I am questioning and being troubled by 
some practices of scientific knowledge production in relation to 
child sexual abuse, I want to ascertain that the tools I am using 
do not lead to the fabrication of a position that condones, or 
fails to object to, child sexual abuse per se. As I show in this 
chapter, doubts have been raised by many authors about 
whether Foucault’s resources can be usefully turned to this kind 
of project. While it may seem like an unnecessary detour, I 
justify this based on the discussion to follow. I leave it to the 
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reader to decide at the end of this discussion whether the 
interlude was required. 
 
One episode that raises some questions about using Foucault’s 
work for investigating sexual abuse is related not only to his 
academic work but to a particular issue he publicly became 
active about. Foucault (along with many other French 
intellectuals of the time) advocated for the removal of 
prohibitions on ‘consensual’ adult-child sex. I do not mean to 
claim that Foucault’s personal or civilian life determines 
whether his work is ‘bad’, however there were some 
identifiable Foucauldian analytics at work here. My question is: 
Does this mean that Foucauldian perspectives on childhood, 
sexuality, the family and so on inevitably come to this 
problematic position of endorsing adult-child ‘sexual 
relations’? 
 
Bell (1993) cites a 1977 submission signed by Foucault (along 
with many others) to decriminalise ‘consensual’ adult-child 
sexual relations. The argument was based on attempting to 
disrupt the naturalised ‘childhood’ on which such laws are 
founded. The petition (information on which is available at 
http://www.answers.com/topic/french-petitions-against-age-of-
consent-laws, including a full list of the 69 signatories which 
included Deleuze, Guattari, and Simone de Beauvoir), and a 
1978 radio interview given by Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, 
and Jean Danet, have been taken up as texts, as objects of 
enquiry, by several feminist theorists (e.g. Bell, 1993; Alcoff, 
1996) who find aspects of Foucault’s work useful but 
problematic. (It is important to note here that although Foucault 
supported the petition, he was neither the instigator nor main 
figurehead. He was clearly part of a larger group bringing this 
question into the cultural arena for discussion. Nonetheless, 
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aspects of his analysis of sexuality and power are clearly 
present. If such analysis can be deployed in the service of 
arguments to legitimate what I want to call child sexual abuse, I 
argue that close scrutiny is warranted regarding how this 
deployment operates and the possible implications for this 
thesis).  
 
Hocquenghem stated that the purpose of their petition was to 
protest “the traditional prohibition against sexual relations 
without violence, without money, without any form of 
prostitution, that may take place between adults and minors”. 
He believes that such sexual relations are treated as ‘worse’ 
than situations where there is clear coercion or force. One of 
the key arguments made is that the laws against adult-child 
sexual relations act as a repressive technology of surveillance 
over the lives of children. The law is infused with psy 
knowledge that insists that adult-child sexual interactions are 
always traumatising for the child. They argue that the psy-legal 
nexus refuses to hear or misuses the words of children who say 
they consent to such relations (Foucault et al., 1988). This 
question of what children say, and the use to which it is put, 
also forms a major focus of many feminist/child-protection 
advocates. However, they insist that it is when children say no 
that they are not listened to (Taylor, 2004), in contrast to 
Foucault, Hocquenghem & Denet’s stance that it is when 
children (apparently) say yes that is problematised.  
 
Foucault and his fellow petitioners imagined that adult-child 
sexual relations can occur in a context of equality, much like 
Rind et al. (1998) but from a different perspective. Rind et al 
argued that their position ‘backwards’ from their finding that 
‘sexual interactions’ with adults did not always harm the 
child’s development, and this affirmed the developmentalist 
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paradigm. In contrast, the proposal of Foucault et al was to 
disrupt this developmentalist paradigm through the argument 
that psy-knowledge about children produces their inequality. 
They argued that their proposal was not about violent incidents 
or rape; in contrast, feminist analyses would consider adult-
child sex to effectively be rape, but this does not mean that a 
feminist opposition to child sexual abuse must defer to 
developmental psychology (although it may, and often has been 
strategically useful to do so).  
 
In other words, one cannot point to the “categories of ‘sexual 
coercion, sexual assault and rape’ as if these are unambiguously 
defined, in actual fact their scope of application is constantly 
being contested” (Alcoff, 1996, p. 114). Bell (1993) 
understands this feminist position to be based on unequal 
positions of economic, social and political power, rather than 
any naturalistic notion of development. Alcoff argues that the 
questions should be about the historical conditions that give 
rise to desires between adults and children (Alcoff, 1996). But, 
by arguing the line that children are unable to consent because 
of unequal power relations, the question arises- are any two 
individuals ever in a relationship of equality, given the feminist 
problematisation of the broader issue of consent between 
women and men (Angelides, 2004), and indeed Foucault’s own 
analytics of power? For Bell, this is the interesting part of the 
challenge raised by Foucault’s questions. 
 
Bell points out that the petitioners seem to want to dismiss the 
fact that childhood and children’s experience of childhood and 
sexuality is constructed (which is Foucault’s argument in The 
history of sexuality), and in this construction they are less 
powerful in relation to adults. That is to say, the proposal seems 
to simply ‘wish away’ the fact that children (or, at least, 
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individuals subjectivised as children) are, in this current epoch 
of social relations of power, in a relatively powerless position 
with adults (regardless of instances in which they may resist 
such power), by replacing it with a situation in which children 
are legislatively regarded as capable of being equal with adults. 
In a sense this constructs the child as the free, rational citizen of 
liberal democracy unfairly repressed by the law, a position 
which Foucault himself so thoroughly critiqued. While this 
state of equality might be a theoretically utopian state of affairs, 
I agree with Bell’s conclusion that in this case ‘the proposal’ 
constitutes a danger which ought to be opposed. In framing the 
law as repressive, the possibility that adult-child ‘sexual 
relations’ may have repressive effects is excluded (Alcoff, 
1996). That is to say, “the repression of adult-child sex may 
effect a decrease in the constraints by which children’s own 
sexual energies are policed, managed and deflected” (ibid, p. 
111). The Foucauldian proposal would result in the ‘liberation’ 
of (primarily) adult men’s sexual desires, despite the rhetoric 
given to children’s empowerment to consent (a notion which, 
as noted, is contradictory to Foucault’s analysis of the 
constitution of sexuality and freedom). Therefore it is hardly a 
radical proposal, effectively shoring up the sexual rights of 
adult men and legitimating their sexual abuse of children.  
 
In a similar discussion, Carolyn Steedman (1994) discusses an 
identical proposal by James Kincaid. (It is interesting that in 
both cases male academics are arguing for the legitimation of 
sex with children, and women arguing against). She describes 
and critiques Kincaid’s (1992) work (titled ‘Child-loving. The 
erotic child and Victorian culture’), where he deploys the term 
‘child-loving’ to refer to a range of practices undertaken by 
adults. Under this rubric, he includes both the molestation of 
children and helping children, as well as a range of other child-
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focussed adult activities. That is, he collapses all adult interest 
in the happiness, well-being, and safety of children to this 
category of an eroticized ‘child-loving’. He claims that the 
intense focus in contemporary culture on the sexual abuse of 
children is a kind of cultural denial, of the erotic pleasure that 
all adults find in children. Steedman finds Kincaid’s analysis of 
paedophilia at the centre of Western cultural history 
‘illuminating’ (p. 166), but takes serious issue with the proposal 
that he derives. Essentially, following a Foucauldian program 
of ‘bodies and pleasure released from power’ (Kincaid, 1992, 
p.386, Steedman, 1994, p.167), he advocates for the lifting of 
legal prohibitions of adult-child sexual relations.  
 
Steedman’s objections can be summarised as follows 
- Kincaid ignores the evidence from children and child 
sexual abuse survivors that such abuse ‘hurts, either 
physically or psychically’, even when as children they 
would not necessarily have understood it in this way24. 
- Throughout his book Kincaid discusses children as 
‘images, bodies, beings located in a field of adult 
desire’ (Steedman, 1994, pp. 167-168). To then suggest 
                                                 
24 This is no straightforward point in the context of my argument. In one 
way, Steedman’s use of the word ‘hurts’ is a helpful way to identify the 
‘harm’ which I have attempted to problematise throughout this thesis. The 
point I am trying to illustrate is that a notion and experience of harm that has 
been produced through the psychological power/knowledge nexus, whilst 
perhaps dominant within therapeutic practices, is not the only discourse of 
harm available. Perhaps the word ‘hurt’ can signify these other possible 
ways of understanding unwanted, unpleasant, dangerous, or otherwise 
deleterious experiences. This is not to say that ‘hurt’ is a more immediate or 
phenomenological experience; it merely indicates the presence of other 
discourses (apart from psy knowledges) through which child sexual abuse 
can be understood. For example, one may be speaking of bodily harm such 
as bruising or tearing; or of having experienced an injustice. Of course, one 
must acknowledge that much of the evidence to which Steedman refers has 
been presented in a psy context, most obviously in relation to 
‘psychological’ hurt. Statements by children or adults regarding harm or 
hurt caused by sexual abuse, whilst not statements one would wish to deny, 
can nonetheless be examined for the discursive regime in which they are 




that the claims of these children to have warm ‘feelings’ 
towards the adult paedophile as a platform for his 
proposal is incongruous with the way childhood and 
children have been constituted throughout the rest of his 
book.  
- He asks the wrong question- why children want sexual 
relations with adults, rather than the opposite, more 
obvious question. 
- “The severer predicament in which the argument finds 
itself is due to thinking that history proffers any kind of 
solution at all to the weird problems it allows us to see 
taking shape and form during the recent past” 
(Steedman, 1994, p. 168) 
 
Taken together, the work of Bell and Steedman constitutes a 
convincing argument against the proposal that the prohibition 
of adult-child ‘sexual relations’ be legitimated. 
 
Bell (1993) argues that whilst the exposition of the discursive 
‘line’ that Foucault’s work has been used to reveal between 
adult and child sexuality is theoretically interesting and maybe 
even convincing, in practice its implications are likely to 
worsen rather than improve the legal situation regarding child 
sexual abuse. Bell argues that in relation to Foucault’s 
statements on childhood sexuality and on adult-child ‘sexual 
relations’, one can follow his theoretical insights and line of 
questioning without agreeing with the “‘ethico-political’ 
decisions he offers” (p. 150), however it certainly has raised 
doubts for the usefulness of his writing for this project.  
 
Having identified some limitations and cautions in using the 
work of Foucault to understand child sexual abuse, I will now 
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turn briefly to the same concerns in the broader context of 
gendered violence.  
 
Foucault and gendered violence 
 
Given that the feminist analyses I am drawing on share the 
claim that sexual abuse of children is a gendered issue, I want 
to briefly address this broader question. It has been suggested  
that Foucault’s work was not particularly concerned with the 
situation of women (Plaza, 1981, cited in Marcus, 1992). Other 
feminist writers have drawn on Foucault’s work, particularly 
his destabilising of essentialist notions of sex and sexuality, but 
the relationship between Foucault and feminism is marked by 
tension and ambivalence (Bell, 1993; Sawicki, 1994; Hekman, 
1996). This is particularly marked where questions of sexual 
violence are concerned (Bell, 1993; Alcoff, 1996; Joy, 2003; 
Howe, 2008).  
 
A couple of key quotes attributed to Foucault are frequently 
cited to affirm these suggestions that Foucault was unconcerned 
with the situation of women and minimised the problem of 
sexual abuse. Monique Plaza (1981, cited in Marcus, 1992; see 
also McNay, 1992) refers to a 1977 interview where Foucault 
discusses the problem of how best to legally respond to women 
who have been raped. His suggestion is that sexual violence 
should be regarded no differently to ‘a punch in the mouth’; 
that is, as an act of violence, not specifically as an act of sexual 
violence. A problem is that this approach seems to betray his 
own analysis of the centrality of sexuality to modern 
understandings of the self (McNay, 1992). If subjectivity and 
identity have no essentialist basis, if our sense of ourself is 
discursively produced, and such discursive productions place 
sexuality at the core of our self, then it seems both 
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disingenuous and simplistic to resist this centrality by simply 
willing it away (Weeks, 1989). (This is the same problem in his 
proposal about the decriminalisation of adult-child sex). It also 
betrays a blindness to gender as a mechanism of oppression 
(McNay, 1992).  
 
Despite the intention of Foucault’s argument to free sexuality 
from disciplinary power, the general response of feminist 
critics is that this solution remains unconvincing at best. At 
worst, it would “further legitimize the sexual oppression of 
women” (McNay, 1992, p. 45). It has even been suggested that 
that some of Foucault’s statements “…suggests that rape laws 
should protect the sexual expression of rapists before that of 
their victims” (Hengehold, 1994, p.89). 
 
The second key quote is from The History of Sexuality vol. 1. 
Throughout this book, Foucault is pre-occupied with "…all 
those social controls, cropping up at the end of last century, 
which screened the sexuality of couples, parents and children, 
dangerous and endangered adolescents- undertaking to protect, 
separate, and forewarn, signalling perils everywhere, 
awakening people's attention, calling for diagnoses, piling up 
reports, organizing therapies” (Foucault, 1978, pp. 30-31). 
However, it appears that he is supremely indifferent to the fact 
some of these ‘perils’ may have resulted in suffering for those 
subjected to them (Howe, 2008). Discussing the apparent 
molestation of girl by a farm hand (in the village of Lapcourt, 
France) in 1867, Foucault marvels at the ‘pettiness’ of the fact 
that this was responded to by the authorities; according to 
Foucault, these were nothing more than “inconsequential 
bucolic pleasures” (p. 31). Clearly, Foucault sees no problem 
with an adult man paying a young girl for his sexual 
gratification. He neglects to consider the extent to which such a 
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sexualised interaction performs a kind of governance, or in 
some cases domination, in children’s lives.  
 
Summary of Chapter 2 
 
From this discussion, it is clear why a straight-forward 
appropriation of Foucault is problematic for understanding the 
sexual abuse of children by adults. It is perhaps reflective of the 
time and context in which Foucault worked, more so than any 
callous disregard, that led him to focus on offenders rather than 
victims of sexualised crimes. It was the offender who was 
subject to the machinations and discipline of psy knowledges, 
more so than the victims (who may not have been considered 
much at all, or as a risk to other children’s innocence, or 
deserving more of moral condemnation than therapeutic 
intervention (Smart, 1999), or of the crime of ‘being in need of 
care and protection’ (McCallum, 2008)).  
 
Where I think the value of Foucault’s work lies is in thinking 
about the way that the child victim of sexual abuse is 
‘disciplined’ by the psy knowledges, and the way that the role 
of social workers and other counsellors is also produced by 
these disciplinary practices. Whereas Foucault’s political 
concern seemed to be mainly with the subjection of adults 
categorised as deviant or abnormal (including not only adults 
who committed sexual crimes, but also those categorised as 
homosexual), this thesis proceeds on the claim that some of the 
categories and analysis produced by Foucault (discussed 
through this chapter) can be useful for thinking about those 
who have been subjected to child sexual abuse and the 
associated research and therapeutic practices. More generally, 
the insight that sexuality itself, as well as childhood, is 
produced through discourse provides productive ways for 
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thinking about child sexual abuse. It is these tools, rather than 
any way of defining abuse itself, that I intend to utilise from 
Foucault’s work.  
 
Having discussed these cautions regarding the use of Foucault’s 
work (and perhaps having persuaded the reader of, if not the 
conclusion, then at least of the necessity of the discussion), I 
will now move on some of the other theoretical and analytical 






Chapter 3- Analytical practice 
 
In this chapter I go into further detail about the use of focus 
groups and published research texts as sources of primary data 
for this thesis. This will require a problematisation of terms 
such as ‘focus group’, ‘discourse’ and ‘data’.  I am particularly 
concerned here with how to analyse texts; published research 
papers and focus groups discussions. As the chapter develops, I 
indicate the way that these analytical traditions disrupted and 
transformed my approach, especially in relation to the use of 
focus groups. By the end of the chapter, this research practice 
becomes destabilised, and I attempt to put together an 
analytical practice that suits the demands of my project. Of all 
the chapters, this chapter makes the least direct reference to 
matters of measurement per se. This is perhaps in response to 
the fact that much of the work or significance of numbers and 
measurement consists in what is said or written about them. 
Accordingly, I need a way to conceptualise not only how such 
written and said things (statements) have been produced, but 




In this section I outline my research method- how was the data 
produced and what conceptual tools were used to analyse it? 
The thesis rests on an analysis of two sets of texts (published 
research, and focus groups discussions). It is necessary to 
attempt to demonstrate to the reader how the texts have been 
produced, read, and put to work in this thesis. The method I 
have developed is, I argue, compatible with the overall 
theoretical orientation being developed, while trying to avoid 
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the dangers of becoming overly concerned with whether or not 
the method is Foucauldian (Graham, 2005). 
 
It might be expected that this thesis would offer a definition of 
child sexual abuse. This expectation will not be met directly. 
This is mainly for the simple reason that the act or crime of 
child sexual abuse is not the focus here. The focus is on 
therapeutic and research statements on the effects of child 
sexual abuse. This can be put simply as follows: for the purpose 
of this thesis, child sexual abuse is defined as whatever a 
particular text or speaker says it is. Child sexual abuse is being 
produced as an object of (scientific and/or therapeutic) 
discourse by the speech or texts. That is to say, if a research 
paper discusses the effects of child sexual abuse on the research 
subjects, the research paper will be interrogated for the terms 
on which this understanding is made. Part of the thesis is to 
investigate how these discursive practices produce and manage 
child sexual abuse: to offer a definition here would be to 




Extracts from the focus groups discussions will appear in the 
following format: 
 
NANCY25   So then it’s really subjective, isn’t it? 
 
KATE   Well of course it is. 
 
NANCY   Yeah. 
 
                                                 
25 The names of focus group participants have been changed. 
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KATE   But your assessment’s subjective. 
 
NANCY    Hmm, yeah.  
 
KATE   Your individual assessment will be 
subjective, probably, you know, we would hope… 
 
NANCY   So what’s the purpose of the test? 
 
KATE   We would hope we would get 
significant…[turning to Nancy] are you the person 




CB  This is why we have focus groups. 
 
The first set of texts are transcriptions from two discussions 
that I convened with a group of individuals employed as child 
sexual abuse counsellors in a busy community-based 
organisation in a capital city of Australia. The team I spoke 
with was one part of a larger organisation offering a range of 
community based services. The team receives funding from the 
state government to provide counselling services to children 
and adolescents who have experienced sexual abuse, as well as 
to their family members. At the time of the focus groups it 
employed approximately ten workers to undertake this and 
related work in the field of child sexual abuse. The team also 
supervises social work and psychology students on placement.  
 
I was previously employed as a counsellor in this team, but had 
ceased working there by the time the research discussions were 
held. Initially these groups were conceptualised as focus 
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groups, a standard method of data collection in social research. 
My role was presented as facilitating a discussion on the use of 
standardised psychological testing in therapy with child victims 
of sexual abuse.  
 
Between conducting these groups and preparing the thesis as it 
appears now, however, I might be said to have undergone a 
discontinuity in subjectivity in the intervening period. In other 
words, this thesis has been animated by (at least) two different 
sets of propositions about what kind of data could be generated 
in such focus group discussions. In the following sections, an 
account is presented of the problematisation of the focus group 
as a method for this research. The speech of the participants 
will be interrogated, and the contributions of the researcher to 
the discussions will be regarded as fully implicated in the 
discussions, and thereby presented as a legitimate object of 
enquiry. The questions that will finally be asked of these 
discussions are: What are the conditions by which these 
specific discussions were made possible? What do these texts 
suggest about the discourses that animate or inhabit them 
(Wooffitt, 2005)? Secondly, I want to draw on the data to 
address my primary research questions, acknowledging the 
issues raised by the problematisation I just mentioned. 
 
I intend to analyse the focus groups as achieving three 
functions: 1-producing and circulating knowledge; 2- 
constructing the object of knowledge (child sexual abuse, its 
effects, and relevant therapeutic interventions), and; 3: 
constituting the counsellors. In what follows, two ways of 
understanding focus groups as a research method will be 
developed, in an attempt to identify what can be productive 
about this research method whilst maintaining an 




My initial conceptualisation of focus groups 
 
Lunt and Livingstone (1996) credit Lazarsfield and Merton 
with the introduction of the focus group to the social sciences. 




The purpose of a focus group is to listen and gather 
information. It is a way to better understand how 
people feel or think about an issue, product, or 
service. Participants are selected because they have 
certain characteristics in common that relate to the 
topic of the focus group (2000, p.3) 
 
Other methodologists claim that focus groups are useful for 
“exploring how points of view are constructed and 
expressed…the study of attitudes and experiences around 
specific topics….examining how knowledge, ideas, story-
telling, self-presentation and linguistic exchanges operate 
within a given cultural context” (Barbour et al., 1999, p.5).  It 
seems, then, that the focus group would be a useful method for 
identifying the discursive struggles over meaning that operate 
within the field of child sexual abuse counselling and the 
regimes of knowledge that inform these struggles, following 
the claims of some persuasive texts that discursive struggles are 
manifest in social interaction as well as in written texts 
(Barbour et al., 1999; Cameron, 2000).  
 
An initial plan was envisaged for a series of focus groups, each 
consisting of 6-8 participants (Lunt et al., 1996 say 6-10; 
Krueger et al., 2000 suggest 6-8; Hamel, 2001 suggests 6-12 is 
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the optimum number of participants), who share the 
characteristic of working as a counsellor with children who 
have been subjected to sexual abuse. Green & Hart prefer the 
term “discussion group interviews” over ‘focus groups’ (1999, 
p. 21) to describe such groups where there are pre-existing 
relations between group members, as was the case in these 
groups. The two groups convened took place in one agency, 
with a team of counsellors employed to undertake therapy with 
child victims of sexual abuse. Nine individuals (not including 
myself) were involved in total, with some participating in both 
discussions while others participated in only one of the 
discussions.26  
 
The participants were recruited by the researcher first 
approaching the management of the agency, with a brief 
description of the research questions and aims. After meeting 
and gaining permission from management, I sent an 
information letter outlining the research (see Appendix Two), 
along with an invitation to participate. After receiving 
notifications of interest from several staff members, a mutually 
suitable time and location was organised via correspondence 
between myself and a nominated member of the staff.  
 
The primary professional groups were Psychologists and Social 
Workers, as these are the disciplines generally recognised as 
authorised to undertake this work. (I will refer to ‘counsellors’, 
specifying particular professions when needed). The focus 
groups were envisaged as a guided discussion, initiated by 
myself as a researcher/facilitator, of the theoretical and 
philosophical understandings that the participants perceived 
themselves as bringing to the work, especially in relation to the 
                                                 
26 I also attempted an online discussion group with three additional 
participants; however this was unsuccessful due to technical difficulties. 
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practice and theory of psychological measurement. As the 
facilitation of focus groups requires skills in group facilitation 
(Krueger et al., 2000), I proposed calling upon my experience 
as a Social Worker to conduct the focus groups. This would 
involve deploying technical know-how about facilitating a 
group discussion. 
 
A number of themes for the focus group were developed and 
presented in advance to the participants. These were:  
 
x Identifying particular psychological tests that 
counsellors use in their work with children who have 
been sexually abused (if, indeed they are used) 
x Discussing the details of these tests, such as what traits 
they are used to measure, what kinds of clients they are 
used with and why they are used 
x Explore the details of how these tests measure the traits 
they claim to measure 
x Discuss how the process of testing is managed within 
therapy 
x Discuss how the counsellors use the results of these 
tests in the formulation of therapeutic plans and goals 
with their clients 
x Discuss counsellors’ views on the ethics of testing 
x Are there any particular organisational requirements 
related to the use of tests? (For example, is the use of 
some tests routine with certain clients?) 
x Discuss the counsellors views on the philosophical 
dimensions of psychological testing through prompt 
questions such as:  




o What power dynamics are involved in 
administering tests? 
o What is the relationship between the use of 
standardised testing and the exercise of clinical 
judgement in therapy? 
o In what ways do counsellors find the use of 
testing helpful or unhelpful in their practice as 
counsellors with child victims of sexual abuse? 
o What are counsellors’ views on how children 
might experience the practice of psychological 
testing? 
 
The above provides a productive point of departure to develop 
a critical perspective on focus groups, informed by the 
constructivist approach to knowledge that has been referred to 
throughout this thesis. That is, the above descriptions of what a 
‘focus group’ is, and what might be done with the resulting 
data, have produced a kind of knowing which can now be 
unsettled.  
 
Before proceeding, it is relevant to note that the focus groups 
consisted entirely of members of one organisation, in one 
location at one point in time, and therefore the resultant data is 
not generalizable. What I am interested in is precisely the 
specifics of the conversations, and more importantly, what 
made these conversations ‘have-able’ or possible. It is entirely 
possible that another group of workers would have opened up 
different points of enquiry and produced another set of 




Adjustment to the depth of field 
 
What can be seen in a focus group? A helpful visual tool here is 
the ‘depth of field’, a concept from the field of optics applied in 
disciplines such as photography, cinematography and 
microscopy. In film and photography, the depth of field refers 
to the distance between the nearest and the furthest point in the 
portion of a scene which is held in acceptably sharp focus 
(Galer, 2007). As one photography text explains, with a 
shallow depth of field: “Subject matter behind and in front of 
the point of focus appears progressively out of focus” (ibid., p. 
23). Although the lens can only focus on one point, the 
transition from in-focus to blurry may be gradual, so that 
although there may be some blurriness within the depth of 
field, this is not always easily perceived.   
 
When one looks with a shallow depth of field, a small amount 
of text can be seen very sharply. “However, the only way that 
shallow depth of field is apparent is if there’s something in the 
background that is noticeably soft and blurry” (Long, 2012, 
p.208). This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1- Depth of field27 
 
                                                 
27 DOF-ShallowDepthofField.jpg by PiccoloNamek, available under the 




So with the shallow depth of field implied by restricting the 
analysis to the level of the text from the focus groups, the 
capacity to see clearly around the edges and beyond is 
diminished. Yet, the blurriness of the surrounds is in danger of 
going unnoticed: “having larger, easier-to-see objects in the 
background will make your shallower depth of field more 
apparent” (Long, 2012, p.208). What ‘conditions of viewing’ 
might enable, not only the blurriness to become noticeable, but 
to also bring the distant objects into the field of visibility?28  
 
ELIZABETH  So on the BASC if you had the 
depression come back clinically significant you 
might say ‘further stuff is warranted, further 
exploration is warranted’ so you might give the 
Children’s Depression Inventory. Which is, once 
again, really subjective and I certainly wouldn’t 
take it as the gospel, I would use it, yeah effectively, 
so… 
 
By focussing on a comment such as Elizabeth’s, I could ask 
how Elizabeth has ‘brought into existence’ the depression of a 
child, the clinical significance of this fact, the question of 
whether this conclusion is a subjective measure, and so forth. 
This could be broadened out to examine what this comment 
achieved in the social interaction of the focus group: what did 
other participants say, what had been said beforehand, was this 
comment challenged, etc.  
 
None of these questions, however, can ask how such comments 
were made possible; the statements ‘existed’ before being 
uttered by her. In contrast to the idea that Elizabeth brought the 
                                                 
28 To reinforce the analogy, Carl Friedrich Gauss, who I cite later in relation 
to the error law, also developed Gaussian optics, useful in understanding 
and calibrating the focussing capacities of lenses.   
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statements into existence, this thesis will try to ask how a 
certain discourse brings both the object and the subject into 
existence. Elizabeth speaks of therapeutic objects (such as 
depression, clinical significance), and in doing so speaks as a 
therapist. In this sense, a therapeutic discourse has laid the 
conditions for Elizabeth to speak herself into this subject 
position.  
 
The term statement, like discourse, is one that Foucault’s work 
endows with a special meaning and purpose that is distinct 
from more common usages of that term. Whereas a statement 
might be thought of unproblematically as simply something 
that is said, in Foucault’s usage the statement itself is not quite 
so immediately apparent. Statements are “…there and say 
everything”, but “become readable or sayable only in relation 
to the conditions which make them so” (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 46-
47). Entire works of Foucault are dedicated to describing these 
conditions; for example, in relation to madness (Foucault, 
1965) or the ‘human sciences’ in general (Foucault, 1970). In 
order to be able to speak of statements in this sense, it is 
necessary to ‘open up’ the texts (Deleuze, 1988). 
It is possible, for example, that one sentence might appear in 
two different contexts and serve completely different purposes 
and suggest different meanings. Davidson describes these 
contexts as ‘styles of reasoning’, making it possible that 
identical sentences can function as two different statements 
(Davidson, 1987); I will come back to this point shortly. 
 
The use of speech as data 
 
A potential difficulty with using Foucault is that this thesis 
takes as one of its primary data sources speech from 
participants in focus groups, transcribed as text, whereas for 
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some Foucault’s methods were primarily ‘archival’ (Elden, 
2001)29. Taking this archival approach would require having 
access to, for example, confidential counselling records, 
containing the results of psychological tests conducted in 
therapy, and the associated reports of counsellors. While such a 
study is imaginable, this thesis draws upon what counsellors 
have to say about their use of psychological tests, and the 
subject positions they produce in doing so. Some would say 
that this is not a ‘Foucauldian’ approach to research. It could be 
said that this thesis makes use of Foucault’s work to develop a 
conceptual framework (Marshall et al., 1999), but must draw on 
other sources to develop the research method. 
 
What is methodologically important for this thesis is not 
whether things are written or said, but that they are studied at 
the level of discourse, to study the conditions through which 
the statements exists, rather than attempting to attribute them to 
an “all-powerful subject” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 60) who speaks 
from with-out discourse, or posing psychological explanations 
about the motivations of the speaker or writer. In fact, the 
position or the role of the speaking subject in discourse is itself 
an object of enquiry. 
 
The use of the speech of research participants has some 
precedence in other Foucauldian informed studies relevant to 
child sexual abuse (Slaney, 2001; Joy, 2003). Rayleigh Joy 
notes that her use of interviews with women presents an 
epistemological challenge to a Foucauldian research project- 
the practice of interviewing might be thought to presume a self 
                                                 
29 One key reason for this is related to the idea of an historical episteme, the 
set of conditions for knowledge that make some statements ‘candidates for 
truth’ (Foucault, 1970). If all possible thought is already embedded in the 
episteme of the times, then the episteme itself cannot be captured or 
described ‘from within’. This is a methodological reason that Foucault 
tended to focus on historical problems. 
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that can disclose the truth of her experience, unmediated by 
discourse. However, she cites Foucault’s later work on 
“…discourse as a non-vertical, unordered criss-crossing of 
forms of power and forms of knowledge, suggests that the 
power/knowledge nexus does indeed encounter selves and is in 
turn affected by them” (Joy, 2003, p. 124). I take this to mean 
that the use of interviews (or in my case, focus group 
discussions) is one way of drawing attention to the way in 
which subjects are both users of discourse, as well as being 
constituted by discourse. Subjects constitute themselves 
through discourse, as well as simultaneously reproduce, 
reshape and resist the discourses they deploy. Subjects are not 
“inactive dupes of the discursive field” (ibid., p. 124); nor is the 
researcher positioned outside of the discursive field, able to 
‘objectively’ identify and get hold of the discursive field that 
his/her ‘subjects’ are merely passive conduits for. 
 
Thus in this thesis, I use focus groups with the aim of engaging 
with the ways in which counsellors constitute themselves, with 
a particular emphasis on how the practice of psychological 
testing and measurement fits in with such moves. 
 
‘Collaborative’ research and power 
 
Focus groups inherently imply a collaborative element to the 
production of knowledge. As Trickett and Espino (2004) 
demonstrate, collaboration is by no means a simple or unitary 
construct. A range of epistemological, pragmatic and 
ideological rationales provide the foundation for the theory and 
practice of collaboration in social research. These rationales 
largely share a common assumption that there is a generalised 
power imbalance between the researcher and the participants, a 
particularly important concern for feminist research (Oakley, 
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2000). This assumption stems from the historical tendency for 
social science research to study marginalised groups, whether 
in the name of liberation, science, or social control. There is a 
more recent tradition of ‘studying up’ (i.e. studies of 
particularly powerful groups in society).  
 
My thesis might be more aptly thought of within this angular 
mode of description as studying ‘across’. In some regards, I 
have exercised power where the research itself is concerned: I 
have formulated the research topic and questions, I have invited 
the participants to the focus groups, I have recorded and 
analysed the data, and have final say over its presentation in my 
research (Wilkinson, 1998). However, in other important ways 
I am/was not in a position of relative power vis-à-vis the 
participants. I had worked in the same specialist field, and some 
of the participants would be regarded as more experienced in 
this field; I am dependant on the good will and interest of the 
participants to contribute to the focus groups; as I was 
relatively new to the geographical area, I did not have long-
standing networks in which to ground and position my personal 
and professional views and practices; I did not have an 
established ‘profile’ in the field. These are all relevant 
considerations in facilitating focus groups with peers. 
 
Still on the topic of power within focus groups, some authors 
suggest that the focus group is a more democratic site than the 
one-to-one interview or the survey. For example, Madriz states, 
that “…the group situation may reduce the influence of the 
interviewer on the research subjects by tilting the balance of 
power towards the group. Because focus groups emphasize the 
collective, rather than the individual, they foster free expression 
of ideas, encouraging the members of the group to speak up” 
(Madriz, 2000, p. 838). This statement could imply that the 
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group is homogenous, and that there is consensus and equality 
amongst group members.  
 
Taking into consideration questions of professional status, 
networks, education, ability to coherently articulate an 
argument, reputation etc., this would be a problematic 
assumption to make for my focus groups. Madriz clarifies her 
position: “Although it can be argued that there is potential for 
power relations to surface among the participants, these 
relations, if they arise, are the participants own power relations, 
in their own constructed hierarchies. Indeed, observing and 
documenting the development of these hierarchies may provide 
the researcher with some very important data” (ibid, p. 840).  
 
Even in recognising the potential for power differences 
between group members, the type of power that Madriz’s 
statements seem to be referring to is a naturalised, 
juridical/sovereign mode of power, where power is possessed 
by one person or group and exercised over the less powerful 
group members. There is an implication that ideally there 
would be no relations of power between group members, and 
that when it is recognised it should be minimised or mitigated 
against. The attainability of such a goal has been questioned 
within feminist methodological debates. Claims of equality and 
a democratic process can serve simply to obscure power 
relations and make them less visible, particularly when there is 
a sense of relationship between researcher and participants 
(Stacey, 1988, cited in Oakley, 2000). This seems to be of 
particular importance in a study relating to child sexual abuse, 





Drawing on a disciplinary model of power, I would argue that 
each speaker’s very capacity to speak is constituted through 
operations of power that produce their subjectivity30, 
subjectivity being the necessary condition for speech. In this 
view, power does not repress or prevent individuals from 
speaking, but it is what produces the very possibility of speech. 
Thus, whenever individuals are speaking (or writing), there is 
power at work. Power per se is not something to be avoided, 
however one can (and I argue, should) still try to account for 
one’s entanglement in relations of power and practice (Butler, 
2005; Barad, 2007). 
 
Whatever power relations may be performed and reiterated 
through the focus groups themselves, I have not made any 
claims or declared any intention to democratise the 
interpretation or analysis of the focus group texts. I argue that I 
am not making any evaluation or interpretation of individual 
counsellors’ practice or judging the validity of what they said in 
the groups. As I am interested primarily in the statements made 
at the level of therapeutic discourse, I am interested in how it 
was possible for the counsellors to say what they said within a 
professional context. Furthermore, the focus groups produced a 
problematisation of both the knowledge produced by 
psychological measurement, and the practice of actually 
conducting (one variety of) psychological measurement in the 
context of working with children who have been sexually 
abused. This second point proved particularly productive for 
this thesis in generating a set of problems around the theme of 
‘subjectivication’ of the counsellors—in other words, how 
practices of psychological measurement govern their activities 
and what kinds of resistances emerged.         
                                                 
30 As has been discussed, power is also entwined in the production of 




Before drawing together these considerations on how to use the 
focus groups in this thesis, I will discuss the second group of 
texts that I draw upon as ‘data’. 
 
Published scientific research on child sexual abuse 
 
In drawing on these texts, I attempt to retain the genealogical 
principle that the distinction between primary data and 
secondary (commentary) be collapsed. For example, some texts 
are published as commentary on the Rind et al. (1998) paper 
mentioned earlier, while others offer alternative findings based 
on different data, methodology, and statistical analysis. The 
possibility of some texts speaking from distance, from outside 
the regime of knowledge/power, is called into question; all such 
texts are to be located within the “field of power” (Bowman, 
2005, p. 26). I will treat both kinds of texts as equivalent in 
terms of their circulation in the field of child sexual abuse 
research. Again, the questions will be asked of these texts: 
What are the conditions by which they were made possible? 
What do these texts suggest about the discourses that animate 
or inhabit them? And how do these texts produce the object of 
knowledge: the effects of child sexual abuse? 
 
One phrase, two statements 
 
Davidson (2001) provides some methodological guidance here, 
in his discussion of ‘statements’ and the ‘field of stabilization’ 
in which they occur. A field of stabilization is akin to a ‘style of 
reasoning’; that is, the network of relations and rules that 
makes it possible to produce statements that reach the threshold 
of scientificity. It is not that all such statements are true, but 
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that they are candidates for truth or falsehood (as opposed to 
nonsensical). A statement is distinct from a phrase or a 
sentence. “…a series of recurrences of the same phrase can 
correspond to a multiplicity of different statements. Even the 
identical sentence need not constitute the same statement” 
(Davidson, 2001, p. 140). In other words, the same phrase 
might appear in two texts, but be produced by two distinct 
styles of reasoning (or ‘fields of stabilization’), and thus entail 
entirely different concepts governed by different rules of usage 
and production. 
 
This allows a comparison of phrases found in different texts, to 
try and discern distinct styles of reasoning which produce them. 
If I remember the principle of diffractive reading at this 
juncture, I must acknowledge that I have already been engaged 
in actively producing two styles of reasoning in the act of 
naming scientific and post-structuralist feminist knowledges 
about child sexual abuse. I justify this naming of post-
structuralist feminism and scientific psychology by referring 
directly to the texts themselves; that is to say, I am not 
interpreting these claims about styles of reasoning, simply 
citing them as they appear in the respective texts (Kendall et 
al., 1999). In doing so I am reiterating and so actively 
constructing ‘post-structuralist feminism’ and ‘scientific 
research’.  
 
Here are two quotes from the two traditions: 
 
We do not deny that child sexual abuse is prevalent 
nor that it can have devastating effects, but we do 
challenge the too-ready presumption of inevitable 
harm and the narrowing of concern that this has 




The findings of the current review should not be 
construed to imply that CSA never causes intense 
harm for men or women—clinical research has well 
documented that in specific cases it can. What the 
findings do imply is that the negative potential of 
CSA for most individuals who have experienced it 
have been overstated (Rind et al., 1998, p. 42). 
 
I will hope the reader allows that the two quotes above are 
literally similar enough to be analysed as a recurrence of one 
phrase, but that they are two different statements in Davidson’s 
sense. My task here is to mark out the respective styles of 
reasoning that have produced these statements. Why can one 
quote appear in a self-proclaimed post-structuralist feminist 
text on child sexual abuse, whilst the other appears in a 
prestigious mainstream psychology journal by self-identified 
scientific researchers (and be subsequently maligned for 
minimising the harm of child sexual abuse)? 
 
The table below (Table 1, on next page) offers a rough 
summarisation of the two styles of reasoning that have 
produced the above quotes. The table shows that while the two 
sets of authors draw on apparently radically different ideas 
about how knowledge of child sexual abuse is produced, they 
can also both produce near-identical sentences or phrases. The 
point is that the analytical tool of ‘styles of reasoning’ shows 
that statements are not the same as sentences.  The two quotes 









 Rind et al.  Reavey et al. 
Causality Child sexual abuse 
can cause harmful 
effects, but not 
inevitably and not 
necessarily intense. 
Expert knowledge 
can and should 
identify ‘what and 
how much’ harm.  
Child sexual abuse can 
cause harmful effects, 
but not inevitably and 
not necessarily intense. 
Expert knowledge 









incorrect research can 
incite individuals to 
evince symptoms. 
‘Looping effects’- 
individual take up 
identities but also 






achievable but should 
be attempted. Child 
sexual abuse can be 
studied as a scientific 
object. Objectivity 
guards against 
ideology, morals, etc. 
Neither possible nor 
desirable. Claims to 
objectivity serve to 
privilege some 
knowledge claims over 




Epistemology Statistical, scientific 
method 
Reflexive, discursive 
Norms Statistically verifiable 
standard against 
which the effects of 
Disciplinary tool of 
power-knowledge 
which effectively casts 
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abuse can be 
measured. Can be 
useful for identifying 
helpful therapeutic 
and policy guidelines 
to assist survivors of 
sexual abuse. 
sexual abuse survivors 
as abnormal and 
therefore deficient, and 
in need of 
intervention.  
Difference To be corrected To be embraced 
 
So, my analytical task for this thesis is to attempt to identify the 
styles of reasoning that produce the particular sentences, 




The question of Foucauldian discourse analysis has 
implications for the coherency and theoretical rigour for social 
work research (Garrity, 2010). The question of what is, and 
what is not (Burman, 1991), discourse, and how it ought to be 
analysed, has been a controversial question in the 
methodological literature. This is particularly so in reference to 
the work of Foucault (Graham, 2005), where the use of the 
term itself (discourse) can mean something quite different from 
other texts that discuss ‘discourse analysis’. This can lead to 
some misleading criticisms of ‘Foucauldian discourse analysis’, 
especially that a) such work focuses on texts to the exclusion of 
practices, and b) that such analyses imply an overly 
deterministic relationship between knowledge, power and 
subjectivity (Lupton, 1997).  
 
The notion of the statement (see above) is implicated in a 
notion of discourse that is not immediately apparent. In a 
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Foucauldian sense, discourse cannot be taken to mean the 
exchange of words and ideas that it seems to mean in some 
methodological approaches, including social work research by 
prominent authors such as Karen Healy and Jan Fook (Garrity, 
2010). Rather, this is a discourse that consists of a ‘great 
murmur’, an ‘anonymous murmur’ “in which positions are laid 
out for possible subjects” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 47). In this 
conception it is not possible to imagine a subject that then 
produces or uses discourse; rather the subject position from 
which ‘one’ speaks is one possible position (not the only 
possible position) laid out by discourse. Text and speech can be 
animated or inhabited by discourse (Wooffitt, 2005), but they 
are neither exhaustive of or synonymous with discourse. To this 
extent this thesis seeks to locate the discursive formations that 
‘animate’ the texts (the focus group data and the research 
publications) in regards to the nature of child sexual abuse as a 
problem for and production of therapeutic treatment and 
expertise. 
 
Following Hook (2007), drawing on Potter and Wetherell’s 
(1987) work on discourse analysis can put into relief an 
approach to this research that is more consistent with the 
general methodological and epistemological framework being 
developed here. In particular, it is worthwhile noting the 
distinction between the ‘interpretive repertoires’ of Potter & 
Wetherell, and the ‘conditions of possibility’ associated with 
Foucault’s archaeology. In the first, an active subject draws 
upon a range of possible ways of understanding a situation, 
object or event; in the second, it is the epistemè that produce 
the subject. 
 
It is not necessarily the case that the approaches to discourse 
analysis are incompatible, and applying them in a 
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complementary fashion may be productive. In particular, a 
focus on face-to-face and small group interactions (such as the 
focus groups) can assist with asking how forms of discourse 
become part of the technology of a discipline or institution, 
while attention to the historical formation of formative 
structures and institutions brings attention to their contingency 
(Hacking, 2004). Nonetheless, care must be taken regarding 
what the analysis implies or assumes about the intentionality of 




Earlier I quoted Krueger and Casey (2000) who stated that the 
“… focus group… is a way to better understand how people 
feel or think about an issue, product, or service” (p.3). By this 
stage in my thesis, attention is immediately drawn to the 
epistemological implications of the suggestion that focus group 
participants could unproblematically express how they “feel or 
think” about psychological measurement, as if this was some 
stable opinion that the individual held inside their head, ready 
to be produced on demand in any given situation. Reifying 
statements as stable opinions to illustrate a theme of the 
research can “undervalue and even distort the data produced by 
discussion groups” (Green et al., 1999, p, 25). A more 
productive orientation might be to ask what speech acts or 
statements do or achieve in their context, how successful they 
are, what “repertoires of knowledge” (ibid. p. 34) do they draw 
upon, what contesting or concurring statements do they elicit, 
and so on. The focus groups are not attempts to uncover what 
counsellors really think about psychological measurement and 





Potter and Wetherell might say that focus groups are a specific 
context in which speech acts are performed. This context must 
have a profound influence on what is being achieved or 
attempted in the speech of participants. The focus groups in this 
research might be said to be ‘naturally occurring’31, where the 
issues under discussion are commonly talked about (or evaded) 
in this timeslot in the organisation’s routine. Pre-existing 
groups may have norms around what can and cannot be said32. 
The aim would be to identify the normative rules of 
conversation being followed by the speakers, rather than 
assuming they are expressing underlying/consistent 
psychological states, desires, preferences etc. The speech that 
occurs in focus groups can illustrate the ‘interpretive repertoire’ 
(Potter et al., 1987) available when counsellors speak about the 
use of psychological testing in their work, and how these 
resources are deployed in the specific context. “The interpretive 
repertoire is basically the lexicon or register of terms and 
metaphors drawn upon to characterise and evaluate actions and 
events” (ibid. p. 138). In this sense one might refer to a 
therapeutic interpretive repertoire.  
 
                                                 
31 By ‘naturally occurring’, I do not mean that the setting does not influence 
the focus group- this buys into the myth of neutrality. “Researchers should 
consider, instead, the different messages that are being given to participants 
when we select different venues” (Barbour et al., 1999, p.11). In this 
research, the venue and time of the face to face focus group was suggested 
by the group members in initial conversations as the most convenient and 
accessible- it is doubtful that they could have participated elsewhere. The 
groups were held at the agency during ‘case-review’ time, when such 
discussions relating to the work of counselling children who have been 
sexually abused is accepted and part of the weekly routine of the 
organisation. As Hacking (2004) notes, such setting and interactions help to 
understand how ways of categorising people, the circulation of knowledge, 
can occur in institutions.  
32 A hypothetical example might be that one can discuss kicking a soccer 
ball with a young client as a rapport building activity; to describe the same 
activity being about improving the child’s passing skills would not be an 
acceptable statement, and even less acceptable would be to frame it as 
improving the counselor’s soccer skills. 
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Here, I want to outline a methodological guideline for this 
thesis described in contrast to the above. In distinction to the 
idea that a speaker can ‘use’ or even ‘draw upon’ an 
interpretive repertoire, the locus of discursive strategy here 
does not lie with the speaker; the speaker is rather caught up in 
or constituted by strategy of discourse, although this does not 
necessarily mean the speaker is a passive participant in the play 
of discourse (such as Elizabeth in the example given earlier, on 
page 79).  
 
Judith Butler (unsurprisingly) complicates this practice of 
‘giving an account of oneself’ (Butler, 2005). In Psychic Life of 
Power (1997a), Butler explains Nietzsche’s idea that the 
subject is always grounded in ‘bad conscience’. In this version 
of subject formation, it is only in the installation of a set of 
social or moral norms that the subject can recognize oneself as 
a ‘self’. Thus the originary scene of subject formation is always 
already a justification. That is, it is not that a subject is, and 
then is called upon to explain oneself; this is the shortcoming 
that Butler identifies in Althusser’s interpellation. (This is the 
famous scene in which the individual is hailed in the street by a 
policeman: “Hey, you”. At this moment the individual, being 
recognised by authority, recognises oneself as potentially in 
breach of a societal or legal norm). It is the call to account for 
oneself, by some external authority (which may well become 
internalised but whose origins precede the subject), that 
initiates the ‘turn’ which founds the subject itself.  
 
In her later book (2005), Butler revisits and revises this scene 
of subjectivation; it is not only an experience of a demand for 
justification that compels one to provide an account of oneself. 
It is also a desire for recognition; to be recognized and to 
recognize others. This recognition (of oneself) requires others 
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to (hopefully) receive and validate it, and this requires a set of 
norms (at the very least, linguistic or symbolic norms) to 
provide the material with which such an account can be 
constructed, offered and received. Thus, the conditions of 
subjectivation precede the subject (and remain ‘opaque’ to the 
subject, so that such accounts are inevitably incomplete), but 
the desire to be recognized may be an equally compelling 
catalyst for giving an account of oneself as the justification 
born of bad conscience or interpellation. 
 
What can be done with these elaborations of the ‘accounting 
subject’ in the current thesis? Given Butler’s discussion is 
largely an abstract discussion of moral philosophy and 
psychoanalytic theory, how might it be put to work in the very 
specific and local context of the focus group discussions? At 
the risk of oversimplifying, the focus groups are situations in 
which the participants are recognised as particular kinds of 
subjects; as counsellors, therapists, social workers, art 
therapists, psychologists, and so on. To what extent might this 
notion of recognition frame the conditions in which each 
participant ‘gives an account of themself’? In writing and in 
speaking of psychological subjects, professionals construct 
themselves through language and conceptual tools of their 
discipline, or else risk losing credibility or, in the extreme case, 
becoming unintelligible to their colleagues (Gergen, 1998). If 
this is the case, analyses of the focus groups links up with the 
genealogical principles described earlier. What is said in the 
focus groups can be understood in reference to the ‘sayable’ as 
a counsellor. There are a finite (although potentially large) 





Summary of Chapter 3 
 
In these two chapters I have attempted to describe the 
epistemological tools I will use in the thesis, and the specific 
forms of information I will be using. I have provided an 
account of a movement in my use of the focus groups over the 
life of the thesis. The position I have described here is best 
conceptualised as a pragmatic one, in the sense that I do not 
claim I have come to the best or ultimate position, just one that 
I can use for the present text. The initial conception of focus 
groups as relatively unproblematic forums in which participants 
could express opinions and views on psychological 
measurement in their counselling work in the field of child 
sexual abuse, has been modified in response to the demands of 
the questions around discourse and subjectivity. I have also 
outlined two influential traditions of knowledge in the field of 
child sexual abuse, and attended to their differences as well as 
their shared concerns. In line with the practice of diffractive 
reading, I have tried to suggest that these two traditions are 
both productive of ways of knowing about and responding to 




Chapter 4- Measurement and science 
 
In this chapter I will discuss scientific approaches to analysing 
psychological measurement as a separate analytical approach to 
the administrative or disciplinary analysis outlined in Chapter 
2. However, they are more entangled than distinct. In order to 
produce an understanding of how psychological measurement 
and statistics discipline the problem of child sexual abuse, 
throughout this thesis I will be analysing measurement as both 
a scientific technique and an administrative technology. In the 
rest of this chapter I will discuss scientific measurement in 
more detail. I will argue measurement in science is a 
historically contingent practice, and refer to some of the 
feminist critiques of these practices. I will describe three 
general models of measurement: representational, interactionist 
and performative. The first two are embedded in the 
epistemological/ontological framework associated with many 
classical ideas of science, while a performative model draws on 
ideas and practices associated with quantum physics. I will 
make some connections between a performative model 
measurement and a disciplinary analysis of power, and start to 
apply these ideas to understanding the function of 
psychological measurement. I finish the chapter by considering 
the contemporary intra-action of scientific measurement and 
psychological measurement in brain imaging technology. 
 
The popularity and power of numbers in psychology, and the 
social sciences more generally, is often thought to derive from 
the association of quantification with scientific method. “…the 
recourse to mathematics, in one form or another, has always 
been the simplest way of providing positive knowledge about 
man with a scientific style, form and justification” (Foucault, 
1973, p. 351 , cited in Reekie, 1998, p. 45). The importance of 
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measurement in psychology is due in large part to the emphasis 
placed on psychology being regarded as scientific, both by its 
own practitioners and the broader community (Porter, 1995; 
Michell, 1999; Porter, 2003).  
 
As well as this rhetorical importance, there is also a strong 
historical connection between physics and psychology and the 
use of statistics and measurement. Gustav Fechner, often cited 
as the founder of quantitative psychology with the publication 
of his book Elemente der Psychophysik in 1860 (Boring, 1961; 
Hacking, 1991; Stigler, 1999), was himself a physicist 
interested in how he could apply the statistics he had learned 
from physics to the study of human psychology. This is more 
than an interesting anecdote, and Michell (1999) shows how 
profoundly this connection has shaped psychology (c/f Green, 
2003). I have been utilising the connections between physics 
and psychological measurement throughout this thesis.  
 
Some important statistical ideas in psychology derive from 
calculations initially made in other fields of science. This is 
called ‘scientism’- “…the view that methods successful in 
certain ‘paradigmatic’ sciences must also apply to others” 
(Michell, 1999, p. xii). There is perhaps no more powerful 
example of scientism than the Gaussian distribution of errors 
from the field of astronomy, and renamed by Pearson in the 
1890’s as the normal curve (Hacking, 1991). This curve (also 
called the Bell curve due to its shape when represented visually 
in a graph) is now deployed in a myriad of contexts in the 
government of lives through psychological assessments and 
interventions33. The Bell curve is not a product of the discipline 
                                                 
33 The  Bell curve is a statistical device for understanding the distribution of 
random errors, and not of human traits at all (Sartori, 2006) Nonetheless, the 
bell curve continues to be utilized as a scientific tool in powerful (if 
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of psychology, but of another field of science, so it can be 
transported across various scientific disciplines. This curve was 
present in my focus group discussions: 
 
CB And…um… I guess…’cos the actual tests if you 
look at graphs and stuff say well this is normal 
range 
 
ELIZABETH Graffs [pronounced differently, all 
laugh]  
 
CB  So, what’s you’re understanding of, in terms of 
the test, they talk about norm groups, they say ‘well 
this is how we define what normal is’, so what’s 
your understanding of what normal means in the 
context of a graph? 
 
KATE  The bell shaped curve, how they fit in, that’s 
how they work it out, isn’t it? That’s what they say, 
if it fits within that range  
 
Despite the importance of psychology’s claims to scientificity, 
not all practices of quantification derive from the natural 
sciences. There is also a tradition of measuring and collecting 
statistics that is more properly thought of as administrative, 
deployed not for the purpose of discovering truth but explicitly 
for classification, planning, and regulation (Porter, 2003).34 It is 
notable that Alfred Binet, the late nineteenth-century pioneer of 
                                                                                                        
sometimes controversial) ways, perhaps most infamously in the case of race 
and intelligence testing in (Herrnstein et al., 1994)  
34 I might make an analogy to Hacking’s distinction between ‘representing’ 
and ‘intervening’ in relation to the functions of these two styles. (Hacking, 
1983) Rose suggests two histories of numbers: “a benign American history 
and a less optimistic European history” (Rose, 1999, p.203), roughly 
equating to numbers as truth vs numbers as political instrument. 
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intelligence testing (arguably the most measured of all 
psychological constructs), was quite explicit that his tests did 
not measure, but classified (Zenderland, 1998, p. 96). Statistics 
of this kind are closely implicated in what has been called the 
“science of the state” (Foucault, 2007, p. 101)—the language of 
‘governmentality‘ refers to the use of statistics in this context 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). The relevance of this tradition for 
analysing psychological measurement is evident especially in 
relation to the establishment of population norms. Whilst 
psychological measurement is a scientific practice, it relies 
upon statistical ideas about population to be effective.  
 
Scientific measurement   
 
It is difficult for us to imagine a practice of science that does 
not involve measuring things. However, measurement was not 
always readily accepted as suitable for understanding Nature, 
the historical object of science or ‘natural philosophy’ (Oakley, 
2000). Prior to the influence of what is now called the 
Enlightenment during the 18th century, although systematic 
enquiry into Nature was undertaken, understanding how the 
world worked was primarily done through appeal to authorities 
of a religious kind. Scientific explanations often appealed to 
God as an irreducible cause or creator, or to universal laws of 
mathematics accessible by logic and reason. Mere human 
observation and experience was not considered adequate to the 
task of such knowledge. It was not until “…the nineteenth 
century…[that] it had finally become a task of the natural 
scientist to measure” (Hacking, 1991, p. 186).  
 
The classification of plants and flowers during the 17th and 18th 
centuries was a significant context for the emergence of 
scientific measurement, which related to debates about holism 
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and atomism as ontological principles. For example, during the 
mid-to-late 1600s and into the 1700s, the Paris Académie 
Royale des Sciences worked to catalogue plant species, with 
great care and attention devoted to differentiating varieties 
based on colour, drawing on the language of painters, dyers and 
weavers for their descriptive tools. Later, in 1737, Linnaeus 
complained that such verbosity was not only unnecessary but 
wasteful, and that only “Number, Shape, Position and 
Proportion” provided scientific description of plants (Daston, 
2005). At the centre of this shift was the way in which a 
scientific fact ought to be constituted, with a movement away 
from detailed particularism to repeatable generalisation.    
 
Discussing the early scientific measurements of natural 
phenomenon such as temperature and electricity, Porter notes 
the dissatisfaction that was expressed by some philosophers of 
the time about the infatuation with numbers and measuring.  
 
Diderot, in his more romantic moods, complained 
of the alienation from nature implied by 
mathematics. In the 1830s, the Hegelian natural 
philosopher Georg Friedrich Pohl compared Georg 
Simon Ohm’s mathematical treatment of the 
electrical circuit to a travel book that ignored a 
charming landscape and its inhabitants in favour of 
recording precisely the times of arrival and 
departure of trains (Porter, 1995, p. 18) 
 
Contrast the view that mathematics represents an ‘alienation’ 
from nature, with the oft-cited Galilean claim that mathematics 
is ‘the language of nature’ (Hacking, 1991). Measurement, let 
alone broader methods of observation and collection of 
evidence, has not always been uniformly accepted as the ideal 
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method of understanding things. Nor is the meaning of 
measurement itself uniformly conceptualised. Nonetheless, 
measurement is a central feature of contemporary scientific 
practice. It is generally agreed upon that by 1860, with the 
publication of Fechner’s book mentioned earlier, that 
measurement was a condition of a discipline being regarded as 
a science (Boring, 1961).  
 
What is scientific measurement?  
 
I will outline three ways to understand what measurement is, or 
what it does, in science. The first is a representationalist view 
of measurement; there are objects with properties, and 
measuring these does not dramatically change, alter, or produce 
the objects being measured. Second is an inter-actionist model, 
which holds that although objects do ostensibly pre-exist the 
act of being measured, there is ultimately no way of separating 
what is known from the practice of knowing: measuring 
something changes it in ways that are not entirely able to be 
accounted for, so ‘pure’ knowledge of objects is impossible. 
Third, I will discuss a performative or intra-actionist model of 
measurement, which essentially argues that the material 
arrangements by which we measure things do not simply alter 
or distort them, but effectively produces them. Each of these 
models has broad implications which apply to research and 
therapeutic practices with the problem of child sexual abuse. 
 
1- Representationalism, classical science and measurement  
 
In classical science, ‘measurement’ has a precise meaning. A 
practice does not qualify as measurement simply by the use of 
numbers. Michell provides an outline of the basic features of 
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the classical concept of measurement in the natural sciences 
(1999, pp. 1-23). The first important issue at stake is that of 
commensurability. An attribute only has a quantitative 
structure if it is qualitatively the same regardless of where it 
occurs. Thus, length is the same attribute (or ‘property’) 
whether it is the length of a plank of wood, the circumference 
of the Earth, or a distance that a particle travels in a nanosecond 
in a physics laboratory. The units used to express this distance 
may differ by orders of magnitude, but length itself is the same 
thing in all these instances. In this model of measurement, the 
attribute ‘length’ found in the classical physics lab is the same 
attribute ‘length’ measured by a carpenter; length is 
commensurable in the two instances. 
 
Suppose for a moment that anxiety is measurable (I am 
choosing anxiety as it commonly appears in instruments of 
psychological measurement, including the BASC—Behavioral 
Assessment System for Children—the main assessment 
instrument used by the counsellors in my focus groups). 
Commensurability would mean that person A’s anxiety is 
qualitatively the same as person B’s. It would also mean that 
person A’s anxiety is always qualitatively identical to itself, 
differing only in amounts across time and space. (If it were not 
the same in each situation, we would need to use different 
names for each instance). Under this model, it is possible, given 
the right instruments, to work out how much anxiety any 
individual person has, both in absolute terms (this is called a 
ratio or cardinal scale) and relative to the rest of the population 
(an ordinal or interval scale). If something is measured using 
the ratio or cardinal scale, it refers to an actual amount or 
quantity of anxiety; anxiety is considered to be a quantitative 
attribute, and the measurement is meaningful in and of itself. 
With an ordinal or interval scale, the anxiety itself may not be 
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exactly a quantitative attribute because it is only rating person 
A’s anxiety relative to person B’s; A may have more or less 
than B, but this does not have to mean we know anything about 
the absolute amount of anxiety. Ordinal and interval scales are 
ordering devices, but do not entail measurement in the strict 
scientific sense defined by Michell (1999). 
 
Some further formal features are required for an attribute to be 
quantitative and therefore measurable within the 
representationalist model.  
 
1: Measurement requires that the attribute in question contains 
a structure which supports consistency of ratios; when some 
thing ‘a’ is measured as being 2x, it bears a precise and 
meaningful relationship to x (i.e. it is meaningful to say that a 
is equal to twice the value of x). The ratio remains consistent 
regardless of the quantity represented by x (e.g. be it 
centimetres, furlongs or miles). x here is a unit of measurement, 
and all quantities of that type (e.g. length) can be expressed as a 
magnitude of x. The ratio to x of any two given lengths will 
remain consistent, regardless of the actual unit in which x is 
expressed (e.g. all lengths can be expressed as a ratio relative to 
a metre, although it is often impractical). Similarly, we can 
conceive of the length ‘zero’ even if we could not actually 
produce or point to such a thing. With our example of Anxiety, 
it would mean that a measurement called 2x (where x is a unit 
of anxiety, analogous to a metre or centimetre of length35) is 
twice as much anxiety as x. It was this lack of an apparent 
standard reference unit for sensations that led some of Wundt’s 
and Fechner’s contemporaries to argue that ‘mental processes’ 
                                                 




could not be measured in the same sense as physical properties 
could be (Darrigol, 2003). 
 
2: A further question as to whether or not an attribute is 
measurable is- how can we tell if the attribute possesses an 
additive structure? The possession of an additive structure is 
why ratio is so important; with our symbols above, an attribute 
x with an additive structure means that 2x is precisely twice as 
much as x. With the attributes of ‘length’ we can say that 2 
metres is twice as much length as one metre, by the practice of 
concatenation (adding two like quantities together). If the 
attribute does not have an additive structure, it is nonsensical to 
add them together.  
 
This question can be further elaborated by drawing a distinction 
between ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ properties (Comrey, 1968; 
Delanda, 2002; Michell, 2006)36. Although this is a fairly 
complex matter, there are a few points that are relevant for my 
purposes here. First, while extensive properties (such as length 
or volume) are directly empirically measurable, intensive 
properties (e.g. temperature, density) are generally measurable 
only through the way they affect things. So while the volume of 
a glass of water is directly measurable, the temperature can be 
measured only be the affect it has on the water (or the mercury 
in a thermometer). It is possible that intensive properties are 
measurable through the effects they have on extensive ones. If 
this is the case, then the differences between intensive and 
extensive properties lie only in our capacity to perceive them, 
and are not inherent in the properties themselves. 
 
                                                 
36 Michell (2006) actually claims that the distinction is now only of 
historical interest in philosophy of science, whilst Delanda (2002) constructs 
an entire Deluezean ontological framework based on the distinction. In any 
case, I have found it a useful way to conceptualize aspects of the scientific 
problem of psychological measurement.  
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The second distinguishing feature between extensive and 
intensive properties has to do with their continuity. While ever 
larger volumes of water will always remain water, changing the 
temperature will actually change the water into a qualitatively 
different kind of thing (ice or steam). Intensive properties can 
produce qualitative state-changes, whilst extensive properties 
cannot. Intensive properties can be thought of as states rather 
than amounts (Essex et al., 1999). 
 
The third difference is whether the property can sustain 
division or addition (concatenation). If you pour half the glass 
of water into a smaller glass, the volume of water in each glass 
is halved. However, in each glass the temperature remains the 
same as it was originally.   
 
It is possible for both intensive and extensive properties to be 
quantitative in structure (or ‘fundamentally measurable’ as one 
mid-20th century writer put it (Comrey, 1968)). Although an 
intensive property (anxiety, for example37) can be experienced 
as more, less than or equal to, it does not necessarily mean that 
these differences are measurable in the strict scientific sense 
(Michell, 2006). Michell argues that, while psychological 
attributes might be quantitative, this in fact has not been 
proven; it is simply assumed.  Here is the outline of the 
scientific problem of measuring psychological attributes. 
Considering the properties that an attribute must possess to be 
quantitative in structure, and therefore scientifically 
measurable, it is far from certain that psychological attributes 
possess such a structure. Michell’s argument is that 
psychological attributes have not been shown to possess this 
structure, and that this has not been acknowledged within the 
                                                 
37 I am jumping ahead slightly here; for now I will assume that anxiety may 
be thought of as an intensive property. 
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discipline (1999). His argument makes an implicit assertion 
that either the classical-representationalist model or the 
interactionist models (see next section) of measurement are the 
only correct models for scientific measurement38.  
 
In this model of measurement, an external observer (e.g. the 
scientist) can ‘stand apart’ from the objects being measured and 
does not influence the object or its attributes through the actual 
measurement act. The instruments used may not be entirely 
accurate, but they do not fundamentally alter the object or its 
attributes. This is the notion of ‘separatism’, meaning that there 
are definable points of connection between ostensibly discrete 
systems; the measured object and the observing agent. 
Measuring instruments act as a mediator between the two 
systems, but the instruments themselves are (ideally) 
transparent and neutral. In this separatist model, psychological 
measurement consists of a (more or less) neutral instrument 
(e.g. a standardised questionnaire, or an experimental 
laboratory situation) that can measure the traits it sets out to 
measure, the ‘cut’ between the object and the researcher is 
complete, and the process of measurement fundamentally alters 
neither participant. It is the will and action of the observer that 
structures and drives this process, with the object of 
investigation being more or less passive (Barad, 2007).  
2- Interactionist model of measurement. 
 
The representationalist model is an ideal notion of 
measurement that provides an aspirational reference point in 
classical physics but is generally recognised as unachievable. 
                                                 
38 There is also another possibility mentioned by Michell (2006, see p.422 ), 
that psychological measurement does not require attributes themselves to be 
quantitative, but that the difference between two instances of the attribute 
are. He suggests that this was the dominant view of psychophysics at the 
start of the 20th century. 
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There is general recognition, even in the ‘hard’ science of 
classical physics but more so in the human sciences, that 
measurement constitutes an intervention, however much one 
wishes to avoid disruption of the observed object. The 
implication of this recognition is to try and account for and 
minimise the disruption, in order to more accurately detect the 
‘true’ nature of the object under study.  
 
The distinction between the representationalist model and 
interactionist model of measurement has methodological and 
epistemological implications, but there is no great ontological 
issue at stake. Both models hold that there is an independently 
existing reality, that objects possess attributes that are part of 
their essence or nature. In one sense, the interactionist model 
simply acknowledges that the pre-existing reality may not be 
directly accessible to human observation or measurement. The 
methodological imperative is to devise means of measurement 
that produce the least disturbance or distortion possible; or less 
ideally, to be able to fully account for whatever disturbance is 
involved so that the pre-measurement state can be deduced.  
 
3- Performative model of measurement 
 
In this model, neither the object, subject, nor instruments of 
measurement can be understood apart from their engagement in 
the ‘phenomena’ of measuring (Barad, 2007). A key point here 
is that there is no independently existing Cartesian ‘cut’ 
between the object of knowledge and the agent of knowledge. 
The cut is in fact a “constructed, agentially enacted, materially 
conditioned and embodied, contingent Bohrian cut between an 
object and the agencies of observation” (Barad, 2007, p. 115). 




Barad stresses the importance of this distinction: as she points 
out, classical physics (and because of this to a large extent, 
common sense) understands that measuring something makes it 
behave differently. Her (and Bohr’s) claim is a stronger one of 
indeterminacy, not uncertainty. “The issue is not one of 
unknowability per se; rather, it is a question of what can be said 
to simultaneously exist”. (p. 118). That is to say, depending on 
the apparatus and conditions of measurement, only momentum 
or position (of a particle in a physics experiment) can be said to 
materially exist at the same time, but not both: “…the values of 
complementary variables (such as position and momentum) are 
not simultaneously determinate”. In a performative model, 
“…measurements do not represent measurement-independent 
states of being” (Barad, 2007, p.138). In a performative model, 
scientific methods, instruments and techniques are constitutive 
of the theories they are used to elaborate. “Contemporary 
scientific reality- and this goes for a science like psychology as 
much as any other- is the inescapable outcome of the categories 
we use to think it, the techniques and procedures we use to 
evidence it, the statistical tools and modes of proof we use to 
justify it” (Rose, 1998, p. 52). 
 
This needs to be distinguished from the recognition (the kind 
familiar to social workers) that “other observers may determine 
a different reality and, similarly, the observational text is likely 
to hold a multiplicity of meanings for the reader” (Le Riche, 
1998, p. 31). A performative model places much more 
emphasis on material arrangements of measurement and 
observation, and de-emphasizes the intentions or will of the 
human observer. It is a ‘post-humanist’ model. The 
contribution of the human observer is partially (not completely) 
determined by the epistemic arrangements of the situation, in 
contrast to the classical scientific model where the entire 
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arrangement of observation is understood as a manifestation of 
the will of the human observer (Crary, 1990; Barad, 2007). 
 
The majority of debates and critique about psychological 
measurement revolves around the first two models of 
measurement from the natural sciences. Key questions in this 
literature are whether psychological attributes are quantitative 
in structure, and more so, what kinds of instruments might be 
used to measure such attributes. There are significant questions 
about the applicability of methods from the natural sciences for 
the study of people. There is the inescapable fact that 
measurement of psychological attributes involves an interaction 
between two or more people, both of whom possess a degree of 
agency thus introducing tricky questions of subjectivity and the 
shaping of interaction by social, political and cultural forces.  
 
In this thesis, I am interested in how a performative model of 
measurement can be usefully deployed to understand 
psychological measurement. As Barad (2007) makes explicit, 
there are important implications for our understanding of the 
power/knowledge nexus in this model. Importantly, the 
performative model shifts attention away from the results of 
measurement, to a genealogy of the measurement situation 
itself. The connections with a Foucauldian formulation of 
power provide a potentially rich source of material for this 
thesis. In the next section I explore some of these implications 
more fully, before reviewing some of the major critiques of the 







The importance of practices 
 
Although I will reference the arguments over the disputed 
scientific status of psychological measurement (i.e. is 
psychological measurement an authentically scientific 
practice?), I want to state that it is not my aim to come to any 
conclusions on that question. In a sense, that question will be 
sidestepped by taking seriously the claim that psychology is a 
science, and treating psychological measurement as a material 
practice of enquiry and knowledge production. The authors I 
draw upon in following this tradition tend to adopt an approach 
that shares many of the epistemological and ontological facets 
of Foucauldian analysis I outlined in Chapter 2. This approach 
follows from recent work in science studies that seeks to centre 
questions of how knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and the 
knower are produced in scientific work (e.g. Barad, 2007; 
Daston et al., 2007). Central to this work is the interrogation of 
representationalism; the idea that there is a reality that exists 
independently of our (human) knowledge of it, and that our 
descriptions accord with that reality to a greater or lesser 
degree. There are a number of possible takes on this idea. 
Indeed, classical scientific method itself rests on the 
assumption that researchers do not have immediate access to 
this reality through the senses, and that only by carefully 
identifying and eliminating and/or minimizing subjective 
distortions can scientific work arrive at better and closer 
representations. Other more critical positions include relativism 
(all efforts to obtain knowledge of the world are limited by the 
local and specific position of the enquirer) and constructivism 
(our efforts to produce knowledge of objects actually produce 




Performative approaches to these questions focus on how not 
only representations but scientific objects (or more correctly, 
phenomenon: Barad, 2007) themselves are produced through 
scientific practices, and the conditions under which these 
achievements are possible. “A performative understanding of 
scientific practices…takes account of the fact that knowing 
does not come from standing at a distance and representing but 
rather from a direct material engagement with the world” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 49). Observation of things is an engagement 
with them; knowledge and objects (‘words and things’) are 
entangled. In analysing scientific practices of knowledge 
production, including practices of psychological measurement, 
one also has to account for the potential that these practices 
alter the researcher.  
 
This understanding informs my investigation of the quantitative 
research texts on child sexual abuse and the practices of 
knowledge production they entail. However, as Barad (2007) is 
at pains to remind her readers, practices and theories derived 
from experimental physics do not translate smoothly into 
discourses about the human sciences, as productive as these 
insights might be. At the same time, as I have already 
mentioned, physics and psychology do not have entirely 
discontinuous histories. It is a matter of taking some care not to 
argue by metaphor or analogy, but to apply insights from one 
discipline in an empirical and thorough manner (parallel to 
scientific measurement itself). Further, if child sexual abuse 
research presents itself as scientific, then an analytical approach 
drawn from the field of science studies is appropriate. 
 
One particular difference that I am aware of in the use of some 
of these ideas from science studies for this thesis, is that the 
practice of psychological measurement with sexually abused 
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children or adults is not an experimental situation of the kind 
that Barad takes as her preferred ‘phenomenon’. In a strictly 
experimental research situation (usually in a physics lab, for 
example), researchers control and adjust the independent 
variable(s) in order to investigate how they affect the object 
under investigation (the dependant variable).  
 
Experimental research of this kind does have a solid tradition 
within psychology, in research on stimulus, response and 
perception (Danziger, 1990, 1997), with the language of 
dependent and independent variables emerging around the 
1930’s (Winston, 2005). This is clearly not the model for 
research on child sexual abuse. Researchers obviously do not 
take their measurements before sexual abuse occurs and then 
subject the research participant to sexual abuse and take a 
second set of measurements. However, more broadly, research 
on the physiology of trauma (a central construct for child 
sexual abuse research and therapy) has subjected animals to 
traumatic events in laboratory and field research (McNally, 
2003).  
 
Sexual abuse researchers try to discover differences based on 
the variable of interest (child sexual abuse) through other 
means, including a raft of statistical procedures. One means of 
attempting this is through the production of the normal range of 
a particular trait, in which a population of non-sexually abused 
research subjects are compared on a set of measures to sexually 
abused research subjects. There are difficulties to be overcome 
with this approach. Even in the case of prospective studies 
(where non-sexually abused subjects would be followed for a 
period of time such that some percentage of them would be 
expected to have been abused in the interim), any changes in 
measurements could not be attributed to sexual abuse alone as 
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there would be so many other possible uncontrolled variables. 
There are also issues with the construction of normality, which 
is often naturalised in the research.  
 
In terms of the epistemological issues I am concerned with in 
this chapter, I am keenly aware that the situation of 
psychological measurement and measurement in experimental 
physics are not identical. However, my contention will be that 
there are important ethical, epistemological and perhaps 
ontological insights from a performative model of scientific 
measurement that will be useful for developing an 
understanding of psychological measurement in research and 
therapeutic contexts with child sexual abuse. 
 
Critiques of quantification 
 
Measurement is an empirical practice, compared to the logical 
methods of mathematics and statistics. However, measurement 
is often ‘joined up’ with these other styles of number-producing 
ways of knowing, and these are all sometimes congealed 
together as scientific methods. As in the natural sciences 
(perhaps more so), the idea that numbers and statistics are a 
suitable means for understanding people is contentious. This 
has manifested itself in methodological debates in various 
disciplines of study concerning people, as well as popular 
debates. In his 1854 novel Hard Times, Charles Dickens 
satirised the idea that humans could be known through 
measurement and quantification (Oakley, 2000).  
 
Inhumanity, math, and social measurement are 
combined in the character Thomas Gradgrind: A 
man of realities. A man of facts and calculations. A 
man who proceeds on the principle that two and 
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two are four, and nothing over. . . With a rule and a 
pair of scales, and the multiplication table always 
in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh and measure any 
parcel of human nature, and tell you exactly what it 
comes to (cited in Peters, 2001, p. 437) 
 
This passage recalls the famous dictum of Lord Kelvin,  
 
When you can measure what you are speaking 
about and express it in numbers you know 
something about it; but when you cannot measure it 
in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind (cited in Porter, 1995, p. 72) 
 
Dickens’ attack on such ways of knowing was likely motivated 
by notions of elitism. HG Wells was another who argued 
against scientific methods of understanding humans, as these 
were ‘deceitful’ because they disregarded the “‘objective truth’ 
of individual experience” (cited in Oakley, 2000, p. 132). Note 
Wells’ use of the term ‘objective’ to describe individual 
experience, precisely what present day psychological 
researchers tend to call ‘subjective’.  
 
It is interesting to note here that these objections are also 
constitutive of other ways of knowing, which produce different 
normative understanding of humans. That is to say, criticisms 
of measurement specifically, or scientific method in general, 
are themselves based on a set of assumptions about what kind 
of things humans are and the best way to know about them. 
Already evident in the Wells’ quote above, for example, is the 
humanist notion that each individual person is a unique being 
whose essential self comes from within them; a standardized 
method of enquiry is incapable of portraying this uniqueness of 
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being. This would potentially give rise to more 
phenomenological ways of knowing about people. This theme 
– that criticisms of any truth claim necessarily include their 
own competing truth claims—which runs through much of the 
Foucauldian literature, revolves around these questions; what is 
the basis of resistance to any regime of knowing, and what 
normative assumptions and values do these resistances in turn 
produce?  
 
In other words, why critique measurement, and what happens 
when we do? I mention this point here to remind myself and the 
reader that my intention is not to expose psychological 
measurement as a false and inaccurate method of knowing and 
that there is another truer way of knowing, free from power and 
other corrupting conditions. Rather, criticisms of 
‘quantification’ are themselves produced by networks of 
knowledge, power and claims to truth, just as much as 
quantification itself. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Quantitative is to qualitative, as patriarchal is to feminist? 
 
Well after Dickens’ time, a robust feminist critique of 
quantification in the social sciences has been developed. 
Various feminist critiques of science and objectivity, and 
quantification in particular, have been developed over the last 
25-30 years (Keller, 1985; Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1991; 
Keller, 1992; Duran, 1998; see Oakley, 2000 for a critical 
discussion)39. The common argument of these criticisms is that 
                                                 
39 I have not delineated the respective contributions of these individual 
authors. I acknowledge that there are divergences and specificities amongst 
their work. My purpose here is primarily to indicate the existence of a well- 
established critique of scientific quantification developed from feminist 
frameworks. My later discussions of the practices of psychological 
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scientific method (of which measurement is a crucial 
component) represents a masculinist or male-centred world 
view, which is presented as objective, ahistorical and universal. 
This is conceptually linked to the Cartesian break between 
reason and matter, and the whole familiar list of gendered 
dualisms associated with each (nature/culture, body/soul, 
emotional/rational, and so on). Experiences and accounts of the 
world which are not presented within the rules or discourse of 
the scientific method are marginalised, along with the 
individuals and groups which produce such non-scientific 
accounts (including women and children, as well as Indigenous 
peoples (Connell, 2007)); Foucault’s ‘subjugated knowledges’. 
While this remains a popular critique of science, there are also 
feminist ‘defences’ of quantitative approaches to knowledge. 
 
Experiments in knowing, Ann Oakley’s (2000) examination of 
the history of research methodologies in the social sciences 
(and how the term ‘science’ came to be applied to research of 
the social world), takes as its starting point the long running 
debates between quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
social research, and the ideological alignments that have 
become associated with each camp. In particular, she is 
interested in the equation of qualitative research with feminism 
and so-called ‘female’ ways of knowing, and the associations 
between masculinism and quantitative approaches to research 
(Oakley, 2000)40. I showed evidence of this in the field of child 
sexual abuse research in my account of the Levett and Russel 
debate in Chapter 1.  
 
                                                                                                        
measurement highlight the implications of this body of work in greater 
detail.       
40 It is worth noting that a reverse sentiment exists on this division: “There is 
more than a germ of truth in the suggestion that, in a society where 
statisticians thrive, liberty and individuality are likely to be emasculated” 
(Moroney, cited as the opening quote in (Hopkins, 1973) 
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This polarisation between proponents of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to knowledge has generated much 
heated debate. On the one hand are the opponents of 
quantification, who argue that such ways of knowing are 
destructive and overly rational, thereby implicitly aligned with 
‘masculine’ ways of knowing41. Oakley cites Dorothy Ross as 
an example of this critical position. In this argument, scientism 
has political implications precisely due to the claim that 
scientific methods are objective. This has resulted in the use of 
such knowledge…  
 
 …to manipulate such things as the money supply, 
consumer choices, votes, and remedial social 
therapies…Blind to what cannot be measured, they 
are often blind to the human and social 
consequences of their use. The manipulators of 
social scientific technique, intent on instrumental 
rationality, cannot notice the qualitative human 
world their techniques are constructing and 
destroying (Ross, 1991, cited in Oakley, 2000, p. 
197). 
 
It could be said that in some ways, Ross’s statement is not 
really even a criticism, to the extent that it simply repeats the 
claims of advocates of scientific measurement. That is, it is 
precisely the capacity of measurement to enable control that 
advocates take as a virtue, not a problem. For example:  
  
Control of nature has been particularly facilitated 
by the invention of instruments of measurement. 
Similarly, the control of human conduct and 
                                                 
41 This tendency, in critical literature on gender, to equate such destructive 
terms with masculinity in a kind of circular ritual of definition of 
masculinity is discussed by Frey (2004). 
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education depends on the development of more 
exact methods of describing human conduct. The 
exact description of human conduct can be 
rendered most efficient when it is reduced to a form 
of measurement, for then small differences are most 
accurately portrayed and small differences most 
accurately noted (P.M. Symonds, 1931:v, cited in 
Danziger, 1997, p. 147) 
  
While declaring some sympathy for views such as Ross’s, 
Oakley presents a different story about the development of 
quantitative scientific methods. She traces the origins of 
science and scientific approaches to knowledge as being born 
of democratic impulses, with the vision of enabling any person 
to have access to knowledge provided they can apply the 
correct methods42. This was a liberatory advancement upon 
theological ways of knowing which held that knowledge and 
truth were the domain of divine providence, and the nature of 
reality was mysterious and inaccessible to ‘man’. The intent of 
the pioneers of scientific method was not to exclude a class of 
people from knowledge, but quite the reverse. Any person in 
possession of the correct method, equipment and enquiring 
mind could access the truth of things. Consistent with this 
democratic impulse, Oakley argues that quantitative approaches 
to knowledge are not necessarily ‘masculinist’. Indeed, some 
feminist researchers have dedicated their efforts to developing 
scales to measure feminist attitudes themselves (e.g. Henley et 
al., 1998). More pertinently, I argue in this thesis that 
                                                 
42 The same point can be made more generally about numerous 
Enlightenment concepts. Autonomy, for example, has been subject to much 
feminist criticism as venerating a detached masculine individualism, yet this 
concept can also mean the capacity to become aware of the external limits 
and influences which inform one’s desires and interests. This capacity 
allows one to ‘refuse to submit’ to such operations of power which may 
otherwise appear natural. As McNay (1992) argues, this aspect of autonomy 
ought to retain some usefulness for emancipatory feminist projects. 
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measurement of the effects of child sexual abuse has been a 
crucial component in feminist efforts to have the harm of 
sexual abuse socially recognised (Russell, 1991). 
 
As science and scientific methods came to be applied to the 
study of society and individuals, so it was necessary for the 
behaviours and characteristics of individuals to be rendered 
calculable, in order for knowledge about them to have the 
status of science (Porter, 1986). As the quantification of natural 
phenomenon became synonymous with what was considered 
legitimate science, Condercet’s ‘social mathematics’ was the 
apt naming of the application of mathematical methods to the 
study of society (Oakley, 2000, p. 103). The appeal of numbers 
was that they were considered to be objective, and not 
susceptible to the vagaries of human subjectivity. Again, this 
was seen as an advance towards democratic forms of knowing, 
free from personal prejudice and political despotism (Rose, 
1999).  
  
The field of child sexual abuse is a highly contested site of 
knowledge claims (being constituted by those same claims). 
The involvement of feminist activists, and the subsequent 
theoretical and political resources on which they draw, often sit 
uneasily alongside those who regard child sexual abuse 
research as an area of objective scientific (psychological) study.  
 
This thesis will argue that it is not necessarily productive to 
categorically dismiss measurement and quantification as an 
oppressive, dehumanising and masculinist practice. Neither is it 
helpful or accurate to dismiss as emotional and subjective those 
knowledge claims that do not conform to scientific methods. 
Important social justice aims have been served through the 
feminist production and deployment of statistics, including, 
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importantly, the problem of child sexual abuse. An obvious and 
fundamental example to point out here is the deployment of 
statistics regarding the gender of the majority of perpetrators. 
The statistic that the vast majority of sexual offenders are men 
is a crucial support for the argument that sexual abuse is a 
gendered crime. It is difficult to reconcile the proliferation of 
this statistic with the argument that quantification per se is 
necessarily a way of knowing that serves patriarchal interests. 
Even feminist post-structuralists who contest the way that 
statistical norms and psychological measurements can be used 
to pathologise women survivors of child sexual abuse, 
nonetheless recognise the political and strategic use of citing 
statistically significant trends such as “men make up about 95% 
of sexual offenders” (Warner, 2009, p.15. Consistent with her 
framework, Warner is explicit about the unstable nature and 
strategic deployment of statistics). Abandoning measurement 
and statistics altogether would seem neither possible nor, I will 
argue, desirable in relation to the problem of child sexual 
abuse. Following Gail Reekie’s claim cited at the beginning of 
this thesis, we need statistics in order for child sexual abuse to 
be a discussable social problem. However, I argue it is valuable 
to analyse how measurement and statistics discipline the 
problem of child sexual abuse. The performative model of 
measurement outlined above provides some valuable tools for 
undertaking this disciplinary analysis.  
 
In the next section, I will narrow down from science, social 
science and measurement to focus on the practice of 





A brief historical sketch of psychological measurement  
 
Despite the ongoing debates related to measurement and 
statistics in the social sciences generally, I would argue that 
quantification has come to be synonymous with scientific 
method in the psy-disciplines. This is made explicit in the field 
of psychiatry in the title of the key diagnostic reference text, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. Psychological measurement 
plays a central part in the claim that psychology is a science. In 
this section I will present a brief history of psychological 
measurement, largely based on Joel Michell’s work on this 
topic.   
 
Michell (1999) investigates how measurement as a practice 
came to be a central tool of psychology as a science. Michell 
suggests that the impetus for psychology’s historical concern 
with measurement was to present itself as both ‘scientific’ and 
as an ‘applied science’ (1999, p. xiii). That is to say, 
psychology as a discipline needed to establish both intellectual 
credibility and practical purpose. Descartes’ radical separation 
of material and non-material properties set the ground work for 
the early separation of psychology from the natural sciences 
(Michell, 1999: 40-42). The separation of physical and mental 
phenomenon leaves no possibility for mental attributes (i.e. 
those functions associated with ‘the mind’) to be the proper 
subject of measurement, which is exclusively concerned with 
the material world. Non-material objects are not considered 
measurable under this division (Boring, 1961; Darrigol, 2003). 
This is one of the bases of the ‘quantity objection’ to measuring 
psychological attributes. 
 
The quantity objection has two sides. The first is conceptual: 
mental phenomena cannot meaningfully be said to be 
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quantitative. The other is more empirical: the hypothesis that 
mental phenomena are quantitative is meaningful, is just that, 
as a matter of fact, mental phenomena do not possess 
quantitative structure (Michell, 1999, p. 44) 
 
Michell (1999, pp. 24-25) identifies three intellectual trends as 
the context in which quantitative psychology had to establish 
itself: 
 
1- The Classical concept of measurement- all measurable 
attributes must be quantitative 
2- The Measurability Thesis- Some psychological 
attributes are measurable  
3- The Quantity Objection- No psychological attributes are 
measurable 
 
In Michell’s account, the idea of applying measurement and 
calculation to psychology was directly modelled on and 
inspired by the natural sciences (p. 34). In the natural sciences, 
there is an association of measurement with exactness. 
However, measurement is not meaningful, let alone exact, if the 
thing it purports to measure is not quantitative (see earlier 
discussion); Michell argues that it is has not been established 
that psychological attributes are quantitative. Despite this 
scientific lack, psychologists nonetheless accepted and 
promoted the idea that psychological attributes are measurable 
for at least five key reasons: 
 
i the tendency to model psychology upon quantitative 
natural science; 
ii the belief that pursuit of the goals of precision and 
exactness required measurement; 
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iii Pythagoreanism (the idea that all entities are 
quantitative- as opposed to Aristotle’s metaphysics which held 
that some attributes are qualitative); 
iv the ‘quantitative imperative’; and  
v the perceived need to ‘sell’ psychology as quantitative 
(p. 39) 
Rather than take the more familiar (though perhaps more self-
consciously radical) humanist objection that understandings of 
human psychology derived from scientific methods per se are 
flawed, Michell argues that it is the unquestioned suitability of 
psychological attributes for measurement which is unscientific. 
His project is to resuscitate what he sees as a critical scientific 
failing on the part of quantitative psychology, a two–level 
‘pathology of science’ (Michell, 2000): 1- the hypothesis that 
psychological attributes are quantifiable has not been 
adequately tested; and 2- this failure has not been 
acknowledged. There is no problem with the notion of 
psychological measurement; it is just that it has not yet been 
proven to be scientifically justified. Michell lays the blame for 
this situation largely at the feet of one S.S. Stevens.  
 
Stevens’ definition of measurement: Assigning numbers to 
objects 
 
Michell contrasts the focus on ratios in the classical definition 
of measurement, with Steven’s (1948) definition of 
measurement that has become the accepted definition in 
psychology43. Stevens’ definition was simply that measurement 
is the assigning of numerals to objects according to a rule. The 
                                                 
43 Statistical methods (probability based modelling and inference), as 
opposed to measurement of psychological characteristics per se, entered 
psychology much earlier, through the work of Gustav Fechner around 1860. 
(Stigler, 1999, p, 187). 
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assigning of numbers to objects does not constitute 
measurement in the classical scientific sense; it is more like a 
method for categorisation or classification. In measurement-
theory terms, this assignation of numbers to objects would be 
called ‘nominal’ if the purpose is to categorise or distinguish 
one class of objects from another (the number is simply a 
symbol with no inherent value), or ‘ordinal’ if numbers are 
used to create a series ordered by some notion of an attribute 
being less-to-more, yet the numbers not necessarily indicating 
any absolute quantity. Nonetheless, Stevens’ definition became 
the benchmark for measurement in psychology, and 
contemporary texts on psychological measurement still refer to 
it approvingly and without qualification (e.g. McCartney et al., 
2006; Strack et al., 2007). That is to say, the numbers produced 
by cardinal or ordinal measurements are generally regarded as 
if they were absolute measurements of quantity. 
 
Michell stresses that the acceptance by psychologists of 
Stevens’ definition of measurement is a rejection of the 
classical definition. This acceptance was productive in that it 
allowed for the quantity objection to be overcome; “it made the 
quantity objection seem quite irrelevant”. The quantity 
objection is essentially the claim that psychological attributes 
are not quantitative in nature. It was not a genuine resolution of 
the scientific problem, but allowed the business of 
psychological measurement to proceed44. So psychologists 
were able to proceed as if psychological attributes were 
quantitative in structure, and used the term ‘measurement’ to 
describe what they did. The use of this term allowed the 
impression that this was a scientific activity. Specific practices 
like the standardisation of questions and instructions for 
                                                 
44 There is a sense in which my thesis makes a productive play on Steven’s 
definition, in that I consider a range of ‘number-generating activities’ in 
relation to sexual abuse. 
159 
 
interviewers in questionnaires and surveys facilitated this 
perception of equivalence with standardized measurement in 
the natural sciences (Strack et al., 2007). 
 
By the late 1940s, with Stevens’ definition, measurement had 
become accepted practice within psychology and was 
considered a necessary aspect of psychology as a science; “…a 
wide class of number-generating operations were routinely 
accepted as measurement procedures” (Michell, 1999, p. 78). In 
effect, the assignment of numbers to attributes was thought to 
constitute scientific measurement, with no real consideration 
given to the question of whether the attributes in question were 
quantitative in structure. Michell (2000) argues that this 
remains the case to the current day. 
 
It is worth noting that some of Stevens’ statements are 
strikingly resonant with what might now be considered current 
critiques of science associated with the likes of Latour and 
Foucault (Matheson, 2006). For example, Matheson cites the 
following quote from Stevens: “…all that passes for scientific 
truth is conditioned upon its social acceptance…In fact science 
can speak of truth only as of a certain place and date, for what 
is true today was not true yesterday and may not be true 
tomorrow…Knowledge, or truth…is dynamic, restless and 
relative” (Stevens, 1939, cited in Matheson, 2006, p. 72). 
Although Foucault conceptualised truth and knowledge in 
terms of historically situated discursive regimes (i.e. that which 
conditions the socially acceptable and the scientifically valid), 
rather than simply social acceptance, the quote suggests that the 
work of both shared a suspicion (or an outright rejection) of the 
claim that scientific truth did or could represent a fixed and 




Michell’s account is enlightening and provides something of a 
critical ‘insider’s’ history of the practice of psychological 
measurement. Importantly, his account does not dismiss 
altogether the potential of psychological attributes to be a 
proper object of scientific measurement. His claim is simply 
that it has not been adequately proven that psychological 
attributes are quantitative in structure. He does not object to or 
critique the idea that measurable, scientific knowledge about 
the psychological attributes of individuals is possible or 
desirable. He does not object to the practice of scientific 
psychological measurement, he just does not think such a 
practice yet exists.  
 
As a result, other than commenting on the professionally and 
economically lucrative advantages that the adoption of 
measurement as a psychological practice generated for its 
practitioners, Michell does not pursue the constitutive aspects 
of the problem. That is, he represents the findings of such 
practices as objectionable because he does not believe that it 
has been proven that psychological attributes are actually 
measurable. Therefore, for him such knowledge may present an 
inaccurate picture of the true nature of individuals. This implies 
that if the correct methods could be developed (a project to 
which his work is directed), then psychology could discover, 
could represent, some truths about humans. Thus, while 
Michell argues that measurement often alters the object 
measured (Michell, 2011), his argument commits to an inter-
actionist model of measurement, with the caveat that 
psychological attributes have not yet been shown to be 
quantitative. This then requires that I look elsewhere for 
accounts of psychological measurement for this thesis, as I am 




Historicising psychological measurement 
 
Danziger (1990) proposes a history of psychology that takes as 
its basis not the ‘rational’ approach of consecutive discoveries 
or instruments, nor the ‘irrational’ view of the individual 
psychologists and the circumstances of their lives. He 
emphasises the constructed nature of psychological knowledge, 
and the imperative upon psychologists to construct their 
research and its presentation in agreed upon forms to a 
community of other psychologists, in order to be regarded as 
scientifically valid knowledge. Further, he proposes that it is 
not only the methods of psychological research that should be 
studied, but also that the proposed object of psychological 
study can be studied historically as this is also liable to change. 
To be more precise, the objects of psychological research 
(people and their characteristics) are constituted by the 
historically specific methods used to produce/describe them. So 
for example, the notion of personality, and the ability to 
categorize personalities as normal or pathological, depends 
upon (rather than proves) an additive model of the person, 
along with the assumption that the numbers applied to the 
various aspects actually refer to something measurable 
(McCallum, 1997). While this insight is shared by both 
Danziger and Michell, Michell’s concern is with the 
misrepresentation and lack of scientific rigour this involves, 
while the constructivist understanding focuses on the ‘truth 
effects’ of these practices, the contingent historical 
circumstances of their production and circulation, and the 
practices of governance they make possible.  
 
Danziger argues that the form of the early psychological 
experiments was in many ways a continuation of the link 
between psychology and physiology. The physiological 
162 
 
experiment, with its concern with response times, and the 
perceptions of sensations like vision and touch, gave practices 
of measurement a central role. There was in fact significant 
crossover between the two disciplines in the early-mid 1800s, 
and it was only in the late 1800s that the distinction between 
them became clear (Danziger, 1997, p. 51).  
Many instruments used for research in the earlier 
‘psychophysics’ and sensory perception research were also 
used in psychological research experiments (Gundlach, 2007). 
These research practices of measurement created a demand for 
technical equipment, with some research laboratories even 
employing or contracting specialists to manufacture 
psychological instruments for these purposes (Gundlach, 2007). 
At this practical level then, it seems that psychology was bound 
up with particular forms of measurement from its beginnings 
(Hand, 2004; Borsboom, 2005).  
 
A distinction here is helpful: whilst physiological research was 
concerned with directly measuring bodily reactions and 
sensations, psychological research became more interested in 
the (human) subject’s perception of these sensations. So the 
phrase ‘just noticeable difference’ indicates that small 
differences between weights, for example, are not necessarily 
perceived by the human subject. The measurement of these 
‘jnd’s’ is an example of a type of problem taken up by 
psychological research, implying the existence of a conceptual 
space in which actual differences are subject to psychological 
processes that cannot be explained at the level of physiology or 
biology. Early psychological researchers were aware of this 
space as a problem to be managed; for example, weights with 
different values were manufactured to appear visually identical 
(i.e. the same size), called ‘deceptive weights’, to minimize the 
influence that visual stimuli may have on the subject’s 
163 
 
perception of the difference in actual weight. As Gundlach 
notes, “You will probably find this kind of weight only in 
psychological laboratories. The Bureau of Standards and your 
local farmer’s market have no need of them” (2007, p. 203). It 
is worth noting that the very concept of jnd’s is premised on the 
idea that human perception is not accurate- otherwise all 
differences would be noticeable.      
 
Despite the disciplinary separation of psychology from 
physiology noted by Danziger, contemporary studies into the 
traumatic impacts of child sexual abuse continue to combine 
the psychological and physiological. Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder is a widely agreed upon consequence of sexual abuse, 
with measurable ‘psychophysiological’ indicators. Researchers 
measure phenomena such as forehead muscle tension, 
electrodermal activity, and heart rate whilst the research subject 
listens to a trauma script, comparing sexually abused subjects 
to controls without such a history (Orr et al., 1998; McDonagh-
Coyle et al., 2001). Some commentators view this reflective of 
a larger process of ‘embodiment’ as an historical event integral 
to the establishment of PTSD as a ‘real’ entity with scientific 
validity (Baldwin et al., 2004).   
 
Three types of psychological experiment 
 
Danziger (1990) discusses three different types of 
psychological experiments (or models of ‘investigative 
practice’) that were important to the historical development of 
the discipline of psychology, each producing contrasting 
relationships between the experimenter/psychologist and the 
‘subject’ (although the subject of a psychological experiment is 
in fact the object of knowledge, the object of the enquiry; or 
more specifically, it may be not so much the person who is the 
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object of enquiry, but whatever particular psychological 
attribute or phenomenon is being studied via the person). Each 
of these models will be briefly discussed in turn. The salient 
point here is to illustrate that divergent investigative practices 
both assume and produce different relationships between 
researchers and their objects of knowledge. Practices of 
psychological measurement require specific ‘agential cuts’ 
(Barad, 2007) to be enacted. I am asking the reader to hold this 
in mind, while also holding in mind that relations of power 
between agents are of central concern in the professional field 
of child sexual abuse. How we—in our professional 
capacities—know about the effects of child sexual abuse, and 
how we respond to those who have been abused, also involve 
such ‘cuts’; I am arguing for an awareness of these cuts that 
extends to accounting for the emergence of the very practice of 
psychological measurement in research and therapeutic 
situations. 
 
1- The Leipzig model 
 
The Leipzig model, associated with the German experimental 
psychologist Wundt (working in the mid to late 19th century), 
was typified by a collaborative partnership between subjects 
and experimenters, often students and teachers. The roles, 
while distinct, were also changeable, so that each person could 
play different roles in different experiments or even in the 
course of one experiment. In this kind of experiment, the object 
of investigation was taken to be the ‘normal, mature’ mind. The 
aim was to discover psychological characteristics that were 
common amongst ‘normal’ individuals; psychologists were the 
same kind of being as the subjects of the experiment (Danziger, 
1990). This understanding of the psychologist as like 
‘Everyman’ (sic) has been evident in other contexts, for 
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example the shift from behaviourism to cognitive science in 
American psychology during the 1960’s (Cohen-Cole, 2005). 
 
2- The clinical experiment 
 
The clinical experiment (common in hospitals) had a much 
more strictly differentiated structure, with the role of (typically 
male) experimenters being clearly in control and in the 
authoritative position in relation to their (typically female) 
subjects. No switching of roles occurred in this context. The 
object of investigation here was the ‘illness’ or difference of the 
subject (typically the ‘hysteric’ or the ‘somnambulist’). Healthy 
individuals were used chiefly for the purpose of comparison, to 
better identify the nature of the primary subjects’ 
deviance/difference. Commenting on the contrast between 
these two styles of practice, Danziger states: “In the one case 
the object of investigation presupposed the asymmetry of the 
experimenter-subject relation, but in the other case it did not” 
(Danziger, 1990, p. 54). 
 
3- Galton’s model 
 
The third model, that of Francis Galton (in his laboratories in 
the UK around 1884), involved a kind of contractual 
relationship between experimenter and subject. Individuals paid 
for the privilege of having their mental faculties measured. The 
social acceptability of this practice may have been due, in part, 
to the popularity of phrenology a generation earlier. Galton’s 
services were marketable to individuals: “In a society in which 
the social career of individuals depended on their marketable 
skills any “scientific” (i.e. believed to be objective and reliable) 
information pertaining to these skills was not only of possible 
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instrumental value to the possessors of those skills but also 
likely to be relevant to their self-image and their desire for self-
improvement” (Danziger, 1990, p. 56)45. Galton’s primary 
interest was the development of a large data base which could 
be used to advance his interest in a program of eugenics (Rose, 
1985). 
 
Galton’s model constructed results of experiments as individual 
performances in a test, reflecting the stable and unalterable 
abilities of that individual. Their social significance lay only in 
their comparison to the scores of other individuals. (Galton’s 
type of experiment is classified as ‘anthropometry’). In this 
way a set of performance norms were established against which 
individuals would be compared. The statistical purpose and 
nature of Galtonian investigations made the individual subject 
very different from the ‘case’ of the clinical experiment and the 
generalisable model of the human mind in the Leipzig 
approach.  
 
The social relationships inherent in the three different 
approaches were entangled with the type of knowledge being 
sought and produced in each. The different approaches were 
reflective of different traditions of both social relations and 
knowledge production. The social aspects of each kind of 
experimentation produced its own unintended, as well as 
intended, consequences on the conduct of the experiment and 
therefore on the data produced by those experiments (e.g. in the 
clinical model, unequal power relations may result in subjects 
producing the kind of performance they believe the 
experimenter desires).  
 
                                                 
45 Similar developments are occurring currently in the field of genetics, with 
self-administered tests available for purchase over the internet (Rose, 2007).  
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There is no method which does not have such effects, as any 
human interaction involves social dynamics. In this thesis, 
practices of measurement, the production of statistical norms, 
and the function of comparison are of greatest interest from 
these models. It is enough to note that Danziger’s account of 
these three models reinforces the validity of the performative 
model for analysing psychological measurement, by illustrating 
that the model of practice is never a neutral tool for 





In psychology, the attributes being measured are usually called 
traits. An assumption of psychological measurement is that 
people’s behaviour can be explained by certain traits or 
attributes they may possess. Too much or too little of this or 
that trait may have observable behavioural outcomes46. 
Whether acquired through childhood experiences or through 
some biological/genetic mechanism, trait theory holds that 
behaviour is determined or influenced by this conglomerate of 
psychological objects (attributes). In child sexual abuse 
research, the assumption is that the experience of abuse is one 
factor accounting for the state of the relevant traits. Dominant 
streams of developmental psychology generally hold—to a 
greater or lesser degree—that once acquired, such traits are 
relatively stable (although of course they are changeable- this is 
the very purpose of psychological intervention). The influence 
of particular contexts in which people act varies according to 
                                                 
46 This kind of idea existed at least as far back as classical Greek medicine, 
namely the idea that the four ‘humours’—black bile, yellow bile, blood, and 
phlegm—existed in varying quantities and intensity from individual to 
individual and climate to climate, and that the balance of the four was the 
key to diagnosing both illness and types of personalities- (Arikha, 2007)  
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schools of psychological thought; they may be thought to be 
secondary to the person’s basic personality, or play a formative 
role in the development of traits (Morss, 1996). Some schools 
of psychological thought do call into question the primacy (or 
the very existence) of stable internal traits relative to the 
person’s context (cf. Potter and Wetherell, 1987); however 
these schools also generally reject the designation of their 
psychology as scientific. For now I am interested in just those 
versions of psychology that claim to be scientific.  
 
Traits emerged as a theme in the following extract from the 
focus group:  
 
CB: …with the BASC (Behavioural Assessment 
System for Children) test, can someone talk me 
through the process of how it works?  
 
ELIZABETH: I don’t want to do all the talking. 
[whispers ‘Go Kate’] 
 
KATE:  Oh OK. Um… 
 
CB: So if you had to explain to someone who had 
no idea what it was.. 
 





KATE: You get a parent to fill out the form, um, 
and once the child’s over 8, then you can use the 
self-report. You can also get a parent-rating scale 
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to coincide with that, but you wouldn’t get a child 
to use…there’s not a scale for the child to self-
report on until, um 8 years of age. Um, and you 
would use it during the assessment period, um, and 
it’s made up of 152 questions. 
 
ELIZABETH: 186 on the adolescents. 
 
KATE: Yeah. Um and they’re true or false, the 
child’s asked to answer true or false to a number 
of, to those number of statements, um, which are 




KATE: Pretty much. And um, yep so we do that 
during the assessment phase, which would be 
probably during the first 6 to 8 to 10 weeks that we 
would be seeing a child. And I try to get the parent 
to do that at the same time as when I get the child 
to do that as well. 
 
CB: And is the parent report identical to the 
children’s report? 
 
ELIZABETH, Kate: No, no. 
 
ELIZABETH: There’s um, four, four scale, never, 
sometimes, (Kate joins in) often, always.  
 
CB: and are they the same questions? 
 




KATE: Nuh…and then we’ve got the computer 
database program and you basically enter in all the 




KATE: A printout of the results 
 
ELIZABETH: a report.   
 
KATE: And measures them on scales, and then it 
has…cause all the questions are related to sub-
scales and stuff, and then it comes out on areas 
around um…clinical manifestations, um… 
 
ELIZABETH: Internalising, externalising, 
maladaptive and adaptive behaviours.  
 
CB: So are these what the scales are? Or, what are 
the scales…when you talk about the scales and sub-
scales, what are they? 
 
ELIZABETH: so for example under the, um, 
Internalizing composite, that consists of several, um 
scales, which include like Atypicality, Anxiety, um, 
Somatization, Depression and anx…did I say 
anxiety? 
 
KATE: Yep, depression. 
 
ELIZABETH: Yeah, depression, depression is not 
part of it, um, but…so you can either start by 
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looking at the composite, the overall, like an upside 
down pyramid. You start with the composite, then 
you go into ‘right, what are the sub-scales 
saying?’, within the sub-scales, what might be the 
individual items that are of…that the [composite 
corresponds to? Recording unclear] 
 
KATE: Yeah So you can narrow it down to what 
might have been the responses that have elicited 
that kind of thing, and it puts it, it rates it within 
everything within, you know, an average range  
 
ELIZABETH: of same age peers 
 
KATE: of same age peers. Based on the normative 
testing and then, there’s at risk and critical items, 
and on the front page of the print out it will tell you 
what might be clinical, or at-risk- items that might 
be things that you might want to look into further 
and sometimes—I don’t know if we’re getting to 
that bit yet—sometimes, I don’t always, necessarily, 
am not guided by that. Like if it says that’s at-risk 




KATE: and you know the child, you know the 
family, so that might be exactly what you’re 
expecting at that point. So it might say you want to 
further testing but at that stage I don’t…you know, 
that’s not a process I would necessarily always 
undertake. Um, and especially if you’ve got a child 
that’s at the start of therapy so, obviously, you 
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know, it wouldn’t be surprising necessarily that 




KATE:…if you know that about the child already  
 
DAVID One thing that I emphasize when I explain 
either to the child or the parent is that what this test 




DAVID …of your own behaviour, or your child’s 
behaviour. Umm, and particularly when I get two 
parents to do it, emphasize that they do it 
separately, because their perceptions of their 
child’s behaviour may be quite different. Not to do 
it together. Like some parents might just 
automatically [inaudible] 
 
CB hmm. So what’s your reasoning, why emphasize 
that it’s their perception? 
 
DAVID Umm, I think, because, um, I think having a 
perception of something is very different from it 
being a concrete, actual thing. ‘Cause perceptions 
change and are fluid. Um, so [linked to that??] it’s 
not used to diagnose, it’s not used to make 
something that’s real. You know, that your 
perceptions of your child’s behaviour can change 
and can vary depending on how you are right now. 
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And I think it’s also that to make it a dynamic thing 
that it can change 
 
Understandings of illness or disease have historically oscillated 
between two basic models. Either illness is caused by some 
foreign element or pathogen that is alien to the nature of the 
organism, or else it is caused by an upset in the healthy 
equilibrium of natural elements (Canguilhelm, 1978). Trait 
theory is clearly an example of the latter. That is, it is not that 
Aggression or Anxiety are inherently unhealthy, but simply that 
one may have too much (or perhaps too little) and that this 
causes the person to be psychologically unwell. In the logic—
or style of reasoning (Davidson, 2001)—employed by 
measurement instruments such as the BASC, the problem is 




The contingent nature of psychological traits is implicitly (but 
rarely explicitly) acknowledged when psychologists refer to 
traits as ‘constructs’. For example, Reynolds and Kamphaus 
(2002), authors of the Behavior Assessment System for 
Children (BASC), state that the BASC is based upon a history 
of scientific research that has established constructs such as 
Anxiety, Depression, and so on. In this sense, the term 
‘construct’ refers to the fact that Anxiety is not directly 
accessible to the researcher/clinician, but is an assemblage of 
behaviours and other self-reported phenomenon. Over time, 
through an accumulation of psychological research, some of 
these behaviours are put together to assess the existence and 




The BASC clinician’s guide (Reynolds et al., 2002) references 
the existence of psychological traits as explanations for 
behaviour. The BASC is divided into various scales for 
psychological constructs such as anxiety and depression. “The 
scales are based on a half century, or more, of psychological 
and medical science” (ibid. p. 19). The authors assert that this 
history provides the evidence needed by BASC users “to draw 
inferences related to individual scale scores” (ibid. p. 19); i.e. to 
connect behaviours to psychological constructs. 
 
I suggest that the history of research to which they refer in fact 
highlights the ‘constructed’ nature of psychological constructs, 
whereas these authors take this history as an accumulation of 
evidence that such traits exist and are merely being discovered. 
Although the word ‘construct’ is often used interchangeably 
with ‘attribute’ or ‘trait’ in psychology literature, its use in this 
context provides a stark contrast to its use in studies such as 
Danziger’s book Constructing the subject (Danziger, 1990). 
The two uses of the word construct could not be more 
different—it is a fascinating example of the ‘one sentence, two 
statements’ phenomenon (Davidson, 2001). In Reynolds and 
Kamphaus, constructs have a solidity and permanence which 
the history of scientific research has revealed as truths. 
Danziger’s reference to construction in psychology aims to 
unsettle just this sense of permanence associated with 
psychological objects.  
 
In summary, psychological research using measurement of 
traits as an explanation for behaviour establishes kinds of 
attributes of which people are made up. The truth of these 
attributes is literally constructed, crystallized over time through 




Any particular instrument of measurement produces only those 
attributes which it is constructed to measure. There are two 
critical approaches to this situation: 1- a humanist criticism 
which argues that such practices break down the individual into 
the component parts, thereby distorting or losing the unique and 
essential human essence of each individual; or 2: a 
performative critique which holds that, seeing as there is no 
pre-existent human condition prior to knowledge, in the 
measurement situation the objects are produced and assembled 
to make up the person. This thesis has been developing the 
second line of investigation. 
 
As the lists of attributes from child sexual abuse research show, 
the production of knowledge about victims of child sexual 
abuse makes-up the very same individuals being researched. 
This can be demonstrated visually in the graph produced by the 
BASC analysis (see figure 2, on p. 219). This graph lists the 
attributes along the horizontal axis, with normal, at-risk, and 
clinically significant amounts indicated along the vertical axis. 
 
Referring back to Barad’s (2007) analysis of scientific 
measurement, any knowledge that can be gained from such a 
measuring instrument is produced by the research situation, 
including (but certainly not limited to) the instrument itself. 
This is not only because of the epistemological limitations of 
measuring tools, but that the very objects being measured are 
only brought about by the research situation. 
 
In the case of the BASC, the objects of investigation are 
ultimately not the child, but the various traits (anxiety, 
hyperactivity, depression, etc.). However, these traits are not 
directly measured by the BASC. It is not an experimental 
situation like that found in physics. What I suggest the BASC 
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does do, in a clinical context, is to act as an apparatus to order 
the vision of the observers, in a similar way to other technical 
devices intended for observation (Crary, 1990). Certain specific 
behaviours have been identified and linked to psychological 
traits (constructed through years of psychological research). 
The observers (who are not the clinician, but teachers and/or 
parents, as well as children over the age of 8 who are enlisted 
as observers of their own behaviours) are disciplined in the 
sense that they are incited to watch the child and reflect on the 
frequency of certain behaviours, while others are necessarily 
excluded.  
 
There is no feasible way that these observations can be said to 
constitute measurement, let alone precise measurements, in the 
classical sense; they are observer’s judgements, guided by the 
particular questions asked on the BASC forms. This is most 
obvious in the instruction to parents, not to count the number of 
times a child does a behaviour, but to rate them as ‘never, 
sometimes, often’, and children simply to provide ‘true or 
false’ responses to the questions.  What this process produces is 
a range of limited possibilities for the ‘kind’ of child being 
assessed. On each attribute being measured, the child has a 
chance of being assessed as ‘normal, at-risk, or clinically 
significant’ (indicated by green, orange, and red circles 
respectively; see figure 2, on p.219). Although this does not 
meet the classical scientific criteria for measurement I 
described earlier in this chapter, it is nonetheless regarded as 






Classical scientific models of measurement meet 
contemporary scientific models of measurement 
 
The distinction between permanent traits and changeable states 
was referred to and reiterated in the discussions. In the extract 
above, David points out two important things: firstly, that 
psychological testing (especially where children are the object) 
is often based on the perceptions of others, and secondly, that 
these perceptions themselves are fluid. The child and their 
psychological attributes are produced, as it were, by a 
measurement of these observations at a  
particular moment in time by the interventions of others around 
them. These interventions are “not used to make something 
that’s real”, even though they certainly can have material 
effects. 
 
This concept of fluid perceptions vs. stable traits is a useful 
way to illustrate an important example of how a contemporary 
science (quantum physics) constructs measurement as a 
practice. In the classical scientific sense of measurement 
described above (associated with Newtonian physics), when an 
object in nature is measured, is taken to say something about 
that object (even if the measurement itself is subject to human 
error). A measurement of a child’s anxiety would be reflective 
of an actual property (attribute) of the child that exists 
independently of being measured.  
 
With quantum physics (in contrast to classical physics), the 
matter of measurement is different. For example, the state of a 
photon wave’s particles only becomes realized by our 
intervention in measuring them at a particular moment. Other 
probable states effectively ‘vanish’ at that moment in time, but 
this is not a reflection of the nature of the thing being 
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measured, it is an artefact of measurement itself (Barad, 2007). 
The research situation (which Barad calls a ‘phenomenon’) 
consists of specific material arrangements. The properties being 
measured only become meaningful within that arrangement. All 
the material elements of the phenomenon intra-act to produce 
the measurement. Crucially, even the observer/object split is a 
product of the arrangements; Barad calls this an ‘agential cut’. 
This is one important basis of the performative model of 
measurement. 
 
Applying this to the case of psychological measurement, it is 
necessary to take into account the various apparatus that 
construct the situation. This includes those elements that are 
internal to the research situation, such as the room, the pieces 
of paper and the words written on them, the spatial arrangement 
of seating and tables, the presence of the researcher/counsellor 
and the child, and the words used to describe or explain the 
procedure. But a diffractive reading/performative model also 
requires us to provide a genealogical account of the 
arrangement. An explanation is needed for how this specific 
arrangement is possible as a material practice. Barad argues 
that one could in fact provide an objective account of this 
situation, if the phenomenon of the measuring, and not the 
object of measurement, is maintained as the analytical object. 
In other words, it might be possible to objectively describe the 
measuring, but not the measured object. (This involves a 
reworking of the notion of objectivity). I am hesitant to claim 
any aspirations of objectivity for this thesis, but I do hope to 
provide an account of the ‘phenomenon’ of the psychological 





“The crucial feature of quantum theory is that the observer is 
not only necessary to observe the properties of an atomic 
phenomenon, but is necessary to even bring about these 
properties” (Signorile, 1989, p84, citing Capra, 1982).  This 
helps to disrupt not only the notion of a stable trait, but also 
draws attention to the effective fabrication of traits themselves 
through intervening.  In a sense, then,  the results of our 
intervention into this system of perceptions and change might 
be an act of “participation in chance events” (Signorile, 1989, 
p. 81, citing Polanyi). At a point in time, a child or parent is 
asked to answer a series of questions, the results of which are 
subject to quantitative analysis in order to produce an account 
of the child’s traits; or better, to produce the child’s traits. 
Other possible results exist, but only one can be actualized.  
 
This brief detour has been for the purpose of establishing that 
whilst the practice of psychological measurement frequently 
claims to be embedded within a classical scientific model, there 
are other contemporary models of scientific measurement 
which would not endorse some key assumptions of the former. 
Perhaps ironically, by the mid-late 1950’s behaviourist 
psychology and the model of science that it attempted to 
affiliate itself with was already being characterised as 
“outdated…and …rejected by logicians of science” (Cohen-
Cole, 2005, p. 116, citing Koch, 1956, 1959), even being 
associated with authoritarian politics. Some authors such as 
Kvale (1992) argued quite strongly, 20 years ago, that the entire 
discipline of psychology as a science was born of, and 
remained hopelessly entrenched in the age of modernism, and 
thus held little relevance to the so-called ‘post-modern’ era.   
 
I argue, then, that the so-called ‘hard sciences’ such as physics 
have engendered and responded to the ontological and 
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epistemological challenges raised by ‘post-modern’ critiques 
(e.g. Barad, 2007), focussing particularly on measurement. 
Later in this thesis I will be examining recent psychological 
texts concerned with measuring the effects of child sexual 
abuse, to assess the extent of any awareness of the view that 
these strictly hypothetical-deductive models of science are seen 
as outdated47 even today.  
 
The continuing hold of classical science in psychological 
research on child sexual abuse 
 
This opens up another productive question: if the classical 
model of science is considered outdated, how can the success 
of psychological measurement be explained? If scientific 
theorizing itself, not to mention the post-modern and feminist 
critiques of science, quantification and scientific method, have 
been so comprehensive in unsettling classical scientific notions 
of measurement, I would argue that this is not reflected in 
current psychological research into child sexual abuse. 
Academic or intellectual refutation of the classical scientific 
foundations of psychological measurement has barely 
registered in the pages of journals such as Child maltreatment, 
Journal of interpersonal violence, Child abuse and neglect, or 
Journal of child sexual abuse. I will cite just one recent text 
(from the latter journal) to make clear that child sexual abuse 
researchers do, in fact, say that they are measuring. It is not a 
question of me having to interpret or dig away at a deeper 
meaning of the text, but simply to present what the text itself 
says. The authors here describe the instruments they use to 
                                                 
47 In using the term ‘outdated’, I do not mean that ways of knowing about 
things necessarily improve or always change for the better. I mean only to 
refer to scientific discourse itself, and to examine the status of the kind of 
science that psychological measurement depends upon for legitimacy.   
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collect the data for their case study of a young woman who had 
been subjected to child sexual abuse. “Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(BAI): The BAI (Beck & Steer, 1990) is a subjective rating 
instrument that measures anxiety symptoms in adult and 
adolescents. Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II): The BDI 
(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a subjective rating instrument 
that measures depressive symptoms in adults and adolescents” 
(Khalily et al., 2011, p. 342).  
 
While noting the claims to measurement, I am also struck by an 
interesting juxtaposition. The instruments are described as both 
subjective and as conducting measurement. How can this be, 
given the insistence that measurement is desirable because it is 
objective? How can a measure be subjective and objective? 
Paying closer attention, the statement is clear that the rating is 
subjective (being performed by the research participant- usually 
in the form of a Likert scale of 1-5 describing the frequency of 
specific thoughts or behaviours). These subjective ratings are 
transformed into measurements by the instruments (including 
the expertise of the psychologist/researcher). The numbers 
generated by the instruments are then treated as objective 
measurements in the statistical procedures that follow the initial 
test-taking and scoring.  
 
One further quote illustrates—and complicates—the point: “It 
is not enough to know that CSA subjects are more poorly 
adjusted than controls; it is also important to know by how 
much” (Rind et al., 2000, p. 9. The reader is left to ask why this 
is important as no specific reason is given). The very question 
of ‘how much’ assumes that differences in the attributes which 
are used to measure adjustment are not just ordinal but are 




This kind of insistence that whatever exists (such as ‘harm’, or 
poor adjustment) must exist in some amount echoes the 
sentiments expressed in the early 1900s by leading figure of the 
time E.L Thorndike (cited in Green, 2003). However, other 
psychology researchers noted that not all properties or 
attributes can be properly subjected to the kind of measurement 
that produces a ‘how much’:     
 
Hardness and softness, like temperature, shape, 
density, intelligence, courtesy, are non-additive 
qualities. Such qualities are frequently called 
intensive. They can be ‘‘measured’’ only in the 
sense that the different degrees of the quality may 
be arranged in a series. Concerning them, 
questions of how much or how many times are 
meaningless”. (Cohen & Nagel, 1934, p. 296, cited 
in Michell, 2006, p. 419). 
 
Theodore Porter suggests that “[t]o understand the 
circumstances under which quantitative objectivity has come 
into demand, we need to look not only at the intellectual 
formation of experts, but even more importantly at the social 
basis of authority” (Porter, 1995, p. 6). Why, Porter asks, do we 
‘trust in numbers’ so readily, even when they may not represent 
a very relevant means for knowing about a specific kind of 
object?  
 
Despite ongoing contestation within psychology of the validity 
of using practices of quantification in understanding human 
thought and behaviour (Hezewijk, 2004), tools of measurement 
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have proliferated48. Some contemporary commentators from 
within the discipline of psychology do take this use of 
measurement, and it’s uncertain scientific status, as a 
phenomenon to be explained rather than taken for granted (e.g. 
Michell, 1999; Hand, 2004; Borsboom, 2005), and some of this 
work informs much of my own thinking here. However, as an 
analysis of research texts  demonstrates, much scientific 
research on the effects of child sexual abuse assumes the 
importance and necessity of measurement, and this will be cited 
to argue that measurement practices ‘order’ contemporary 
understandings of child sexual abuse. My intention is that the 
perceived inevitability and taken-for-granted-ness of 
psychological measurement be disrupted (Hacking, 1999), and 
made to seem ‘strange’ (Kendall et al., 1999). 
 
I want to briefly discuss an example of a contemporary form of 
psychological measurement, before concluding this chapter.  
 
Brain imaging technology 
 
I want to turn briefly to a relatively recent development in 
psychological measurement; brain imaging. This was 
mentioned by one of the focus group participants: 
 
JASON Is there just not a sufficient test to show 
that brain development and brain functioning, if 
you have insecure attachment grows one way… 
 
ELIZABETH I think there’s lots of theory, but I 
don’t know if there’s an actual test.. 
                                                 
48 The electronic database Mental Measurements Yearbook lists no less than 





JASON You could have an actual physical test that 
says “Hey, your brain is developed this way… 
 
KATE There is brain… 
 
JASON Which shows that you have had insecure 
attachment. Your brain is, by this scan it shows 
your brain is like this. 
 
Medical technology is becoming increasingly implicated in the 
measurement of psychological processes, through the practice 
of brain imaging. Images produced through brain scanning 
(Positron Emission Tomography- PET- and Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging- MRI) are becoming increasingly familiar, 
and one notable context for such images is the covers of 
psychology textbooks (Beaulieu, 2002). There are three 
justifications for spending some time on this subject here: 
firstly, as Jason indicated above, counsellors in this field are 
interested in the possibility of using such technology. Second, 
brain imaging is a form of psychological measurement in its 
own right. The third justification is to illustrate the 
methodological point mentioned earlier. Although PET and 
MRI scans are becoming more and more familiar, they are 
novel enough to retain some degree of strangeness. They 
remind us not only of the way that technology can produce 
scientific knowledge, but also that any practice of knowledge 
can be both familiar and strange. They may also help to explore 
what is meant by Foucault’s notion that knowledge is a relation 
between the sayable and the visible (Deleuze, 1988). 
 
Although at first such images might seem like a visual medium 
(and of course, they are partly that), Anne Beaulieu’s (2002, 
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2003) research with brain image researchers and professionals 
shows that these images are not really read as visual per se by 
those involved in their production. These professionals interact 
with the images as simply representations, admittedly ones that 
hold some popular appeal and are available to a wide audience 
as engaging pictures (Dumit, 2004). According to Beaulieu’s 
research participants, the images represent something 
meaningful, but are not meaningful in and of themselves. What 
they represent is a measurement of the brain; they are “pictures 
of numbers” (Beaulieu, 2002, p. 57). As one imaging 
researcher put it: “They’re not pictures, they’re statistical maps. 
So you’re showing hard evidence” (ibid, p. 60).  
 
Brain imaging has been used to measure both physical features 
(e.g. volume), and activity of brains. Measuring brains often 
concerns mental processes in ‘normal’ brains, such as cognition 
(Bösel, 2007), while other research is concerned with 
measuring changes that are wrought on the brain by 
psychologically traumatic events (as distinct from physical 
injuries caused by accidents, although this has been an 
historically important area for the study of brain functioning; 
ibid.). For example, Stein and colleagues (1997), using MRI 
technology, found that women who had experienced childhood 
sexual abuse had significantly reduced (5% smaller) left-sided 
hippocampus volume compared to non-victimized women. 
Later studies using both MRI (to measure volume) and PET (to 
measure activity) technologies found smaller (up to 22% 
smaller) and less active hippocampus regions (right and left) 
for women who had been sexually abused and suffered from 
PTSD, compared to controls who had either been sexually 
abused and suffered no PTSD, or who had neither been abused 
nor suffered from PTSD (Bremner et al., 2003, cited in Roth et 
al., 2007). Recent Victorian Department of Human Services 
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training material for child protection workers includes brain 
scan images, contrasting the brain of a ‘non-abused child’ to 
the much smaller and evidently less active brain of a 
‘traumatised child’.  
 
These techniques render the question of psychological 
measurement in different ways, producing different 
possibilities for conceptualising how such measurement might 
be undertaken. For one thing, brain imaging renders the 
Cartesian mind/matter split irrelevant by taking the brain 
(matter) as its direct object. Being matter, the brain is directly 
observable and thus measurable in ways that the mind could 
never be. Through these technological possibilities, 
psychological attributes become extrinsic (directly observable 
and measureable), and no longer intrinsic (measurable only via 
their effects on behaviour). The quantity objection outlined by 
Michell (1999; see the earlier discussion) disappears when 
psychological processes are taken to be chemical/biological and 
thus directly observable and measurable.  
 
These are possibilities that some of the participants in my 
research were alive to. In the context of discussing whether the 
effects of trauma and insecure attachments in childhood could 
be measured, Jason (in the above extract) was doubtful that 
pen-and paper psychological testing could produce a 
meaningful measurement, but turned to brain scanning 
technology as holding this possibility.  
 
The possibilities of this technology are clearly an exciting 
development for some counsellors and researchers. While such 
developments are debated and sometimes criticised as a tactic 
of biological reductionism, they are also productive processes 
that open up new possibilities for understanding and 
187 
 
management of the self (Beaulieu, 2003). In this sense, then, 
brain imaging technology can be read as a continuation of the 
practice of psychological measurement, which can direct 
counsellors in the therapeutic management of their clients’ 
lives. Resource restraints prevent brain imaging from being an 
everyday practice with clients, but research in brain functioning 
is becoming increasingly incorporated into contemporary 
knowledge production about people who have suffered trauma 
and abuse.  
 
This entails a noticeable reconfiguration in how we think about 
psychological attributes and processes. Speaking about 
changing conceptions of atoms from Democritus through to the 
physicist Feynman, Barad says: “Not only has our image of the 
atom changed, but our practices of imaging and imagining and 
intra-acting with them have changed, and so have we” (2007, 
p.354). I suggest that the word ‘atom’ could be replaced with 
‘psychological attributes and processes’ without losing the 
meaning of Barad’s argument. A new technology not only 
changes the way we understand the object, it also changes the 
object, and just as importantly, through our intra-actions, 
changes us. As counsellors and/or researchers in the field of 
child sexual abuse, our ‘selves’ become different across 
different material relations of engagement and entanglement.     
 
Summary of Chapter 4 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to establish the instability of 
psychological measurement as a scientific practice, by showing 
that what is called psychological measurement is based on one 
specific model of scientific measurement. I have begun to 
develop an alternative model of analysing measurement, a 
performative model, based on the argument that scientific 
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measurement is in fact a heterogeneous concept formed by 
local material practices.  
 
In the previous chapter, I focussed not on the scientific 
dimensions of psychological measurement, but what might be 
called a disciplinary analysis. The two approaches to analysis 
of psychological measurement will together form the basis of 
the rest of the thesis, focussing specifically on the 
psychological measurement of the effects of child sexual abuse. 
 
I have noted that measurement and statistics are produced 
within both scientific and administrative (or disciplinary) 
discourses. I have teased out the connection between these 
ways of producing and conceptualising measurement and 
statistics and the practices of psychological measurement. I 
intend to show that scientific and disciplinary practices of 
measurement are entangled, and that it is necessary to consider 
both elements. I have described some divergent understandings 
of what measurement is and what it does. I have also stated that 
practices of psychological measurement are influential in 
understandings of child sexual abuse. In the next chapters I 
want to investigate more closely practices of knowledge 
production, tying this more explicitly to psychological 
measurement in research and therapeutic settings with people 
who have been subjected to child sexual abuse. In Chapter 5 I 
examine the function of ‘normal’ within these practices.  
189 
 
Chapter 5- Normal 
 
In this chapter I begin with an extract from the focus group that is 
mainly concerned with the issue of normal and how to understand 
this idea in the context of child sexual abuse therapy. While the 
counsellors did not endorse the idea that the aim of therapy is to 
normalise their clients, there is nonetheless a difficulty in the 
relationship between the concepts of normal, harm, and well-being. 
This is particularly complex in light of the fact that psychological 
measurements generally take normal as the point of reference for 
establishing degrees of harm of child sexual abuse and classifying 
behaviours and traits as ‘clinically significant’ or not. 
 
The tensions and difficulties with the potentially regulative 
functions of normal, especially within developmental psychology, 
have been established by a substantial tradition of critical literature 
over the last two decades or more (e.g. Walkerdine, 1988; Morss, 
1996; Rose, 1999; Ashenden, 2004; Burman, 2007). In this 
chapter, I do not focus on going back and re-establishing these 
claims49. I am more interested in historicising normality’s 
privileged position in research and therapy on the effects of child 
sexual abuse. I am also interested in the difficulties of the critical 
claims themselves. Resistance to normative ideas of development 
raises further questions about how, then, we go about 
understanding the effects of child sexual abuse. I will note here 
that this approach is informed by the diffractive practice I am 
attempting to perform. Rather than establishing or rejecting the 
                                                 
49 I could say this is one black box I am leaving relatively untouched.   
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truth of claims about norms and normality, I try to account for both 
their ‘conditions of possibility’ and their effects.    
 
This chapter is structured around developing an account of how the 
following conversations in the focus group were possible. How 
were certain things sayable? Upon what epistemological 
conditions, material arrangements and relations of power does this 
conversation depend? What effects do these difficulties produce 
for understanding the effects of child sexual abuse?  
 
CB  What’s therapy’s role in relation to the idea of, 
you know, kids being normal, or not normal 
 
ELIZABETH  Hmmm, cause I know you don’t like the 
word normal50 
 
CB Do you? [laughs] 
 
ELIZABETH Yeah. You always like ‘expected’. What 
might be expected? Yeah 
 
CB Yeah, what do you reckon, what’s the difference? 
Between using those words? 
 
                                                 
50 This statement, demonstrating that I have influenced Elizabeth, could be 
problematic if I were claiming that my research approach was objective in a 
classical sense. However, as I have made clear, I do not make such claims (refer 
to Chapter 3). Rather, I try to acknowledge and account for my ‘entanglement’ 
in the research. I am of the view that challenging and disrupting the notion of 
normalcy is a useful thing, and am pleased that my discussions with my 
colleague seem to have had some effect in this direction. Obviously, in this 
focus group I was invested in asking her to articulate this further. I would also 
note that Elizabeth has made her own interpretation and use of our past 
conversations that do not necessarily accord with my own. 
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ELIZABETH Well ,normal, what’s normal? But I think 
in certain ages, etc. there’s things that would be, 
personality traits, social skills etc. that would be 
expected. And so…yeah, I’d rather use the word 
‘expected’…oh, I’d write the word ‘normal’ in my 
reports, but I mean ‘expected’ [laughs] 
 
CB Yeah. But um….and normal is the word that the 




CB It says, this is the normal range, so why do you 
prefer, or why do you mean ‘expected’ as opposed to 
normal? 
 
ELIZABETH  Expected, because what is normal? And I 
remember you used to say that- ’what does normal 
mean?’ you can say something’s expected, you know or 
it’s normal, it’s a normal reaction for a victim of 
sexual abuse, mm…how, normal? I don’t know, but is 
it something that might be expected, for a victim of 
sexual abuse that they might regress in behaviours. I 
just think umm, I don’t know, normal more puts people 
into ‘normal/abnormal’, there’s those two categories 
 
KATE Yeah, you can, if you’re not normal, then there’s 
something wrong  
 
ELIZABETH Yeah, that’s right, where as if it’s 
something that’s expected … 
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KATE  If you say that’s not expected, that’s not 
necessarily saying there’s something wrong with that  
 
ELIZABETH  No 
 
KATE  That wasn’t expected, or that’s extra-ordinary 
in some way, but it’s not an abnormal trait which I 
suppose that’s a societal, kind of negative 
 
ELIZABETH That’s right. The connotations I think it 
brings up, you know ‘you’re normal’, or well ‘you’re a 
weirdo’ you’re crazy, you know just those things I 
think it can raise for people, even in trainings I use the 
word expected, what would be expected in terms of 
child development. So…anyway that’s just me.  
 
CB  Yeah 
 
ELIZABETH   So when I compare it to like the BASC 
to a group of same age peers, we would expect, you 
know, you would expect that they’d have a certain 
degree of social skills. But when it’s really high and 
says ‘well no, that’s actually clinically significant’, 
their social skills are quite, um, delayed compared to 
their peers and you know, they can’t  do general 
encouragement, they can’t share with others, etc., well 
that’s not something that’s expected with that age 
group, so why are they engaging in such behaviours? 




CB    And…um… I guess…’cos the actual tests if you 
look at graphs and stuff say well this is normal range 
 
ELIZABETH Graffs [pronounced differently, all laugh]  
 
CB   So, what’s you’re understanding of, in terms of 
the test? They talk about norm groups, they say ‘well 
this is how we define what normal is’, so what’s your 
understanding of what normal means in the context of 
a graph? 
 
KATE  The bell shaped curve, how they fit in, that’s 
how they work it out, isn’t it? That’s what they say, if it 
fits within that range  
 
In the above conversation, how were such questions and comments 
possible, and how was the notion of ‘normal’ produced as a 
contentious and problematic term? At first blush, the attempt to 
displace the term ‘normal’ with ‘expected’ may appear as a purely 
semantic distinction. This reading would be in line with narrative 
therapist Jane Hutton’s (2008) suggestion that expectations are 
closely tied up with norms, that the two tend to team up in a 
regulatory assemblage. There would also be a distinction to be 
made between normal as referring to a standard, which may not be 
explicitly social in nature, and expectation as cultural or social 
pressure to conform to51.    
 
However, the counsellors in the focus group attempted to produce 
a different distinction between what is normal and what is 
                                                 
51 Ron Frey, personal communication, 2012. 
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expected. Normal implies a “kind of negative” for those deemed 
abnormal. In contrast, the notion of expectations facilitates the 
therapeutic-assessment question- “Why are they engaging in such 
behaviours?” Normal is regarded as a statement of judgement, 
whilst expectation is a statement of enquiry and explanation. 
 
Again, this thesis asks not whether such a distinction is valid, but 
about the grounds upon which such a problematisation occurs. In 
short, what were the contingencies, or the conditions of possibility, 
that made the conversation ‘have-able’? I am interested in 
exploring what enabled the counsellors to be critical of the notion 
of normal, when the normal child is so pervasive and taken-for-
granted in quantitative research on child sexual abuse. In this 
chapter I argue that normal is a foundational reference for 
establishing the harm of child sexual abuse, yet its’ very 
normativity produces resistance and discomfort in therapeutic 
practice.  
 
I want to reiterate the extent to which normal is contested. The 
following quote is offered by Burman as something of a critical 
statement, a critique of dominant discourses about children and 
child abuse:  
 
...the dominant naturalised discourse of (‘normal’ or 
‘typical’) development …has helped to produce the 
position of the abused child as different, abnormal and 
outside prevailing discourses…of childhood (Burman, 
2003, p. 37) 
 
As the focus group extract above suggests, such concerns are not 
limited to the theoretical or academic, but inform the thinking and 
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practice of counsellors who simultaneously employ and contest the 
discourses of developmental psychology which produce the very 
categories of normal/abnormal. Thus, in articulating a position 
regarding the usefulness of the norm, the counsellors (myself as 
researcher included) speak themselves into variously refined 
subject positions as counsellors, positions which both engage and 
contest the place of normal. The productions of such subject 
positions are contingent upon the possibility of the norm and its 
problematisation in the field of child sexual abuse therapy. I want 
to avoid the suggestion that the counsellors uncritically embraced 
the notion of normality in these discussions.  
 
Normality and well-being 
 
Scientific enquiry has generally equated health with being a 
‘normal’ state, and illness as a pathological state (Canguilhelm, 
1978). This scientific reification has contributed to the capacity of 
normal to perform as a  powerful technique of governance 
(Hacking, 1995). It is in reference to the norm that the individual 
subject of disciplinary power is produced and governed (Foucault, 
1977a)52. To be normal is a goal towards which individuals are 
incited to orient themselves as an ethical ideal of health and well-
being, and deviations from the norm ought to be worked on. 
                                                 
52 It is worth noting that Foucault argues in Discipline and punish that 
disciplinary power effects greater individualization towards the bottom of the 
hierarchy (see p. 193), with the child as the most individualized subject of 
disciplinary power. However this evocation of a hierarchy is uncomfortable, not 
only because it maintains elements of a sovereign model of power, but also 
because it would suggest in the current study that the counsellor should be more 
anonymous or less individualized than the child. This is a position which I will 
be attempting to disrupt in the current study, where I will be arguing that the 
subjectivization of the counsellor is as much an effect of disciplinary power as 
the subjectification of the child. 
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Paradoxically, although ‘normal’ is morally conflated with what is 
natural, expertise is frequently sought in the quest for normality 
(Rose, 1998, 1999). 
 
The normal stands indifferently for what is typical, the 
unenthusiastic objective average, but it also stands for 
what has been, good health, and for what shall be, our 
chosen destiny. That is why the benign and sterile-
sounding word ‘normal’ has become one of the most 
powerful ideological tools of the twentieth century 
(Hacking, 1990, p. 169).  
 
Scientific discourse on sexuality in general has been very closely 
governed by notions of normality and deviance; Krafft-Ebbing’s 
Psychopathia sexaulis (1965), first published in 1886, is widely 
cited as influential in this regard, with its concern with 
‘aberrations’ and ‘deviations’.  Perhaps more widely known, to 
general Western audiences, is the work of Alfred Kinsey, which 
did not so much question the normal/deviant binary but expanded 




In order to grapple with theme of normal in understanding the 
effects of child sexual abuse, its privileged place as a point of 
reference and comparison has to be put in context. Following the 
demand of diffractive reading—i.e. that I attempt to provide a 
                                                 
53 Kinsey has also been accused of minimising the extent and the potential harm 
suffered through child sexual abuse- Mayne 1993. 
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genealogical account of the phenomenon under investigation—this 
requires an examination of the statistical concept of normal and 
how it used as a reference point for understanding an individual in 
the context of a population. The earlier extract indicated the ethical 
dilemma faced by the counsellors in regards to the regulatory and 
judgemental functions of the normal. If this were the only factor at 
work, we might expect a relatively easy dismissal of the 
importance of the normal. However, the following extract suggests 
the complex productivity of statistical norms for understanding the 
effects of child sexual abuse.      
 
ELIZABETH  The only thing I look at is the percentile 
rank, I find that quite informative. ….on the sheet, so 
it’s, it gives you a number, and I just remember from 
stats, so if it’s got 35 what you actually do is, that 





ELIZABETH …Challenging behaviours than your 
client. So I think, ‘that’s pretty good then’, so [laughs] 
 
NANCY …{inaudible] for Indigenous clients? 
 
ELIZABETH… I’m not saying, I’m not saying the 






ELIZABETH… I ‘m just saying I find percentile 
ranks…standard deviations have got no…when it’s got 
.05 in terms of, what do you call that, frequency? 
 
[inaudible. Group talking at once] 
 
ELIZABETH …The thing tells you, shoots out at you if 
something’s clinically significant, but yeah, I don’t get 
all that. Percentile rank I found very useful. 
 
SALLY But the percentile rank is based on the mean 
 









CB Can you give an example of how it’s been useful to 
look at the… 
 
ELIZABETH I just find it useful, I don’t know, I find it 







ELIZABETH  So even if it was like a behavioural thing 
or whatever comes back, you know you might have a 
high number and you think ‘oh my God that’s gonna be 
really bad’, you know. But when you do the percentile 
ranking you go, you know what; there’s 80% of same 
age peers who display more, um, withdrawal than what 
they do so I actually think they’re going pretty well, in 
context of everything. SO yeah, I dunno, that’s what I 
like. 
 
For Elizabeth, the issue is not whether the measurements of 
attributes or behaviours have any intrinsic meaning; the numbers 
only take on relevance when compared to the mean (average) 
among the child’s peers. This provides her with a means of 
contextualisng the child’s observed or perceived behavioural 
difficulties and struggles.  
 
Statistical laws and populations 
 
During the mid-1800s, the French statistician Adolphe Quetelet 
devised the idea of a ‘statistical law’; that social phenomenon 
would continue to occur at regular rates due to the…  
 
underlying stability of the “state of society”. Using 
statistics, it seemed to be possible to uncover general 
truths about mass phenomena even though the causes 
of each individual action were unknown and might be 




Individual causes were of no relevance; what mattered were 
statistical regularities, or ‘laws’ (Cole, 2000). Applied to human 
and social phenomenon, the idea of statistical laws led to the 
possibility that human behaviour was at least partly dictated by 
underlying laws of society or human behaviour, laws which were 
not subject to human will. One of the more famous works in this 
vein would be Durkheim’s pioneering study of suicide (Durkheim, 
1952, first French edition 1897), in which he used statistics to 
argue that social conditions determined rates of suicide (Oakley, 
2000).  
 
This type of reasoning presents a problem for the discipline of 
psychology (or psychological styles of reasoning). In other words, 
it is difficult to justify individualized interventions into people’s 
lives if their ‘problems’ are the result of more less deterministic 
statistical laws at the level of society. There is, however, a different 
possible use of statistical regularity, one which guides the bulk of 
psychological research and intervention. This is the reification of 
normality and the problematisation of individual deviance. 
Individuals could be incited to take responsibility for their own 
deviation from the norm, with the help of expertise. Rose refers to 
this as ‘responsibilization’ (Rose, 1999). Individual cases of 
deviation from the statistical norm are understood as errors to be 
corrected, with the help of psychological expertise if necessary. 
 
In the field of child sexual abuse, an example of this is performed 
through the notion of ‘sexualised behaviours’ caused by the trauma 
of child sexual abuse (Friedrich et al., 2001), where the abused 
child’s sexual behaviours are measurably different from the normal 
child. Within a psychological style of reasoning, intervening with 
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the individual child is a possible response because of her/his 
difference from the norm.  
 
Yet, as the focus group extracts in this chapter demonstrate, the 
counsellors’ relationship with notions of normal, average and 
deviance are more complex than this analysis suggests. There was 
considerable resistance to the idea that the role of therapy is to 
normalise deviance. At the same time, some counsellors found it 
helpful to compare their client’s scores on psychological measures 
to the average, but stressed that this was not intended as a 
normative judgement. Difference from the norm was framed by 
members of the group as an expected response to child sexual 
abuse, but still a difference that warrants individualised therapeutic 
intervention.  
 
The ‘error law’/ the normal curve 
 
Another statistical device implicated with the normal is the curve 
of the ‘error law’, initially developed as a way of understanding 
and controlling errors made by different astronomers in their 
celestial observations. Astronomers noticed that their observations 
of planets differed from observer to observer. But how could this 
be, given that the planets must be of the same size or in the same 
position regardless of who observes them (Cole, 2000)? The 
difference must be due to human error. The error law was devised 
by Gauss as a tool to understand and control these differences in 
observations. Each individual’s observation was to be understood 
as a deviation from the truth. The larger the number of individual 
observations, the more the errors could be controlled for, 
effectively cancelling each other out, with the aggregate 
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representing something closer to the truth than any individual 
observation.  
 
It has to be noted that, while Gauss’s curve is intended as a 
statistical tool, the same principle of truth aggregating around an 
average is also influential in the qualitative research notion of 
triangulation. In this process, the results of two or more sources of 
data (e.g. interviews and surveys) are compared, and where there is 
difference, the truth is assumed to somewhere in between the two 
results (Oakley, 2000). There is an ontological and epistemological 
contrast between this notion of triangulation and Barad’s (2007) 
practice of ‘diffractive reading’. This contrast consists primarily in 
the fact that triangulation assumes there is some form of extrinsic 
truth, perceived differently from different perspectives (Oakley, 
2000), whilst diffraction assumes that each 
position/practice/discourse is productive of truth effects, with no 
necessary common object that exists independently of them.  
 
Returning to the error law; Quetelet, while working on the 
preparation of the Belgian census of 1840, had “…convinced the 
world that that Gauss’ bell-shaped ‘law of errors’ was precisely the 
type of law for the distribution of human, social and biological 
traits” (Hacking, 1991, p. 188). In 1835, Quetelet published Sur 
l’homme et la développement de ses facultés, and with it the 
introduction of the ‘average man’. The average man was the result 
of measurements of large numbers of individuals (in his example, 
military recruits) on a range of characteristics (height, weight, 
etc.). Each individual could be placed in a curve distributed around 
the average man (Cole, 2000). The average man was put to work in 
a range of contexts, including as a means of governing the labour 
of convicts in Australian penal colonies. Convicts sentences were 
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measured not in chronological years, but by comparing their labour 
to the amount of work the average man could achieve in a year 
(Foster, 2005). The distribution of individuals in relation to the 
average enabled any difference54 to be rendered as a deviation 
from the norm, as error.  
 
…the ‘error law’ finally found its place in 1844 as the formula 
governing deviations from an idealized “average man”. Quetelet 
interpreted the applicability of this law as confirmation that human 
variability was fundamentally error, but the effect of his discovery 
was to begin the process by which the error law became a 
distribution formula governing variation which was itself seen to 
have far greater interest than any mean value (Porter, 1986, p. 7) 
 
The notion of human difference-as-error is profound. In his 
discussion of the ‘making up’ up of human kinds, Ian Hacking 
(1995) describes how scientific ideas about people have shifted 
from a focus on human nature and the ‘memorable’ person, to the 
idea of normal and the calculable person, and that this shift was 
made possible, in large part, by the emergence of statistics. "For 
well over a hundred years the most powerful second-order kind 
used in conjunction with people has been normalcy" (Hacking, 
1995, p. 371). Foucault describes how Lombroso (around the 
1870s) was able to use physiology and psychiatry to discredit 
political movements to which he was opposed, by scientifically 
proving (measuring) the deviance or inferiority of the individuals 
involved (Foucault, 2003, p. 154). Another example of this process 
of moral judgment through measurement is provided by Reekie 
(1998): “By the late 1930s unmarried mothers and their children 
                                                 
54 Differences which are inevitable, seeing as the average person does not 
correspond to any ‘actual’ person.  
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were being subjected to a battery of intelligence, educational 
achievement and aptitude tests. As psychological techniques 
became more refined social investigators attempted to measure the 
‘emotional maturity’ of illegitimate subjects” (p. 126). In fact, 
statistically calculated norms allow any kind of behaviour or 
characteristic to be measured and distributed, with averages and 
relative deviations identified (Hook, 2007).  
 
Foucault’s term ‘bio-politics’ refers to the way in which statistics 
form part of a strategy of normalization, in which people are 
understood, see themselves, govern and are governed in relation to 
such norms (Foucault, 1978, p. 139; Hacking, 2004). It is not 
simply that the average is ‘there’, it works as an ethical ideal, “the 
telos of history” (Cole, 2000, p. 81)55. It is crucial to note that in 
this concept of bio-politics, the norms of the population towards 
which conduct is directed are those of health, prosperity, and 
security (Foucault, 2007). The aim of normalization is not 
oppression, but the incitement of each individual to maximize the 
quality of their life and the prosperity of the population as a whole. 
In this way psychology has harnessed the power of statistics, 
whereas the sociological concept of ‘statistical laws’ (e.g. 
Durkheim’s studies of suicide) could threaten the legitimacy of 
psychiatric or psychological ‘styles of reasoning’  which are based 
on the notion of individual deviancy (Davidson, 1987, 2001). 
 
To summarise the argument following from the above material; 
statistical laws linking individual problems to social conditions do 
                                                 
55 The average is put to work in this teleological way at the level of governing 
the individual, but Quetelet also argued that humans would develop over time to 
become closer and closer to this ideal, and that this would be to the overall 
benefit of society. This proved to be a very productive idea for the project of 
eugenics (Cole, 2000). 
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not provide a rationale for individualised intervention into people’s 
lives when they deviate from the norm of health and well-being. 
Statistical laws must be joined up with a way of understanding 
individual differences which not only render those differences 
problematic, but incite the individual themselves to regard them as 
such (as errors to be corrected). Psychological measurement makes 
explicit the practice of the normalising judgement, but also enables 
the recognition of the harm of child sexual abuse. The phrase 
normalising judgement suggests that some human actions are 
understood to be caused by an individuals’ deviation from the 
norm on particular psychological traits or attributes, and thus are 
explainable in reference to the norm. An ontologically different 
reading is equally possible; that the traumatic experiences of 
sexual abuse have caused the individuals’ traits to differ from the 
norm (I will develop this theme later in the chapter).  
 
I suggest that the catch, then, or the trouble with normal-the reason 
the counsellors in the focus groups did not want to completely 
abandon normal despite its objectionable normative possibilities - 
is two-fold: 1) normality is readable as a sign of health and well-
being; and 2) difference from the norm can be understood as an 
effect of child sexual abuse, making harm visible. I admit to being 
troubled here by what may be a shortcoming of simply critiquing 
normal as regulative. I am no longer certain why there is anything 
necessarily wrong with making visible the harm by showing the 
difference to the norm. I need remind myself that the normal child 
is itself a fabrication of psychological measurement (along with 
other regulative discourses about childhood), that there are 
relations of power involved in declaring a person or a group to be 
different from the norm, and that such designations of difference 
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have consequences for the person or group which may in itself be 
experienced as problematic.   
 
Development and the normal child56 
 
The notion in Western thought that individuals develop, as 
opposed to simply get bigger, has been traced by historians to the 
late 18th century (Burman, 2007). The natural sciences, particularly 
biology, physiology and the philosophical realm of 
Naturphilosophen, focused on two contrasting ways of 
understanding why things grew (or the question of ‘what is life?’) 
(Steedman, 1994; Reill, 2005). These two explanatory frameworks 
are signified by the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘vitalism’ or 
‘hermeticism’ (Keller, 1985). Mechanism meant that the causes of 
the body’s movements and functions could be explained purely in 
terms of its material features. Once this ‘machine’ had been 
started, “…all the activities of the human body could be explained 
in terms of its material composition, and the interaction of its parts 
at the physico-chemical level” (Steedman, 1994, p. 52).  
 
Vitalism or hermeticism proposed that living matter possessed an 
active principle of some kind that continually animated it. This 
active force was not an observable thing but an irreducible 
                                                 
56 Perhaps the contested nature of the term (normal) should be highlighted by the 
use of single quotation marks. However, I am cognizant of the point made by 
(Visker, 1995) In discussing Foucault’s use of quotation marks to unsettle the 
‘human sciences’, there is an implication that if done correctly there could be a 
correct, scientific method of studying humans; and such a method would have 
no need of the offending quotation marks. Similarly, to discuss a ‘normal’ child 
could be read as implying that although the ‘normal’ child of developmental 
psychology is a discursive construct, there is an actual normal child waiting to 
be discovered through other means. This goes against the constructivist reading I 
am trying to develop here, in which any object of knowledge is a product of the 
discourses surrounding it. 
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property of living matter that could not be subject to investigation 
or explanation (Steedman, 1994). The notion of vitalism, the 
driving life force, provided the foundation for the idea that 
individuals have ‘interiority’ (Steedman, 1994). This point 
warrants special attention. The notion that individuals have an 
interior, a space ‘inside’ themselves that directs one’s actions and 
way of being in the world, is clearly one condition of possibility 
for the production of psychological attributes as objects of 
scientific enquiry. Once such a space is established, it becomes 
possible to produce knowledge about it; the nature of the space, the 
relationship of the inside space to the observable exterior, and 
crucially, the ability to devise techniques for its proper 
management. The interior space is able to be described as one 
amenable to calculation and measurement, able to be understood in 
terms of, if not Mathematics, at least in terms of numbers. This 
was the subject of debate between Enlightenment mechanists and 
vitalists- the latter arguing that “…active life forces could not be 
seen directly, nor could they be measured” (Reill, 2005, p. 158), in 
opposition to the Newtonian program of quantifying the ‘life 
forces’ within individuals (Reill, 2005).  Both such traditions can 
be seen at work in different and sometimes conflicting ways in 
contemporary literature on child development. The development of 
the individual was closely supported by the notion of evolution of 
the species. 
 
The notion of a normal pattern or progression of childhood 
development is an example of the operation of normalcy in the 
lives of children. Past texts on child psychology with titles such as 
Normality and pathology in childhood: Assessments of 
development (Freud, 1965) and The normal child and some of his 
abnormalities: A general introduction to the psychology of 
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childhood (Valentine, 1956) demonstrate and reproduce this 
structure.  
 
Such concerns continue to be found in titles such as The normal 
child (Bellman et al., 2006). However, there is also a concern with 
the consequences of defining a normal child. Witness the preface 
to the just-mentioned text: 
 
We accept the dangers inherent in talking about the 
‘normal child’: we might be understood to imply the 
existence of the ‘abnormal child’. Far from it:…we 
emphasize that every child has norms and that 
deviations from the ‘standard’ patterns are often 
unclear and controversial (ibid, p. v) 
 
This dilemma was also a concern for Elizabeth in the focus groups: 
“Normal more puts people into ‘normal/abnormal’, there’s those 
two categories”. 
 
The operations of normality and abnormality or pathology have 
especially profound effects for sexually abused children, and 
structure (sometimes critically) therapeutic and research practices. 
Levett argued that the field of child sexual abuse is characterised 
by “…an over-riding preoccupation with norms: development, sex 
and sexual practices” (Levett, 1990, p. 42). 
 
 “'[C]hild abuse' is an idea established in relation to the distinction 
between the normal and the pathological, that is, it is an idea 
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generated within discourses of science and resting upon an 
understanding of 'normal' childhood development" (Ashenden, 
2004, p. 17). O’Dell (2003) argues that the ‘analytic of 
developmentalism’ (p.135) is the key way in which children and 
childhood is/are constructed within contemporary psychological 
(and popular) discourse.  
 
Sexual abuse is seen as an experience which positions abused 
children outside of the ‘normal’ childhood experience. This 
abnormality ‘sticks’ (Ahmed, 2004) to the child in a socio-cultural 
sense: the child herself becomes abnormal. This is partly connected 
to the association of childhood with innocence, which renders the 
‘knowing’ child not only problematic, but perhaps also culpable 
(Burman, 1991, citing Kitzinger 1988). But more pertinent to my 
interests here is that this enables a scientific production of the 
effects of sexual abuse as it impacts upon the expected normal 
development of the child. The primary concern within this 
paradigm of developmentalism is identifying and correcting the 
pathological effects of sexual abuse upon the child’s development 
(Khalily et al., 2011); thus the therapeutic phrase, a corrective 
experience. While I concur with Burman (1994) that the normal 
child “is…a fiction or myth. No individual or real child lies at its 
basis. It is an abstraction, a fantasy, a fiction, a production of the 
testing apparatus that incorporates, that constructs the child, by 
virtue of its gaze” (p. 16), the effects of the construction of the 
normal child are concrete rather than mythical. In other words, the 
focus here is not on looking for the child that developmental 
psychology attempts to capture and describe, but the children that 




Developmental psychology is a science. A common claim as to 
what constitutes a scientific approach to child sexual abuse is in 
relation to causality. Child sexual abuse has harmful effects, and 
scientific research aims to identify and measure these effects and 
their size. An important point must be made here; statistical 
research alone is not intended to demonstrate causality, only 
correlation. In order to prove or establish causality, statistical 
methods must be linked up with psychological theory and 
etiological models which attempt to explain why two or more 
factors are statistically correlated (Maniglio, 2009). In the classical 
scientific method research is about testing hypotheses. The 
researcher posits that an independent variable will bear a causal 
relation to one or more dependent variables. A commonly found 
example is when researchers have utilised the notion of traumatic 
sexualisation (Finkelhor et al., 1985) to posit a cause-effect 
relationship between sexualised behaviour and sexual abuse among 
children (Friedrich, 1993; Matorin et al., 1998; Friedrich et al., 
2001). 
 
In mainstream developmental psychology, the ‘doctrine of 
continuity’ (Magai and McFadden, 1995, cited in Miltenburg and 
Singer, 2000) requires this notion of linear causality. Harmful 
experiences in childhood are thought to necessarily result in a raft 
of psychological and relational problems. This notion of continuity 
cannot easily account for the fact that many abused children do 
form compassionate and meaningful relationships during the 
course of their lives. Miltenburg and Singer (2000) argue that these 
developments are best understood as moral commitments, rather 
than as strictly scientific or psychological outcomes, and therefore 




Definitions of child abuse have largely revolved around two poles- 
the intention of the abuser and the harm suffered by the victim 
(Buchanan, 1996).57 Within an ethic of consequentialism, sexual 
abuse is held to be morally problematic because it can be 
scientifically demonstrated that it has harmful effects (Slaney 
2001; Davis 2005). It could be suggested that the majority of 
‘effects’ studies rely upon and reinforce this notion, ‘cataloguing’ 
and ‘documenting’ the consequences of child sexual abuse 
(Finkelhor, 1988, cited in Davis 2005:112). 58  
 
Consequentialism removes emphasis from the act of abuse, and 
focuses on the effects of such abuse (Lilienfeld, 2002). In other 
words, consequentialism is the moral corollary to the scientific 
principle of causality, and so is consistent with the classical 
scientific premise of cause-and-effect. Measurement provides a 
demonstration of a cause-effect relationship between sexual abuse 
and harm. This relationship is demanded by scientific practice, 
which is not necessarily required by a moral objection to child 
sexual abuse.  Bowman (2005) notes that in cases of child sexual 
abuse reported in apartheid South Africa in the 1940-50’s, the 
concern was with the moral transgression of the offender with little 
regard given to the child. He notes that in many of these cases 
“[t]here was no apparent quantification of the damage to the child” 
                                                 
57 Buchanan is discussing child abuse as a general phenomenon, and not child 
sexual abuse specifically. In relation to the question of intentions, I will note that 
adults who have sexually abused children frequently do not construe their 
intentions (nor their behaviour) as harmful. Psychologists tend to refer these 
kinds of thoughts as ‘cognitive distortions’; this in itself is a fascinating example 
of the power-knowledge nexus in operation around the issue of child sexual 
abuse, but one beyond the scope of the current project. 
58 There is a further dimension to this debate that marks any adult sexual interest 
in children as problematic because it is a kind of illness (pedophilia, a type of 
paraphilia). Here the problem is the pathology of the adult pedophile, quite apart 
from any consideration of whether the child was harmed. The emergence of the 
pedophile as an object of psy knowledge has been taken up by numerous 
Foucauldian inspired writers, for example (Davidson, 1987; Slaney, 2001) 
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(p. 109) and the child was not referred to social workers or 
psychologists for counselling.  
 
Ashenden (2004) shows how, in a modern liberal democratic 
system of governance, state intervention into the ‘privacy’ of the 
family requires justification based on scientific, rational 
knowledge, in order to operate under the banner of objectivity. 
Whilst the concern with the abuse of children may well be founded 
on moral concerns, this is insufficient to justify overriding the 
moral primacy of the private family59.  
 
Child sexual abuse researchers themselves are often careful to 
present their findings as scientific, and therefore not as moral. In 
the magazine Science,  a group of established child abuse 
researchers published a short paper titled The science of child 
sexual abuse (Freyd et al., 2005). Here they lamented that the state 
of research on child sexual abuse was ‘fragmented’, and “often 
infused with unstated value judgements”. They recommended that 
advancements in the prevention and treatment of child sexual 
abuse could be made only by furthering the possibility of 
                                                 
59 The requirement of scientific legitimacy is not the only barrier to be 
negotiated for intervening into men’s familial violence against women and 
children. Wendy Brown (1995) suggests that classic liberal constructions of 
‘rights’ depend upon an unstated exclusion of women and children from the 
status of citizen. State ratified rights are designed to protect equal citizens from 
other equal citizens who might attempt to use violence and present other 
impediments to the pursuit of their interests. “Liberal state-of-nature theory 
presumes that violence inheres among equals, not between dominant and 
subordinate persons” (p. 150). The liberal rights effort to protect women and 
children from men’s familial violence flounders, according to Brown, because 
liberal rights were never meant for the private sphere of the family. Violence 
and domination within these spheres is naturalized, barring its treatment as 
political and thus a legitimate object of state intervention. Furthermore, the 
formative ground on which the liberal subject/citizen depends upon this 
disavowed zone of exclusion (the ‘haven’ of hearth and home). Extending rights 
to these zones would politicize precisely what liberalism requires to be 
naturalized, in the process upsetting the very grounds upon which (an already 
masculine) citizenship depends.     
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conducting scientific research. There is a place for morality and 
politics here, in so far as funding is required to facilitate scientific 
research. However the authors qualify even this potentially moral 
dimension, by justifying the need for research in terms of the 
economic costs of the impacts of child sexual abuse.  
 
The elaboration of scientific knowledge, which can be seen to 
objectively establish the necessity of intervention, is required. “In 
this sense, medicine must find on the body some form of violation 
in order to substantiate a moral transgression scientifically” 
(Bowman, 2005, p. 110). In the case of interventions into child 
sexual abuse, the ethic of consequentialism links up with the 
requirement of the law to find the irregularity in the body or the 
psychology of the child victim (ibid.). Bowman refers to this as a 
“crisis of damage” (p, 140), where the moral offence might be seen 
to outweigh the physical harm caused in some cases of child sexual 
abuse. Developmental child psychology acts here as a legitimating 
form of knowledge to substantiate that abuse has not only 
occurred, but more importantly, caused harm. Researchers within 
the developmentalist tradition make purposeful decisions about 
defining child sexual abuse as a matter centred on the 
“developmentally immature child” rather than “adults’ advantage 
of authority and power over the child” (e.g. Khalily et al., 2011, p. 
339). 
 
While the physical examination acts as both forensic verification 
and establishes the need for medical intervention, the 
psychological assessment establishes the necessity of (usually 
longer term) psychological treatment. In some jurisdictions, 
victims of sexual abuse may be entitled to forms of compensation 
to assist with their recovery. Claims are assessed not on the act or 
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acts abuse per se, but on the psychological harm suffered; harm 
which must be assessed and verified by an authorised professional 
such as a clinical psychologist (Gavey, 2003). It is not that 
physical harm, the “anchoring point of sexual damage” (Bowman, 
2005, p. 112) becomes unimportant-any such injuries come to hold 
a psychological significance. However, psychological research 
tends to work in terms of psychological constructs that may not 
have a physical manifestation. In the language of scientific 
measurement, there is a distinction between directly observable 
(and therefore measurable) extensive attributes, and intensive 
attributes which are only detectable via their effects on extensive 
attributes. I discussed this in Chapter 3.  
 
Slaney (2001) describes how the ethics of consequentialism 
(causality) have led to the search for the corroboration of abuse 
with psychological and behavioural problems to demonstrate why 
abuse is ‘bad’. Consequentialist (or utilitarian) ethics are “...based 
exclusively on the consequences of an action”, in contrast to 
deontological (or intuitinist) ethics which are “…based on deep-
seated beliefs concerning an action’s wrongfulness irrespective of 
its consequences” (Lilienfeld, 2002, p. 182, citing Hacking 1995). 
For Slaney, an ethics of consequentialism is unnecessary as abuse 
is unacceptable in and of itself, as it is defined by the issue of 
power, not harm. In making such a claim, one knowingly either a) 
challenges the idea that science ought to be solely concerned with 
establishing cause-effect relationships, or b) eschews scientific 
approaches as the only legitimate option. It is entirely theoretically 
possible to propose that ‘adult-child sexual contact’ is not 
necessarily harmful to the child without condoning or excusing 
such behaviour (a point made by Dorais, 2002, p. 8, but not a 
position he himself, a therapist, condones).  
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However, the pervasiveness of the consequentialist ethic, 
especially the scientific commitment to causality, makes this 
difficult; thus the insistence that adult-child sexual contact is 
always, necessarily harmful. To object to child sexual abuse on 
grounds other than its harmfulness is to challenge the 
consequentialist ethic. Davis (2005, p. 11) objects to the reliance 
on a consequentialist ethic for moral wrongness to be established. 
That is, even if research (such as the Rind et. al. study) claiming 
that the effects of childhood sexual abuse are not so disastrous as 
often thought is taken into account, this does not provide grounds 
for challenging the illegality or immoral wrong of the acts. Davis 
suggests that such consequentialism, via psychological knowledge, 
has in fact constrained the lives of adults sexually abused as 
children. "Indeed, the tendency to equate wrongness with 
psychological harm has certainly contributed to the tendency to 
define victims in terms of psychological problems" (Davis, 2005, 
p. 274: footnote 17).60 
 
Critical perspectives on child developmental psychology 
 
The very idea of development is not natural and universal, but 
extremely specific, and, in its specificity, occludes other 
marginalised stories, subsumed as they are within the bigger story. 
The big story is a European patriarchal story, a story from the 
                                                 
60 Another obvious implication of the focus on harm is that the seriousness of 
child sexual abuse may be minimised in cases where children who do not 
display signs of harm. In a report in The Age newspaper (Child sex abuse 
sentence 'soft', Christine Kellett, August 29, 2007), it was reported that Judge 
Botting, in his sentencing comments, said there was "scant" evidence to suggest 
the victim of a man found guilty of child sexual abuse charges had suffered 
psychological harm as a result of the abuse. This lack of harm was referred to in 
relation to the sentence handed down.  
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centre which describes the periphery in terms of the abnormal, 
difference as deficiency (Walkerdine, 1993, p. 455, cited in Morss, 
1996, p.50) 
 
Burman (1992) illustrates how the tendency to understand children 
through the discourse of developmental theory obscures or neglects 
the power dynamics that operate in children’s experiences, 
especially with adults. Developmental theory interprets children’s 
speech (or behaviour) as a (de-contextualised) product of their 
developmental stage (e.g. capacity to utilise logic, rational use of 
concepts). This excludes considerations of the power relations in 
children’s lives (adult/child, interviewer/child). Burman brings 
attention to the discursive strategies that children employ to resist 
or utilise power relations. This brings forth children’s agency, 
especially as users of discourse and subjects within relations of 
power. These aspects of children’s subjectivity are foreclosed in 
the analytic of developmentalism. This also illustrates that other, 
competing regimes of description are available for the fabrication 
of children which produce other possibilities for children (or, 
indeed, produce other children). 
 
In the statistics of (developmental) psychology, abnormality is 
literally thought of as a significant deviation from established 
norms (Pilgrim and Rogers, 1993, cited in Warner, 2009). In 
measures of psychological characteristics a statistical deviation of 
more than two standard deviations from the normal range is 
considered to be ‘clinically significant’, undoubtedly calling for 
the expertise of professional intervention. Quetelet’s conception of 
human difference as error is not a metaphor–it is literally applied 
to real people seeking to understand the ways that sexual abuse 
may have influenced their lives. This alludes to the manner in 
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which psychological measurement is simultaneously a means of 
producing knowledge about people, and a means of governance.  
 
Psychological testing and measurement has been integral to the 
scientific endeavour of developmental psychology, and psychology 
in general, and as such, to our ways of thinking about children. As 
Burman (1994) has observed, “…tools of measurement produce 
research objects and research subjects. Developmental psychology 
has been driven by the demand to produce technologies of 
measurement” (p.3). Rose (1999) shows how these normative 
expectations of developmental psychology—what children should 
be like as they grow up—were established in clinical laboratories. 
Looking at photos of such observations being undertaken (see 
Rose, 1999, p.146), it is evident that what the adults were involved 
with was very much perceived (at least by themselves) as ‘proper 
science’. As with all good science, events and observations were 
measured and recorded. Rose illustrates how the ‘normal’ child in 
these studies was first represented through photographs, then 
illustrations, then sparse line drawings, and finally, tables of 
numbers. Ultimately, the numbers became more real measures of 
childhood than actual children.  
 
Harm and the norm 
 
Quantitative research on child sexual abuse frames the question of 
harm in terms of difference from a) non-abused children, and 
relatedly b) the norm. The non-abused child is synonymous with 
the normal child. Distinguishing the normal child from the abused 
child becomes a focus. For example, Stephanie Dallam and her 
218 
 
colleagues (Dallam et al., 2001) argue that some of the choices of 
variables studied and statistical techniques used by Rind et. al. 
under-calculated the difference between abused and non-abused 
subjects. Dallam et al also argue that the variable ‘child sexual 
abuse’ accounts for more of the difference between abused and 
non-abused individuals than Rind et. al. claim. While what is at 
stake is establishing the extent of harm caused by child sexual 
abuse, in their disagreement both sets of authors establish that 
normality is the prime reference point for measuring the effects of 
child sexual abuse. 
 
In developmental psychological research, both the normal child 
and the sexually abused child are examples of the construction of a 
scientific fact (Latour, 1986). This is not unique to the field of 
child sexual abuse or psychology in general, but occurs across 
different scientific disciplines. The making of scientific facts by 
comparing two sets of numbers, often represented in a graph or 
table is a trans-disciplinary technique, made possible by the use of 
statistics: a normal/control group versus a 
comparative/experimental group. For example, in his study of the 
discovery of the substance called TRF in the field of 
endocrinology, Latour argues that scientific objects are constructed 
as the difference between a control curve and an experimental 
curve. In other words, results from experiments on a ‘pure’ 
substance are calculated and inscribed, then represented in a curve 
on a graph- this is the control curve (this is taken to be a 
representation of how the substance ‘behaves’). A second 
experiment is then conducted on a ‘purified fraction’ (i.e. a 
substance similar to the first except it contains the object under 
study, TRF) and similarly inscribed. When the two curves are 
compared, the discrepancy can be interpreted as a result of the 
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action of the object under study (TRF). Latour’s point is that, as 
opposed to the internal scientific explanation that the substance 
caused the discrepancy between the curves, “…the object was 
constructed out of the difference between peaks on two curves” 
(Latour, 1986, p. 125). TRF could not be said to have existed as a 
scientific object without the two curves and their discrepancies.  
 
In the field of child sexual abuse, I suggest that ‘harm’ is a 
scientific fact or object that has been constructed out of the 
difference between sets of numbers. The superimposition of the 
curves produced by studying normal (non-abused) children and 
sexually abused children allows researchers to see—to make 
visible—the difference between the two groups. This difference is 
the harm caused by child sexual abuse. Scientifically, statistically, 
the harm is only visible after these graphs are available for 
comparison. I stress again that this is not the same as saying that 
child sexual abuse would not be harmful if it was not studied by 
psychological research, only that when these effects are cast as 
objects of scientific enquiry, they become objects of a different 
kind (compared to, say, political, moral or religious constructions 
of the effects of child sexual abuse).  
 
Figure 2 (see next page) shows that on a BASC test, the normal 
child should score in the area just above the bold line (at 50) on a 
range of attributes (circled in green). The band between the 
numbers 50 and 60 on the vertical axis indicates the average range 
for each attribute listed on the horizontal axis; 60-70 indicates the 
‘at-risk’ range (technically, more than one standard deviation 
outside the mean range); and above 70 is the clinically significant 
range.   
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Figure 1- Sample of BASC graph61 
 
                                                 
61 Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition (BASC-2). 
Copyright (C) 2004 NCS Pearson. Reproduced with permission. All rights 










Returning again to Rind and his colleagues: “It is not enough to 
know that CSA subjects are more poorly adjusted than controls; it 
is also important to know by how much” (Rind et al., 2000, p. 9). 
 
Picking the phrase ‘poorly adjusted’ out of the quotation cited 
above indicates how deviation from the norm is problematic in 
quantitative research on child sexual abuse. Poorly adjusted would 
mean a score on the BASC, for example, outside of the normal 
range. However, the word ‘adjusted’ also provides a clue as to 
alternative ways to consider relations to the norm. Deviation from 
a norm need not be thought of as necessarily a poor or deficient 
state of affairs. Writing in 1933 on veterans of World War I 
suffering from shell shock, Kurt Goldstein (1995) challenged the 
conceptualisation of such individuals as simply damaged. Using 
the biological concept of the adaptive organism, Goldstein instead 
understood the limited functioning of distressed or traumatised 
beings as adaptive responses to experiences of the environment. By 
seemingly curtailing the level of one’s functioning on a 
behavioural, physiological and neurobiological level, the 
traumatised ‘organism’ actually enhanced its capacity to survive. 
Difference from the norm was in fact beneficial.  
 
I think this is what the members of my focus group were getting at. 
If a child has been sexually abused, they may well be different 
from the norm, but this is to be expected as an adaptation. The 
adaptation cannot be understood as a deficiency, because it is an 
adaptation that enables survival. Yet it is precisely this adaptation 
that produces the difference between numbers, the psychological 
measurements of abused vs. non-abused people, and in the 
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language of psychological testing, the difference is classified as 
‘clinically significant’ or ‘at-risk’. This leaves a tense dilemma for 
the counsellor. What is the role of a therapeutic intervention in the 
case of an individual (adult or child) whose deviation from the 
norm has enabled them to survive an abusive environment?  
 
Canguilhem took up Goldstein’s ideas (Canguilhelm, 1978) and 
argued for the importance of order to understand processes of cure 
and recovery- a new order can be established that is beneficial to 
the organisms changed capacities, situation, etc. It is of no value to 
compare evaluatively the new order compared to the old order 
because circumstances and/or the organism have changed- the 
conditions of survival and functioning have changed.  
 
Canguilhem warned against attempting to correct the ‘new order’. 
“We must not attempt to interfere with these new constants, 
because we would thus create new disorders” (1978, p. 114). 
Taking this idea into the field of child sexual abuse would mean 
that traumatised children should be understood as behaving 
adaptively, and not as deviant. From this perspective, referring and 
comparing to the non-abused (or normal) child is worse than 
irrelevant; in fact it would be harmful to try and normalise the 
abused child.  
 
In the focus group, Kate was well aware of the problems presented 
by this tension between, on one hand, an individual child in 
therapy seemingly suffering pronounced anxiety, and on the other, 
an appreciation of the context in which this anxiety functions. 
 
KATE: well developmentally, but OK you’ve got Jonny 
come in, well he might be a kid that is very anxious 
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about this, in his character traits in general so, I think 
you’re right, when you look at impacts and indicators 
and see yes, you’re trying to look at a reduction in that 
you know, nightmares, intrusive thoughts, blah blah 
blah, you’d be hoping that your therapy would do that 
but I guess, the thing is, is that we start with a child 
after they’ve had a traumatic event so, you don’t know 
them a year ago, you don’t know them prior the them 
having met Uncle Billy, you know what I mean, so…  
 
My point here is that while Kate is aware that, as a counsellor, 
there is some expectation that she might assist Jonny achieve a 
reduction in anxiety, she also struggles with question of how the 
anxiety is indicative not simply of an individual deviation from the 
norm, but a contextually adaptive response.  
 
The conversation continued: 
 
ELIZABETH:  but anxiety can be, is about feeling 
unsafe so if after 12 months of counselling there’s, you 
know, the child now real….the support system’s more 
stronger and has a greater sense about how to keep 
little Johnny safe, well there’s a huge anxiety gone, 
and sometimes it can just be about that, that, yeah I 
dunno 
 
JASON: Yeah I don’t think it really matters what it was 
because if it’s enough to get it to the high end of the 
scale then it’s come down, obviously it was significant 
to get it, do you say clinically significant, yeah, I would 
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have thought that’d be important. I’d take that as a 
positive. 
 
ELIZABETH:  hmm. And you’d be worried about the 
long term impacts if you, you know if you did it in 12 
months and then your kid, you’re still seeing little 
Johnny at 2 years and it’s clinically significant, I’d be 
worried about the long-term impacts on little Johnny’s 
mental health having such high anxiety… 
 
KATE:  if he’s ranked up there constantly… 
 
ELIZABETH:  that could lead to phobias or obsessive 
compulsive, or, I dunno, but I’d be worried about, I’d 
probably say ‘He needs to go to a CAMHS’62, you 
know, I dunno. It might help inform whether we’re the 
right place for him given his anxiety is so great… 
 
KATE: yeah, has the right work been done, it might 
make you question… 
 
ELIZABETH: that’s right, I dunno 
 
KATE: have you not…maybe, ‘cos that would be 
something, if you saw that and it was clinically 
significant and you’d go ‘Oh Ok’, and it would be hard 
and like Nancy said that would be highly unlikely if 
you got something like that that would be surprise to 
you, I would hope, in our assessment, If you get a high 
                                                 
62 Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service 
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anxiety rating you go ‘yeah, that makes sense to me’. 
Yep, I get it. 
 
JASON: and I think the question of ‘normal’ is really 
important, because like culturally, I mean I don’t know 
the exact figures but, apparently Western culture is the 





JASON: the wealthiest are the most unhappiest so 





JASON: as opposed to some of these other cultures 
where all of these, not all of them, but a lot of these 
issues aren’t even present, so what’s, you know, you 
might question what’s normal in all that. 
 
I want to focus here on Kate’s comment: “has the right work been 
done, it might make you question”. The therapeutic context 
produces a particular construction of deviation from the norm (in 
this case, Jonny’s anxiety), with an attendant expectation that 
therapy should address this problem. If therapy fails to achieve this 
outcome, the counsellor is invited to question her own practice, 
even while articulating the view that Jonny’s anxiety is related to 




Significantly, Canguilhem states that in the context of adaptation to 
a changed environment that “the concept of normal is not 
susceptible to objective measurement” (1978, p. 119). However, 
this is precisely, and literally, what psychological measurement 
does- it objectively produces normality. The implication of this is 
that in the context of trauma, an individual functions in a 
qualitatively different way than they did before, and this qualitative 
difference is not pathological but in fact adaptive.  
 
These different interpretations of difference, adaptation and 
deviation, seem to be fundamentally opposed. How does the 
adaptive interpretation impact upon the therapeutic imperative to 
normalise deviance? While counsellors experience their 
entanglement with these questions, when researchers call for 
improved techniques of treatment for victim/survivors of child 
sexual abuse (Freyd et al., 2005), what do they mean, if not to 
restore normality?  One text provides an answer quite explicitly: 
“A better understanding of the pathophysiology associated with 
exposure to childhood maltreatment will lead to improved 
psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacologic treatment 
interventions with a goal of ultimately leading to a lower 
prevalence of associated morbidities” (De Bellis et al., 2011, p. 
550). The goal is to treat affected individuals in order to reduce the 
prevalence of morbidities; no mention is made here of possible 
adaptive purposes of these responses. Further, it is worth noting, 
echoing the earlier concern of Louise Armstrong (1996), that the 
focus is on treating and preventing the prevalence of ‘morbidities’ 
among victims, devoid of any political or contextual positioning of 




Based on my reading of the above extracts, I argue that neither the 
disciplinary view of normal as a regulatory construct, nor the 
equation of normal with healthy, is adequate to understanding the 
production of these problems. The counsellors are moved, are 
influenced, by their engagements with all of these ideas. It is not a 
sufficient response for the counsellors, to say ‘well, Jonny is 
anxious because of the sexual abuse he suffered’. The subject 
position of counsellor demands a therapeutic response; at the same 
time there is an awareness that an individualised response is not 
necessarily congruent with the situation. The counsellors are left to 
struggle to account for their own agency within this situation.     
 
Summary of Chapter 5 
 
Statistical techniques alone, whilst pivotal to the “work of modern 
government” (Tyler, 1997, p. 79), are not inherently psychological. 
They are means of recording and producing the traits of a 
population; “they become ‘psychological’ only at the moment of 
their application to the inner, emotional life of future citizens” 
(ibid., p. 79). These numbers, in tandem with the incitement to the 
normal and the goal of maximization of the health of the 
population (for evidence of this rationality applied to child victims 
of violence, see Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2007), 
work as measures against which it is “possible to calculate success 
or failure at the work of being a child” (Tyler, 1997, p. 77). 
 
The results of individual measurements can only take on effective 
meaning when the results are compared to a general population, 
with particular reference to where the individual is calculated to sit 
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relative to the statistical norm. In fact, some authors suggest that 
this comparative function of psychological tests is measurement: 
“Measuring in this case means finding where this degree [to which 
an individual exhibits a certain attribute] and thus this individual fit 
into the distribution of that attribute across a defined population” 
(Gundlach, 2007, p. 214). Such a practice entirely sidesteps the 
issues raised by Michell (discussed earlier), namely the question of 
whether psychological attributes have to be quantitative in order to 
be meaningfully measurable, but raises new issues in the light of a 
disciplinary analysis of power/knowledge, and critical perspectives 
of normal.    
 
In this chapter I have attempted to unsettle the notion of normal, 
and also to make visible the tensions that counsellors can 
experience in relation to normal. While the normal child does sit at 
the centre of developmental psychology in important ways, this is 
also contested in practice. The statistical device of normality does 
not, I argue, entirely succeed in presenting itself as objective and 
neutral, as evidenced by the critical concerns documented in the 
literature and the focus groups. There is special concern about the 
potential for individuals who have been subjected to sexual abuse 
to be stigmatised or deemed abnormal. At the same time, making 
difference from the norm visible has been an important strategic 





Chapter 6- Objective knowledge about child 
sexual abuse  
 
The practice of clinical assessment utilises psychological 
measurement for different purposes than in research contexts 
(Anastasi, 1993). As part of these distinct arrangements, the object 
of enquiry as well as the ‘test user’ are subject to different 
technologies of the self and modes of subjectification. For 
example, in test manuals, repeated advice is given to the clinical 
practitioner that measurements should not be the sole source of 
information, and that any results of such measurements should 
always be understood in context of information gathered through 
other sources such as the ‘clinical interview’;  
 
“…it is important to keep in mind that individual 
children are not predictable in their manifestation of 
trauma, despite the trends that are evident among 
groups of traumatized children. Results of broad-based 
measures, such as the BASC, must be integrated with 
the history, the interview and observations of the child, 
and possibly the narrow-band trauma scales that focus 
specifically on the traumatic event” (Reynolds & 
Kamphaus, 2002, p. 233).  
 
Such advice would be irrelevant for researchers intending to 
establish the very trends among groups referred to. This chapter 
focuses on child sexual abuse as an object of scientific research, 
with the issue of the clinical context and counsellor subjectivity 
being taken up in the next chapter. 
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Child sexual abuse as an object of scientific enquiry 
 
What do quantitative approaches to studying child sexual abuse, 
including meta-analyses like the Rind et al. paper, and research 
papers deploying instruments of psychological measurement, 
attempt to achieve? In general, they claim that the effects of child 
sexual abuse are a proper object of scientific enquiry, and as such 
should be subject to the methods of scientific enquiry. This 
specifically entails objectivity, and a commitment to 
consequentialism (or causality). The claim that research into child 
sexual abuse should be scientific is by no means unique to Rind et. 
al.. In a short paper published in the prestigious journal Science, a 
group of established sexual abuse researchers make a strong call 
for inter-disciplinary research into child sexual abuse to unify 
under the banner of science (Freyd et al., 2005). They lament that 
“much of the research on CSA has been plagued by 
nonrepresentative sampling, deficient controls, and limited 
statistical power” (p. 501, my emphasis), as well as the “unstated 
value judgements” that “infuse” the field.  
 
Note that these are precisely the shortfalls that Rind et. al. 
identified and attempted to address. Yet the Freyd et. al. paper 
claims that CSA has long term and widespread harm despite their 
admission that there is a lack of scientific evidence to support this 
claim (that is the point of their paper). The call from Freyd et. al. is 
based on the assumption that such scientific research will better 
demonstrate the harm of sexual abuse. Yet Rind et al., using 
rigorously reviewed scientific (statistical) methods, claimed that 
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the evidence does not lead to this conclusion.63 Despite their 
differences, both sets of authors agree that child sexual abuse is a 
proper object of scientific study; it has crossed the ‘threshold of 
scientificity’ (Foucault, 1970).  
 
Latour (1993) described the sorting of ideology from science as a 
key feature of modernist knowledge, and the papers cited above 
seem to confirm Latour’s vision of ‘the modern’ as “waiting for 
that dawn and thrilled to its promise” of dispelling the “traps of 
naturalization and scientific ideology” (p. 36). In other words, both 
sets of authors above maintain that the truth about the effects of 
child sexual abuse will be discovered by the gradual accumulation 
of scientifically attained information, with current efforts always 
building and improving upon the past. When this state of pure 
knowledge has been achieved, ideology and morality will be 
revealed for what it is and only the pure truth will remain. 
 
What model of science? 
 
The features that I have identified in the research texts (objectivity, 
causality) are used in those texts to establish the research on child 
sexual abuse as scientific. Taking that claim seriously, and in 
reference to the previous discussion of scientific measurement, I 
can draw on some of the recent literature in science studies to ask 
what kind of science this research is modelled on. In short, I will 
argue that these are features of a classical model of science that has 
in fact been usurped in the very fields of scientific research from 
                                                 
63 It is notable that the Freyd et al. (2005) paper did not contain reference to the 
Rind et al. (1998) study. It does not seem likely that the 2005 authors could have 
been unaware of the 1998 paper, given the controversy it generated.  
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which psychology originally adapted them. More recent 
reworkings of these classical concepts, particularly in the field of 
physics, may generate alternative understandings of psychological 
measurement. 
 
It should be noted that other authors in the wider field of 
developmental psychology are more ambivalent about the extent to 
which this classical model of science ‘fits’ their discipline. (After 
all, developmental psychology, like any other construct, is not a 
unitary discipline). White and Pillemer (2005), for example, are 
quite explicit about the importance of values in developmental 
psychology work, and seek to embrace this aspect of the 
knowledge they produce. The commitment to causality in the child 
abuse literature is questioned by Miltenburg and Singer (2000)64 
for different reasons. As they point out, causal explanations of the 
harm caused by child abuse generally tend to explain negative or 
deleterious consequences. They propose that the reason for the 
general neglect, in the research literature, of how many abused 
children go on to live satisfactory lives and build close 
relationships, is that such achievements are based on moral agency 
(see also Mayne, 1993). Such acts and decisions are difficult to 
capture within an ontology committed to causality. 
 
So what makes child sexual abuse research scientific? “In the strict 
sense of the term…the science of an object exists only if this object 
allows measurement and causal explanation, in short, analysis. 
Every science tends toward metrical determination through 
establishing constants or invariants” (Canguilhelm, 1978, p. 131). 
The strictest version of causality is determinism, that event a will 
                                                 




lead to event b. Scientific research, in this model, should uncover 
deterministic relations. When there is variability, classically-
informed models of psychology put this down to the ignorance of 
the researcher or the inadequacy of the research tools, rather than 
any indeterminacy inherent in the phenomenon under study 
(Gigerenzer, 1987).  
 
The notion of direct causality, a one-to-one linear model of a cause 
and effect, has been somewhat displaced, if not entirely replaced, 
by the notion of risk factors in the social sciences. The language of 
risk factors can be traced historically to a shift in scientific 
thinking from determinism to probability during the 19th century 
(Hacking, 2006). In this model of risk, child sexual abuse is 
understood as one of a number of potential factors that may 
contribute to poor outcomes. Thus Maniglio (2009) can state in his 
meta-analysis of child sexual abuse research that “…being a victim 
of child sexual abuse should be considered as a general, non-
specific, risk factor for psychopathology, but not the only 
important one” (p. 655). Nonetheless, “further research should 
elucidate the causal mechanisms and processes that contribute to 
the adverse consequences associated with child sexual abuse” 
(ibid). This statement contains elements of a Laplacian idea about 
probability (Hacking, 1991); that although a one-to-one correlation 
between sexual abuse and any particular set of outcomes cannot be 
demonstrated, this may be due to the ignorance of researchers 
rather than any indeterminacy inherent in the phenomenon itself; 
there are still ‘causal mechanisms’ awaiting discovery.  
 
This statement makes it clear that there is still a commitment to 
causality that is not ontologically very different from determinism. 
It is only that the number of causal factors (independent variables) 
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is now larger than one, requiring more sophisticated statistical 
techniques to analyse. The notion of causality is still important, 
and an ‘individual factor’ like child sexual abuse remains 
influential, however it must be placed in a network of other factors 
that all contribute to an overall outcome (along with a caution 
about the limitations of our knowledge). Within this network of 
factors, the influence of child sexual abuse can be calculated by 
comparison to the norm. For example, one group of researchers 
calculated that for individuals who were subjected to child sexual 
abuse, this accounted for “approximately” 7.83% of their contact 
with mental health services over their lifetime (Cutajar et al., 
2010). 
 
The tight connection between cause and effect is a requirement of 
scientific explanations, but Latour reminds of the reflexive nature 
of notions of causality. Scientific explanations are built up over 
time, through work, materials and associations. “Causes and 
effects are only a retrospective way of interpreting events” (Latour, 
2005, p. 39. f.n. 30). The cause is posited as such after the effects 
have already happened; this is the work of scientific explanation. 
Adherence to this ontology harnesses the rhetorical power and 
persuasive authority of scientific psychology, even if it requires the 
elision of voluntary responses and decisions that individuals may 
make (Gergen, 1998). 
 
A good example of Latour’s point about the retrospective 
attribution of causes can be found in Matorin and Lynn’s (1998) 
discussion of sexualised behaviour among children who have been 
sexually abused. They note the finding of other researchers that 
sexually abused children tend to display “…sexual preoccupations, 
compulsive sex play, frequent masturbation, precocious sexual 
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activity and knowledge, and aggressive sexual behavior” (p. 262), 
that adolescents and adults can also display troubling sexual 
behaviours, and they state that these behaviours are the “behavioral 
manifestations of traumatic sexualisation”. Viewed from Latour’s 
position, traumatic sexualisation has been posited after the fact as 
an explanation for the problematic behaviours. Where Matorin and 
Lynn argue that traumatic sexualisation causes the behaviour (and 
that traumatic sexualisation, in turn, is caused by sexual abuse), 
Latour’s position would be that the very concept of traumatic 
sexualisation is formed by the behaviours.  
 
The scientific research on child sexual abuse generally proceeds by 
defining particular psychological constructs (sometimes called 
traits) that previous clinical and research literature has identified as 
being effected by child sexual abuse. Rind et al. delineated 18 
categories of such constructs from the studies they looked at: 
alcohol problems, anxiety, depression, dissociation, eating 
disorders, hostility, interpersonal sensitivity, locus of control, 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology, paranoia, phobia, 
psychotic symptoms, self-esteem, sexual adjustment, social 
adjustment, somatization, suicidal ideation and behaviour, and 
wide adjustment (Rind et al., 1998, p. 28). Rind et al. were 
criticised for excluding a specific category of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, commonly considered to be an effect of child 
sexual abuse (e.g. Dallam et al, 2001. However, these authors also 
noted that one reason that PTSD was not included in the Rind et al. 
meta-analysis was the lack of relevant studies with non-clinical 
populations). Other researchers generally include either PTSD or 
specifically identified symptoms of PTSD in their effects studies. 
For example, Paolucci et al. (2001), in their meta-analysis, used 6 
categories: PTSD, depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, victim-
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perpetrator cycle, and academic performance. Another category of 
increasing concern amongst researchers has been developmentally 
inappropriate sexualised behaviour as a consequence of child 
sexual abuse (Friedrich, 1993; Friedrich et al., 2001; e.g. Chromy, 
2003).  
 
Warner notes the representational assumption inherent in attempts 
to scientifically measure psychological attributes and bracketing of 
critique this can entail:  
 
Psychology also too often relies upon the idea of an 
objective world and psychologists’ expert ability to 
decipher problems within it. Critique is avoided by 
restricting the terms of debate. It is not whether the 
problem exists, but how good is this test or this 
technique at measuring it” (Warner, 2009, p.25).  
 
The above list of measured psychological attributes65 illustrates the 
assumption contained in meta-analyses that these characteristics 
are in fact measurable. However, this is not to say that the 
measuring instruments themselves go unquestioned. Questioning, 
critiquing, assessing and evaluating the applicability and validity 
of the measuring instrument to the task are standard scientific 
procedures. This is expressed in Schrodinger’s caution to scientists 
about the use of measuring devices: “Any old playing around with 
an indicating instrument in the vicinity of another body, whereby 
at any old time one takes a reading, can hardly be called a 
measurement of that body” (Schrodinger, 1935, cited in Barad, 
                                                 
65 Of course, not all those listed are strictly psychological attributes (e.g. alcohol 
problems); however in the context of the research, problems in these areas are 
theoretically posited as symptoms of psychological traits.  
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2007, p. 281). It is routine for research papers to include a section 
entitled ‘Measures’ to describe the questionnaires or tools 
(instruments) used to assess the variables under investigation. 
These discussions frequently investigate the reliability and validity 
of the instruments used. Some literature focuses specifically on 
which psychometric instruments provide the best measurements of 
the traumatic impacts of child sexual abuse (Crouch et al., 1999; 
Gilbert, 2004). Others produce further related constructs as 
scientific objects that can be measured; for example, the degree of 
severity of sexual abuse itself can be treated as a measurable, 
independent variable to be statistically accounted for when 
assessing the harm of child sexual abuse (Loeb et al., 2011; Young 
et al., 2011). 
 
When is a measure not a measure? 
 
Interesting anomalies can be found on closer examination of the 
‘Measures’ sections of published articles. A close reading may 
reveal that many so-called measures do not claim to do any 
measuring whatsoever. To choose a recent example from the 
Journal of Child Sexual Abuse: Deering and Mellor’s (2011) 
‘Measures’ section describes the asking of open-ended questions 
asking about the respondents’ history of sexual abuse, asking 
respondents to describe the long-term impact of the abuse 
experiences on aspects of their functioning, and inquiring into 
aspects of family history. In fact, the very title of the article 
specifies this is a qualitative study. Similarly, a study into the 
psychophysiological impacts of child sexual abuse includes as a 
‘measure’ the Early Trauma Interview, consisting of ‘broad 
prompts’ and ‘open ended questions’ (McDonagh-Coyle et al., 
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2001). By what convention, then, is a discussion of measures 
deemed necessary or even accurate?  
 
In the above instances I think it is reasonable to assume that the 
section title ‘measures’ is a convention of the journals the articles 
are published in. It could be argued that the term measure in this 
context is intended as a catch-all for any investigatory tool or 
instrument used in a study, and that I am missing the point by 
drawing attention to this. My point here is precisely that the term 
measure is used to describe procedures that clearly do not fall 
within any scientifically defensible definition of this term. The fact 
that the heading of ‘measure’ is a convention indicates the 
preferred style of investigative practice (Danziger, 1990). I suggest 
that even if the term is simply a poor choice of words, it implies 
some commitment to the epistemological requirements of 
measurement as a mode of scientific enquiry, even if the mode of 
enquiry is not technically measurement. The example of 
triangulation I mentioned earlier works here (Oakley, 2000). It is 
about a particular, objective relationship between knower and 
object. The use of standardised questions in an interview format is 
another example of structuring research practice around an ideal of 
objectivity (Gundlach, 2007).  
 
But, back to the more clear-cut instances where measures are used 
with the intention to measure. As Michell has argued, the 
implication that psychology measures things is an important part of 
psychology’s claim for scientific status (Michell, 1999, 2000). 
Michell (1999) would describe the current situation as attesting to 
the fact that whilst the instrumental tasks of quantification have 
been duly undertaken, the logically prior scientific task of 
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establishing that the measured objects are indeed quantitative is 
ignored.  
 
Michell’s concern can be explored by considering an instrument 
such as the Child Sexual Behavior Inventory (CSBI) (Friedrich et 
al., 2001). The CSBI, like many psychological instruments, is not a 
‘direct’ measure of traits but a measure of behaviours and their 
frequency, based on the reports of parents on their child’s 
behaviour. There is no metaphysical question involved in whether 
the frequency of certain behaviours can be counted by an observer 
(the reliability and accuracy of the observer is another question). 
Like the BASC and other similar psychological tests, however, the 
CSBI does not instruct anyone to precisely count anything. Rather, 
in the case of the BASC the reporter is asked to state the frequency 
of specific behaviours using a Likert scale, on points from 1 
(never) to 5 (very often). The CSBI is more specific (e.g. less than 
once a month, 3 times a week). 
 
Friedrich and colleagues found that “the CSBI-1 total score 
delineated sexually aggressive from physically aggressive and non-
aggressive children” (Friedrich et al., 2001, p. 38). This should 
hardly be surprising, given that the CSBI is simply a checklist of 
sexual behaviours. In this claim, the CSBI only ‘measures’ 
behaviours, with no underlying assumption that these are related to 
another, un-observable attribute (i.e. the logic is that of 
behaviourism).  
 
A more interesting claim for the CSBI is that it discriminates 
sexually abused children from non-sexually abused children. The 
behaviours are theoretically linked to the individual’s attributes or 
traits. This is theoretically founded in Finkelhor & Browne’s  
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notion of traumatic sexualisation as an outcome of sexual abuse 
(see Finkelhor, 1988). In this theory, children subjected to 
developmentally inappropriate, frightening, or otherwise 
distressing sexualised acts (i.e. sexual abuse) are said to suffer 
from traumatic sexualisation, which manifests in observable 
sexualised behaviour. 
 
The issue is in the assumptions of the theoretical link between the 
sexual victimisation of the child and their subsequent sexualised 
behaviour. It is one thing to say that a child “Makes sexual sounds 
(sighs, moans, heavy breathing, etc.)” (an item on the CSBI- see 
the Appendix to Friedrich et al., 2001) less than once a month or 
more than 3 times a week. (There is the question of how the 
observer interprets exactly what constitutes a ‘sexual sound’). It is 
two more things to say; 1- there is a normal amount that a child of 
certain age should exhibit this behaviour, and 2- a deviation from 
this norm is caused by the child’s traumatized sexuality (or any 
other discernible psychological trait or attribute).  
 
The kinds of research described above turn on establishing 
differences between sexually abused research participants and 
statistically normal populations, and using standardised techniques 
intended to achieve a modicum of objectivity of some kind. There 
is an implicit assertion of causal effects of child sexual abuse. 
Especially when conducted in statistical terms, this commitment to 
causality fails to account for individual agency of the research 
participants. These issues have been identified as problematic by 
researchers interested in making visible the harm of child sexual 
abuse, without wanting to invest in these ontological, 
epistemological and ethical commitments. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I re-iterate some of these alternatives and then try to 
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account for some of the problematisations these attempts produce 




The production of normality renders the sexually abused child 
abnormal to the extent the sexual abuse has caused their 
development to be thrown off the normal and healthy course. This 
way of framing child sexual abuse has been strategically effective 
in establishing the unacceptability of adults using children for 
sexual purposes, and therefore it has obvious usefulness. However, 
this discourse of developmentalism has a number of limitations 
and unexpected consequences of its own, which may in turn be 
limiting to the lives of children and of adults abused as children. 
One response to this is to try and suggest a way of thinking about 
child sexual abuse that does not rely on the power/knowledge 
nexus in which developmental psychology is embedded. In doing 
so, the productive possibilities of developmentalism are 
concurrently articulated. That is, developmental psychology, like 
any body of knowledge that is invested in governing lives, 
produces as well as limits possibilities for the living of lives and 
the production of subjectivities. 
 
The ‘wrongness’ of child sexual abuse (or ‘adult-child sexual 
relations’) 66 has been established within the paradigm of 
                                                 
66 The terms used to describe sexual interactions between children and adults 
(and older children and adolescents) are themselves constitutive of how such 
behaviour is understood. My preference will be for the term ‘child sexual abuse’ 
to describe any sexual interaction between children and adults (or significantly 
older children), as I think it keeps issues of power and exploitation as the focus. 
However in doing so I acknowledge that this term (child sexual abuse) is 
potentially problematic for a range of reasons: it forecloses on questions such as 
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developmental psychology67, where measurement practices have 
played a pivotal part in establishing the parameters of the normal 
child (Burman, 1994) and the normal adult. If one follows the 
critique of normal I have been tracing here, if normal is regarded 
as a problematic, regulative ideal, one must respond in different 
ways to the question of why child sexual abuse is unacceptable or 
unethical.  
 
In order to begin on this question, it might be helpful to consider 
that the clinical literature identifies both physical and 
psychological harm to sexually abused children. In both cases, a 
normal, healthy child is counter-posed to the sexually abused child, 
the former being characterised by its presumably unharmed psyche 
and body (e.g. Adams, 2011). In raising this, I intend to draw a 
fundamental analogy between the discursive constitution of the 
body, and the construction of the normal and sexually abused child 
through developmental psychology. This analogy draws on 
questions regarding the nature of the body, and the extent to which 
                                                                                                             
what do we mean by ‘sexual interactions’?; what do we mean by ‘child’ and 
‘adult’?; how do we respond to children and young people who claim to have 
initiated and/or consented to sexual interactions? What are the consequences for 
children when they are identified as having been sexually abused? Despite these 
limitations, I will use the term strategically, as the available alternatives appear 
to minimize the operation of power. For example, “children who have 
experienced sex”, (Joy, 2003), or children who have had “sexual encounters 
with adults” (Angelides, 2004, p. 143). Here I am influenced by Sharon 
Marcus’s (1992) argument (although I may be misappropriating her position for 
a different purpose) that the languages we use to discuss sexual violence and 
rape are founded on “neither real nor objective criteria, but political decisions to 
exclude certain interpretations and to privilege others” (p. 387). I attempt to 
draw attention to these exclusions where possible. 
67 Of course, the field of developmental psychology does not have exclusive 
claims to the problematisation of child sexual abuse. Feminist activism, the law, 
as well as broader discourses regarding the family and the innocence of children 
can all be identified as discursive operants constituting the problem of child 
sexual abuse. My focus here, however, is on the contribution of developmental 
psychology as the premier mode of understanding child sexual abuse within 




all bodies are discursively produced and maintained. This is the 
subject of long-standing debate, especially amongst contemporary 
feminist academics. To pre-empt my argument slightly, I suspect 
that the question of whether or not the harm of sexual abuse is 
solely ‘discursive’, as opposed to ‘real’, is ultimately a misleading 
one, to the extent that children’s bodies and psychological 
interiority are always already produced as objects of scientific 
(medical, psychological) discourse. If this is the case (as I will 
argue), then the harm associated with sexual abuse can only be said 
to act upon a discursively constituted body; it follows that the harm 
itself can only act ‘through’ discourse. That is to say, if a body is 
made up of what is said, written and thought about it, and through 
the practices incited as an enactment of these discourses, then any 
harm to that body must also be produced through things said, 
written and thought, and the consequent practices68.  
 
The experience of ‘pain’ is a site of similar contestation. 
According to the International Association for the Study of Pain, 
one defining part of pain is that “the attribution of meaning to the 
unpleasant sensory events is an intrinsic part of the experience of 
pain” (cited in Ahmed, 2004, p.23). Professional understanding of 
(even physical) pain and suffering is historically constituted. For 
example, surgeons in 19thC America had very different definitions 
                                                 
68 Of course this is not to suggest that bodies would not exist if there was no 
discourse. Nor, that the physical effects of child sexual abuse, where present, 
such as bruising or tearing, only exist because we talk or write about them. But, 
what we say and write about them does play a formative part in the meaning that 
is made of them. Taking the example of bruising; bruises which appear identical 
will be thought of and responded to differently depending on the explanation 
given for its appearance and the context in which the explanation is given. A 
bruise on the arm of a 10 year old boy forcibly held down by an adult in an act 
of sexual aggression is different from the ‘same’ bruise acquired through a game 
of football. The latter may not even be considered an injury, whilst the former 
may take on medical, legal/forensic and psychological significance. The 
physical injuries of sexual abuse take on their significance via discourse. 
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to their modern day counterparts of what constituted ‘minor’ 
surgery when considering when and to whom to administer 
anaesthetics. Their understandings were not based on a primitive 
brutalism (no matter how incomprehensible their views may 
appear to modern sensibilities), but on careful considerations 
befitting the professional climate of their time. This included 
debates over if, how and what kind of pain could be experienced 
by children, and what the consequences of this might be for the 
child (Pernick, 1985). Some felt that children actually “lacked the 
mental capacity to suffer” (Pernick, 1985, p. 150), while others 
believed children to be especially sensitive to pain. However, this 
is most definitely not to say that the pain, the suffering or the harm 
is not ‘real’- there is no necessary binary opposition between the 
notions of discourse and material reality (Hall, 2001), and to say 
that something is the product of social/historical construction is not 
to say that it exists only in imagination (Butler, 1993; Hacking, 
1999; Butler, 1999). 
 
This presumed binarism opposing a pre-discursive reality (or body) 
to a socially or historically constituted one is related to long-
standing Western understandings of free-will versus determinism. 
Philosophical positions that emphasise the social construction of 
reality are often associated with determinism, whilst those 
positions that privilege the free rational individual (i.e. pre-
discursive, ahistorical) subject are seen to be aligned with free will. 
However I follow Sawicki’s (1994, see also Hacking, 1999) 
argument that the process of social construction is not necessarily 
deterministic. I will use the phenomenon of gender as an example, 




Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1999, first edition published 
1990) is probably the best-known contemporary feminist critique 
of the Western philosophical debates over the extent to which 
gender is socially produced by discourse or reflective of deeper, 
underlying characteristics of individuals and their differences (see 
also Grosz, 1994 for a summary of these debates, and also Butler 
(1993), for a more focussed discussion of the relation between 
discourse and the materiality of bodies). Directly addressing the 
feminist antagonism between post-structuralism and ‘the body’, 
Butler summarises the questions/warnings of concern: “If 
everything is discourse, what happens to the body? If everything is 
a text, what about violence and bodily injury? Does anything 
matter in or for poststructuralism?” (Butler, 1993, p. 28). In 
general terms, Butler states that feminism requires a grounding of 
some kind in the ‘sexed specificity of the female body’, even if this 
is constructed and is already inscribed as gender. 
 
We may seek to return to matter as prior to discourse 
to ground our claims about sexual difference only to 
discover that matter is fully sedimented with discourses 
on sex and sexuality that prefigure and constrain the 
uses to which that term can be put. Moreover, we may 
seek recourse to matter in order to ground or to verify 
a set of injuries or violations only to find that matter 
itself is founded through a set of violations, ones which 
are unwittingly repeated in the contemporary 
invocation (Butler, 1993, p. 29) 
 
In other words, one cannot state unproblematically that sexual 
violence causes harm to bodies, without considering the extent to 
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which bodies do not simply exist as matter, but are experienced, 
configured and constituted through discourse69.   
 
Butler makes the radical argument that not only gender, but 
biological sex differences themselves are produced by discourses 
about the body. Medical, legal and psychological discourses have 
been particularly influential in this achievement. By reifying 
certain capabilities of some bodies (e.g. the capacity to conceive 
and give birth), and emphasising links and connections between 
certain groups of body organs and parts, a particular understanding 
of bodies as fundamentally ‘sexed’ is achieved. Monique Wittig, 
feminist lesbian philosopher, once stated in response to a question 
in a seminar, that she did not have a vagina (cited in Butler, 1999, 
p. 201 footnote 54). This surprising response makes sense in the 
light of this understanding of bodies as being produced and ‘sexed’ 
through discourse. Wittig’s statement stems from the argument that 
particular parts of women’s bodies have been linguistically ‘carved 
up’ and grouped together to form the organ known as the vagina, 
but there is nothing naturalistic or necessary about this grouping or 
assemblage of the body’s capabilities. This is not dissimilar to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s claim regarding the “originary theft” of the 
girl’s body into an assemblage of passive womanhood, 
“…achieved through the transcendental organization of her organs 
into a functional form, a receptacle for male desire and progeny” 
(Gatens, 2000, p. 68). These types of formulations can be seen as 
                                                 
69 A similar tension exists in the psychoanalytic literature on trauma and the 
notion of ‘splitting’. Briefly, some kind of splitting of consciousness is seen to 
be necessary as the condition of subjectivity; the primary address by the Other is 
both overwhelming and necessary (Butler, 2005) Individuals who experience 
profound trauma are also thought to undergo a further split, in order to fabricate 
a kind of space in consciousness where one can still function as a coherent 
subject. The tension, then, is around what kinds of differences there might be in 
these two traumas, and why one is necessary and the other problematic (or why 
they might be both simultaneously). See (Leys, 2000)  
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belonging to a Nietzschean tradition of understanding the 
relationship between knowledge and the things that are known: 
“…there can be no relation of natural continuity between 
knowledge and the things that knowledge must know. There can 
only be a relation of violence, domination, power, and force, a 
relation of violation. Knowledge can only be a violation of the 
things to be known, and not a perception, a recognition, an 
identification of or with those things” (Foucault, 2000, p. 9). 
 
However ‘radical’ this may seem, Butler goes on to argue that 
Wittig’s view still presupposes a pre-discursive body, upon which 
violence is done by language and other discursive practices 
(including sexual violence, which is an extreme act of enforcing 
the category of ‘sex’). This is what Foucault (1978) characterised 
as a juridical model of power, the ‘repressive hypothesis’ in 
History of Sexuality vol. 1. In a juridical model of power, ‘sex’ or 
sexuality would be seen as an entity that pre-exists the operation of 
power through discourse (which includes both text and practices). 
In the juridical model this pre-discursive sexuality is repressed 
through acts of power which restrict its true expression. There are 
several examples of Butler’s point in Wittig’s theoretical and 
political writings. For instance: “Language casts sheaves of reality 
upon the social body, stamping it and violently shaping it. For 
example, the bodies of social actors are fashioned by abstract 
language (as well as by nonabstract languages). For there is a 
plasticity of the real to language” (Wittig, 1992, pp. 43-44 ). The 
key terms here are the images of ‘stamping and violently shaping 
it’, implying a pre-discursive body upon which discourse acts, as 




Foucault offered an alternative understanding of power as 
operating discursively and productively, a ‘discursive’ model of 
power. Bodies, in this discursive model of power, only ‘exist’ to 
the extent that they are produced through discursive practices. 
Bodies are not repressed or mutilated by discourse, but actually 
produced. (In this sense, power is productive, not repressive). 
Butler would argue that the constitution of bodies is not just 
gendered, but dependent upon gender. “The mark of gender 
appears to ‘qualify’ bodies as human bodies; the moment in which 
an infant becomes humanized is when the question, “is it a boy or a 
girl?” is answered” (Butler, 1999, p. 142). The practice of gender 
assignment of ambiguous babies illustrates this; in fact it is often 
presented as an act of compassion because it bestows on the child a 
definite sex/gender, and therefore humanity. In a similar argument, 
one that Butler attributes to Wittig, sexual abuse is a violent 
practice of gendering; it enforces the categories of sex and gender. 
In an awful process of simultaneous annihilation and affirmation, 
then, the sexual abuse of girls both confirms their status as female, 
and via this ‘legitimate’ gendered status, as human. For boy 
children, sexual victimization sets in place a doubting of their own 
subject position as masculine. The clinical literature on boy victims 
provides many examples of how sexual victimization disrupts their 
gendered identity. In turn, men and boys are often quoted as saying 
they feel they ‘are nothing’, as if by taking away gender, so too is 
humanity itself forsaken. It is perhaps not necessarily that 
masculinity per se has been called into doubt, but the possession of 






Discourse, bodies and children 
 
Although there are important points in Butler and Wittig’s 
arguments that emphasize the gendered nature of the discursive 
violence inflicted upon women’s bodies, and the particular ways in 
which lesbians (in Wittig’s work) disrupt the binary gender 
division which the ‘heterosexual matrix’ reproduces, the 
framework is also a productive one for thinking about children. I 
have already referred to Butler’s argument that children do not 
‘become human’ until they are assigned a gender. I would like to 
suggest there is a kind of analogy of the argument when looking at 
the clinical and research literature about sexually abused children. 
The documentation in the psychological and social work literature 
of the harm caused by sexual abuse relies on this view of children 
as being harmed by practices of adult power, not only in regards to 
their sexuality but their psychological, social and physical ‘well-
being’ generally. If, in this literature, sexual abuse of a child is 
understood as an act of violence inflicted on a child, then the 
consequences of this violence are framed as a thwarting of the 
healthy development of the child. Of course it does not necessarily 
follow that the child would have developed ‘normally’, but I think 
this is the effect of comparison to the statistical norm. The child is 
restrained from expressing its ‘true self’. Thus, just as for Wittig 
language and other discursive practices inflict violence upon 
women’s (pre-discursive) bodies which result in their disfiguration 
from their ‘true’ nature, so too are children restrained from 
expressing their true nature as a consequence of sexual abuse. In 
both cases, language and abuse are practices of power understood 
in terms of the extent to which they thwart the true and ‘free’ 




Sexual abuse sets the abused child apart from the normal child. 
This normal child is sometimes especially apparent when it is used 
in contrast with versions of childhood against which one objects. A 
recent example may help clarify this point. An Australian study 
into representations of children in corporate advertising material 
argued that many depictions of children are overly ‘sexualised’ and 
as such incite both adults and children themselves to understand 
children as sexual beings in a manner that is usually associated 
with adult sexuality (Rush et al., 2006). Of the many interesting 
and worthwhile points raised in the research, my interest here is on 
the way the normal child (or more accurately, a normal childhood) 
is used to problematise the childhood depicted in the advertising 
material. The normal child can have exclusionary effects on the 
sexually abused child. 
 
A discursive model of power regarding childhood would hold that 
the child (and for that matter, childhood sexuality) is already 
constructed through discourse, even to the extent that the notion of 
‘childhood’ is a social achievement (Ariés, 1973). That is to say, 
childhood itself is a relatively recent historical category of being 
human; the historical emergence of our productions of childhood 
can be documented. As a product or fabrication of construction in 
this way, ‘the child’ is already imbued with relations of power that 
are productive, not just oppressive. For example, the 
documentation produced by psychological, medical and legal 
discourses work together to produce a ‘normal’ child (Rose, 1999). 
This works to fabricate a particular understanding and way of 
relating to individuals constituted as ‘children’, in turn inciting 
particular ways in which they experience themselves and their own 




Radicalising further Beauvoir’s famous statement that one is not 
born, but becomes, a woman, Butler argues that one is always in 
the process of becoming a sex/gender. Gender is not a state to be 
achieved but “…an incessant and repeated action of some sort” 
(Butler, 1999, p. 143). As described by Butler, Wittig argued that 
‘sex’ is always gendered, to the extent that only women can be said 
to be ‘sexed’, in relation to the male who is not sexed. 
Contemporary work on masculinity has argued convincingly that 
masculinities are diverse and the result of a set of ongoing 
gendered practices. That is, there is not one masculinity that can be 
achieved and secured, but a multiplicity of masculinities that are 
always performed through specific actions in localised contexts. 
The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell, 1987) is an 
influential explanatory framework in understanding how men as a 
social group achieve and maintain power through the reproduction 
of oppressive gender identities.  
 
Nonetheless, the language that some children use to discuss sexual 
abuse is illuminating here. Some children use the term “sexed” as a 
verb, as in ‘he sexed me’70. In this sense, and in keeping with 
Wittig’s argument, the child who is sexed (i.e. sexually abused) is 
made female within the modality of heterosexuality, whether the 
child in question is considered a boy or a girl. But such 
identifications are performative, neither artificial nor fully stable. 
‘For the imperative to be or get “sexed” requires a differentiated 
production and regulation of masculine and feminine identification 
that does not fully hold and cannot be fully exhaustive’ (Butler, 
1993, pp. 187-188). 
 
                                                 
70 Here I  am citing my own clinical experience.  
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So far I have been struggling with the question of how to 
understand the discourse surrounding the harmful effects of sexual 
abuse of children, and trying to disrupt some of the taken for 
granted psychological knowledges of development, and naturalised 
assumptions about children’s bodies. The problem with these 
modes of thinking the harm done by child sexual abuse is in the 
extent to which they posit a normative model of being for 
individual children, a normativity which I have been arguing is a 
power-laden means for governance of children in general; but 
especially the sexually abused child. One of the philosophical 
assumptions underlying these questions is the Cartesian mind/body 
dualism. The debates have been essentially staked on the material 
difference between thought and body; that what is thought about 
bodies affects bodies, bodies which are of a different kind of 
substance or essence to that of thought.  
 
Some feminist philosophers, when faced with this question, have 
turned to the philosopher Spinoza (often through Deleuze). 
Spinoza’s concept of ‘monism’ refers to the “fundamental 
assumption…of an absolute and infinite substance, singular in both 
kind and number. If substance is infinite and nondivisible, it cannot 
be identified with or reduced to finite substances or things. Finite 
things are not substances but are modifications or affections of the 
one substance, modes or specifications of substance” (Grosz, 1994, 
p. 10). That is to say that reason, mind, body, thought, feeling, or 
matter (human or non-human) are not different substances, but are 
expressions of the one substance, referred to by Spinoza as 
simultaneously God and nature (Gatens, 2000)71. 
                                                 
71 Spinoza’s references to God are generally thought to be referring to nature; it 
was not really possible to exclude God altogether in the political climate of 




Spinoza offered a novel way of thinking the body that was not 
reliant on the mind/body dualism of Cartesian philosophy. For him 
a body can be defined not in terms of what it is, or what makes it, 
or its essence; but, put simply, in terms of what it can do. The 
body, according to Spinoza, is defined not by a pre-determined set 
of limits imposed by nature, or the inherent properties of the body 
itself (which are after all of the one substance as all other things), 
but in terms of its possibilities of connections with other bodies. 
The limits of such possibilities of human bodies are not known, 
indeed may not be capable of being known. Deleuze and Guattari 
wrote of these connections (or ‘assemblages’) as forming 
machines, emphasizing what they can achieve (1983). Therefore 
one may speak of writing machines, for example, and especially 
desiring machines.  
 
Elaborating on this conception of bodies, Gatens offers an idea of 
how harm might be defined in this ontological framework:  
 
The human body is permanently open to its 
surroundings and can be composed, recomposed or 
decomposed by other bodies. From the perspective of 
modal existence, such encounters with other bodies are 
conceived as good or bad depending on whether they 
aid or harm our characteristic constitution…Human 
freedom…amounts to the power that one possesses 
actively to select one’s encounters rather than always 
being the plaything of chance associations (Gatens, 




Connections and relations with other bodies are judged according 
to whether they enhance or diminish the potential for the 
realisation of possibilities. Relations dependant on “order-words” 
(commands, demands, insistences) (Gatens, 2000) diminish such 
possibilities because they insist upon the acceptance of one 
possible situation as the actual situation. Gatens specifies rape as 
an instance of the operation of “order-words”. The dynamics of 
child sexual abuse is another example of such a diminishing 
situation. 
 
Psychological assessment as a radical practice? 
 
Having examined some of the alternatives to what I have called 
scientific psychology as means for making sense of the effects of 
child sexual abuse, I want to attempt to continue the diffractive 
reading and read these points of productivity through each other. I 
am not aiming to start from the position that one is more truthful or 
liberatory than the other, but to acknowledge both as influential 
forces in the production of this unstable scientific object: the harm 
of child sexual abuse. 
 
One of the key points made by Wittig is that the violence that 
shapes and naturalises the social experiences of sex and gender (or 
the workings of subjection in general), is hidden by these very 
effects. If sex and gender are made to appear as natural 
social/biological/cultural entities, then it is not thought or made 
conscious that these entities were/are violently forged. Returning 
to the analogy made earlier, that knowledge and sexual abuse are 
both forms of violence, I am reminded of the historical and 
contemporary silences that surround the sexual abuse of children. 
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As Liz Kelly pointed out, “It simply is not the case that the 
'damage discourse' has always been dominant. In the late seventies 
and early eighties, both researchers and practitioners were 
struggling against an orthodoxy which asserted that abuse was not 
damaging” (Mayne, 1993, p. 19). Russell argued that “Feminist 
researchers have focused on investigating the destructive 
consequences of child sexual abuse… because there has been so 
much sexist research which has both minimised the effects and 
accused the child of asking for it by her so-called seductive 
behaviour” (Russell, 1991, p. 53)    
 
An opening here appears for a radical interpretation of clinical 
descriptions of the effects of sexual abuse. If (for example) the 
‘unruly’ behaviour of a child, or the difficulties in life experienced 
by an adult, can be said to be an effect of violence inflicted upon 
them, rather than being a trait inherent in themselves, this presents 
a potential exposé of the violence that has been inflicted. So the 
BASC clinician’s guide states that, when assessing children who 
have experienced traumatic events, that “…they often show 
aggression, overactivity, and even rule-breaking behavior as they 
act out the intense feelings experienced in response to the 
traumatic life event(s)” (Reynolds and Kamphaus, 2002, p. 233). 
As the BASC measures behaviours that are linked through 
psychological theory (specifically, through Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder) to constructs such as aggression, anxiety, etc., it ‘shows’ 
the effects of the trauma, enabling the traumatic event(s) 
themselves to be revealed through further clinical investigation. 
 
In light of Wittig’s position regarding the ‘covering up’ of 
discursive violence in relation to its effects, there is an argument to 
be made that psychological statistics function as a radical 
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‘showing’ of the violence of child sexual abuse. The Foucauldian 
literature tends to focus on the power/knowledge matrix produced 
by psychological discourse, positioning the ‘psy’ professions as a 
kind of dominant practice governing the lives of individuals, 
especially children (Rose, 1998, 1999). I do not object to this 
analysis. However, a different analysis is made available if, 
following Wittig’s general observation that sexual violence is a 
radical enforcing of sex/gender that obscures its own violence, I 
would consider sexual abuse to be among the practices that most 
powerfully produces these power/knowledge effects. Sexual abuse 
produces effects, the silence surrounding the abuse naturalises the 
effects and obscures the violence. In this light it is possible to see 
psychological statistics as a counter-discourse, by exposing this 
violence through measuring its effects. The difficulty with this line 
of argument is that the ‘showing’ depends upon the kind of 
normative identity that Wittig herself argued is a product of 
violence.  
 
I would suggest that the clinical literature goes, in a sense, ‘half-
way’ to this end of making visible the harm. The trauma of sexual 
abuse may be identified as a cause of the problem; but the traits are 
then reconfigured as those of the child, who (with their parents and 
the expertise of the counsellor) become morally charged with 
correcting the deficiencies. This is what Louise Armstrong was 
identifying when she wrote Rocking the cradle of sexual politics 
(1996). A clear contemporary example of this incitement to 
responsibilization of abused boys especially can be found in the 
Victorian Health Promotion Foundation’s violence prevention 
document Preventing violence before it occurs (Victorian Health 
Promotion Foundation, 2007). In that document, statistical 
evidence is drawn on to suggest that boys who have been abused 
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are at higher risk of committing violence against women in the 
future, and their parents are encouraged to access therapeutic 
services to prevent this from occurring.   
 
The language of ‘measurable symptoms” (e.g. Crouch et al., 1999) 
produces this disciplinary function. It is not uncommon for 
researchers to call for improved tools for measuring the impacts of 
child sexual abuse. For example, “most child maltreatment 
researchers agree that work in this area has been hampered by 
inadequate instrumentation for measuring relevant variables” 
(Crouch et al., 1999, p. 255). In wanting to identify the harms 
caused by child sexual abuse, one kind of power, or practice of 
governance, gets superseded with another; relations of power are 
both discontinuous and continuous. It might seem incongruous to 
propose any kind of similarity between the power involved in child 
sexual abuse and the disciplinary function of psychological 
research. However, I argue that each exercises power in relation to 
the child, or adult who was abused as a child, in its own way. In 
the psychological research, at stake is the identification of what 
kind and ‘how much’  harm is caused by child sexual abuse, 
measured in relation to the normal child (Friedrich et al., 2001). It 
is the very operation of power that encourages the therapeutic 
normalization of sexually abused children in the interest of their 
and their community’s well-being.   
  
While sexual abuse is clearly an oppressive and diminishing 
experience, it does not follow that psychological measurement is a 
liberatory practice. Both can be understood as means of governing 
the individual child (in the sense that they produce possible 
subjectivities while excluding others). Bell (1993) addresses this 
issue in the context of a discussion on feminist knowledges about 
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‘incest’. Is feminist knowledge of child sexual abuse (‘incest’) 
itself a disciplinary discourse? In reference to Foucault’s analysis 
of the deployment of sexuality within families as a site of alliance, 
Bell states that…  
 
[t]he statistics that have and are being produced due to 
feminist investigation of the issue of incestuous abuse 
can be understood as a bio-political knowledge. At first 
blush, therefore, it may seem that feminism is part of 
the deployment of sexuality. But is feminist knowledge 
of incest a knowledge that works within the 
power/knowledge networks of the deployment of 
sexuality? And if it does, does that mean that feminism, 
paradoxically, is part of a discursive incitement to 
incest? (Bell, 1993, pp.100-101)  
 
This comes in the context of a discussion, based on Foucault’s The 
history of sexuality: Vol. 1 (1976), of the two systems of power 
deployed around incest; alliance within the family, and the 
deployment of sexuality. Incest is at the intersections of these two 
strategies. Bell identifies two aspects of feminist work on incest 
that could be considered “mechanisms and effects of the 
deployment of sexuality” (p.101). These are ‘the confession’, and 
the “disciplinary power which feminism has arguably set in place 
both within and around the family” (p101). Unfortunately Bell 
does not go on to discuss the feminist statistics specifically in 
further detail, but her point is germane for my purpose here, to 
explore psychology as practice of governance. I will also return to 
the notion of the confession, for as Armstrong (1986) points out, 
“all elements of human measurement, including the survey, the 
questionnaire and the interview seek to capture the essence of the 
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confession” (cited in Bowman, 2005, p. 118), thus contributing to 
mechanisms of surveillance.  
 
Scott (2001) argues that an account of feminist knowledge of 
sexual abuse as simply emerging from personal testimonies of 
abuse incorporated into an analysis of patriarchal society, thus 
constituting a subjugated knowledge, is incomplete. Thus, while 
some have characterised feminist knowledge of child sexual abuse 
as below the threshold of scientificity— “Such knowledges are not 
‘discourses’ for they have little authority, no institutional backing 
and none of the accepted forms such as statistics, clinical 
instruments or case studies which legitimate the unions of 
power/knowledge (Scott, 2001, p. 357). Scott reminds us that in 
fact “…feminists have not simply listened to, and retold, survivors’ 
stories. We have analysed, edited, counted, listed and in countless 
other ways ‘worked up’ ‘subjugated stories’ into ‘evidence’, 
‘theory’ and ‘professional practice’” (ibid, p. 359). Feminist 
knowledge of child sexual abuse indeed holds considerable 
authority, institutional backing72 and produces statistics. “The 
problematic assumption here is that feminists are by definition 
located outside the disciplinary professions” (p. 357) 
 
This has not only historical but also methodological stakes for my 
project. Referring to Barad’s practice of ‘diffractive reading’ 
(“reading insights through one another in attending to and 
responding to the details and specificities of relations of difference 
and how they matter” (Barad, 2007, p. 71)) requires first that 
feminist and scientific-psychological (‘psy’) insights are in fact 
                                                 
72 For example, the Victorian CASA standards of practice for working with 
survivors of sexual abuse explicitly indicate the need for a feminist 
understanding of gendered power dynamics. 
260 
 
distinct. I want to assess the idea that feminist and psy knowledges 
are potential systems of knowledge production, each definable by a 
set of distinct and specific conditions (e.g. assumptions, standards 
of evidence, technologies and practices of research, etc.). Barad 
would not suggest that each system is radically separate, but rather 
that they are entangled though specific material arrangements 
(notably, their shared production of child sexual abuse as an object 
of knowledge). Nonetheless, for a diffractive reading to be 
possible, there must be at least some sense of the systems being 
‘different’. If they are not, I find myself in the Foucauldian trap of 
having no contrasting epistemological standpoint from which to 
view any knowledge claims—feminist and psy knowledges, if they 
are indistinct, can only analyse knowledge from within a closed 
and self-referential ‘knowledge-power’ nexus.    
 
Sexual abuse and liberal subjectivity 
 
A further angle on the recognition of the subject ‘sexually abused 
child’ can be taken from the work of theorists of recognition and 
subjectivity. Wendy Brown argues that attempts to ensure rights 
for identified groups of subjects through legislative and 
disciplinary discourse (e.g. based  on race, religion, culture, 
gender, sexuality, ability) also work to reify, to solidify, to 
‘empiricize’ identity, “as if their existence were intrinsic and 
factual, rather than effects of discourse and institutional 
power…the language of recognition becomes the language of 
unfreedom, how articulation in language, in the context of liberal 
and disciplinary discourse, becomes a vehicle of subordination 
through individualization, normalization, and regulation, even as it 
strives to produce visibility and acceptance” (Brown, 1995, p. 66). 
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This parallels the paradox identified by certain political and 
psychoanalytic thinkers (explored at length in Butler, 1997a, 
2005), which can be summarised as follows. As subjects, we are 
required to conform to a minimal set of social and linguistic norms 
in order to be recognized by, and to recognize, other subjects as 
legitimate. While these norms limit and constrain possibilities for 
how to be, they are the necessary ground on which subjectivity is 
possible at all. Or rather, they are means through which the 
(re)iteration of identity and subject positions are per-formed. Thus 
it is not possible to ‘free’ the subject by abandoning normativity 
per se; this would mean the dissolution of the subject entirely. 
Within liberal rights discourse, potentially political abuses of 
power become “matters of individualized, dehistoricized injury and 
entitlement, into matters into which there is no harm if there is no 
agent and no tangibly violated subject” (Brown, 1995, p. 124, my 
emphasis). 
 
From this, it could be argued that the statistical configuring of the 
harm of child sexual abuse, through the measurement/production 
of child sexual abuse victims, is the attempt of a scientific 
psychology to confer legitimacy on such a subject. This also points 
to the inadequacy of a protest against the use of numbers and 
statistics in research. For example, at a seminar on “Narrative 
methods in research”, a speaker righteously proclaimed that 
“whenever you reduce a person to a number or statistic, you reduce 
a person to a number or a statistic” (Chamberlain, 2008). The 
implication being, that it is better to describe the person using 
words, preferably those uttered by the ‘research subject’ 
themselves. However, in the context of the work of Brown and 
Butler (and others), the equation of statistics with untruth and 
words with truth does not bear up under scrutiny; both are the 
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material of disciplinary power. But as such, they also play a part in 
the circuitry of recognition. “Language, essentially, objectifies 
experience and, in so doing, enables it to be shared” (Le Riche, 
1998, pp. 29-30). Numbers and statistics hold out the same 
promise of shareable, communicable knowledge, on a universal 
scale. If psychological measurement (as a practice of disciplinary 
power) individualizes and normalizes, it says: “Here is a place for 
you, a place in which you are recognizable as a subject, and a place 
which locates you amongst other individuals by comparing you 
with them”. The price of recognition is a normalizing judgement in 
a field of hierarchization, but (notwithstanding some of the 
critiques of quantification), language also involves the flow of 
power and plays of hierarchy (Le Riche, 1998). 
 
Summary of Chapter 6 
 
In this chapter, I began by developing an account of how the 
effects of child sexual abuse are produced as objects of scientific 
enquiry, through modes of research that privilege causality and 
objectivity as ontological and epistemological commitments. I then 
put these ways of knowing ‘into play’ with some critical 
alternatives that call into question these ethico-onto-epistemic 
(Barad, 2007) positions. I tried to retain my own commitment to a 
diffractive reading, which is interested not in the truth or falsity of 
either set of claims, but the effects they have in producing the 
effects of child sexual abuse as objects of enquiry. I suggested that 
read in interaction with each other, it is possible to regard 
psychological measurement as a more helpful practice than 
otherwise might be possible. By helpful, I mean it makes visible 
the harm of child sexual abuse, harm which may otherwise remain 
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naturalised. At the same time, it also individualises this harm as a 
property of the abused person, inciting such persons to access 
therapeutic treatment. This in turn raises further problems in 
regards to disciplinary power, and the extent to which this is both 
restrictive and productive. 
 
In the next chapter I intend to explore how practices of objectivity 
entailed in psychological measurement can govern the activities of 




Chapter 7- Practices of objectivity for 
researchers and counsellors 
 
But we should not think of these practices that make 
individuals calculable purely as technologies of 
domination, for they can also be technologies of 
autonomization and responsibilization. Numbers, and 
the techniques of calculation in terms of numbers, have 
a role in subjectification- they turn the individual into 
a calculating self endowed with a range of ways of 
thinking about, calculating about, predicting and 
judging their own activities and those of others (Rose, 
1999, p. 214) 
 
If numbers are about “objectivity”, then where does 
this leave subjectivity? (Oakley, 2000, p. 102) 
 
In this chapter I will pay greater attention to the subject positions 
that are possible for researchers and counsellors. The theme of 
objectivity will be prominent here, considered through the lens of 
an analysis of subjectivization and ‘technologies of the self’ or 
‘care of the self’ (Foucault, 1988a, 2005). I will argue that 
practices of psychological measurement can be studied in reference 
to techniques of the self: what type of self is a condition of 
conducting psychological measurement? Further to this, any 
practices which are formulated in resistance to psychological 
measurement as a therapeutic activity or research tool constitute 




Rind et al. (1998, 2000) state repeatedly their view that qualitative 
reviews of child sexual abuse research are problematic because 
they are subjective and imprecise, and that quantitative reviews 
have the advantage of “reduced subjectivity, and increased 
precision” (ibid., p. 42). This accords with most accounts of both 
measurement and statistical methods in general; they are valuable 
for their objectivity and their precision. Meta-analyses make 
particularly strong (yet contestable) claims to scientific objectivity 
(Shercliffe et al., 2009). I have already noted Michell’s objection 
to the precision assumption; if psychological attributes are not 
quantitative in nature, then investigating and/or representing them 
using quantitative methods is in fact imprecise (Michell, 1999). I 
have also mentioned the critique of scientific objectivity that states 
that the belief in a ‘God’s eye view’ actually leads to a less, rather 
than more, complete understanding than approaches which take the 
investigators own subject-position and the ‘entanglements’ of the 
research situation into account (Harding, 1986; Barad, 2007; 
Daston et al., 2007). Such views demand a blurring of the 
objective/subjective opposition and call into question the ‘cut’ 
between objects and subjects of knowledge. 
 
These debates aside, the review of clinical and research literature 
and the focus groups provides empirical evidence that practices of 
objectivity and precision can be influential in terms of the 
‘technologies of self’ of researchers and counsellors in their work 
with sexually abused children. But saying that objectivity is 
influential is not to say what objectivity is, or that it is ever 
actualised in practice. I need to look more closely at the statement: 




Technologies of the self 
 
Although Foucault’s concerns were quite different in his 
development of the notion of technologies of the self, I suggest it is 
a useful frame for my purposes here. In this section, I will discuss 
the idea of technologies of the self, to provide a conceptual context 
for the notion that objectivity can function as a way of conducting 
oneself as a counsellor or researcher in the field of child sexual 
abuse. Objectivity is an important practice to investigate because 
of its privileged position in instructions and claims for the conduct 
of psychological measurements.  
 
“Let’s say very briefly that through studying madness and 
psychiatry, crime and punishment, I have tried to show how we 
have indirectly constituted ourselves through the exclusion of some 
others: criminals, mad people, and so on. And now my present 
work deals with the question: how did we directly constitute our 
identity through some ethical techniques of the self which 
developed through antiquity down to now?” (Foucault, 1988b, p. 
146) 
 
Foucault’s later works marked a shift in emphasis from the 
disciplinary apparatus of institutions such as asylums and prisons, 
towards an examination of the means through which individuals 
actively engaged in the constitution of their ‘self’ (Hutton, 1988; 
McNay, 1992; Paras, 2006). In The hermeneutics of the subject, 
Foucault (2005) traces the practices of care of the self from early 
Greek philosophy (in Plato), through to their transformations in 
later Christian traditions. There are a few themes I want to draw 
upon for the current research. Firstly, although the concern for the 
self does not remain constant in its meanings, methods or 
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objectives over different historical periods, nonetheless the theme 
of caring for the self emerges in different forms across societies. In 
the Socratic dialogues, for example, care for the self was a concern 
for the young and privileged male youth who were in a position to 
harbour ambitions in public life and politics. Caring for the self 
was a kind of training to prepare for these responsibilities of 
governing. In contrast, around the first and second centuries A.D., 
this concern for the self had expanded its scope both in terms of 
the range of the population to whom it applied (it became a more 
widespread or democratised cultural phenomenon), as well as 
shifting emphasis from youth to more of a life-long process 
directed towards old-age.  
 
Some of these technologies of the self, such as verbalization, “have 
been reinserted in a different context by the so-called human 
sciences” (Foucault, 1988a, p. 49). Whereas the practice of 
confession, for example, was used in some Christian traditions for 
the purpose of renunciation of the self, in the human sciences such 
techniques of verbalization affect an active constitution of the self. 
In therapy around child sexual abuse, talking about the abuse may 
be seen as necessary to gain insight into how it has impacted on the 
self; that is, how the self has been shaped by the abuse. The 
therapeutic project then is to understand this impact and undertake 
a new or preferable shaping of the self. Counsellors informed by an 
understanding of the normative potential of confessional practices 
may also contest this imperative to talk about the abuse, for 
example by acknowledging that silence may be a way for clients to 
resist the intrusion of unwanted therapeutic intervention in their 




Hutton (1988) spells out the historical relevance of these ancient 
and Classical practices of the self for contemporary ‘psy’ 
professions:  
 
Like the therapists of our own society, these earlier 
practitioners regarded the care of the self as a serious 
and salutary pursuit, even if they expressed their 
commitment to it in an ethical or religious rather than 
a medical vocabulary. The question that Foucault asks 
of Freud is why he seeks to discover the truth about the 
self through these techniques, whereas his 
predecessors had been content to search for a method 
of self-care (p. 135).  
 
Indeed, in Hermeneutics of the subject, Foucault (2005) argues that 
within the dominant Western tradition of philosophy, the principal 
of ‘know thyself’ has taken prominence, but that in the earlier 
practices of the self, this principal was secondary to the wider edict 
to ‘care for the self’ (effectively, to care for one’s soul). That is, 
the ethical reason for knowing oneself was so that one could better 
undertake the task of caring for one’s soul, rather than discover the 
truth (of oneself, of humanity, of the world). The kind of self that 
is concerned primarily with caring for the soul may be a different 
kind to the one concerned with truth.  
 
This does not sound too distant from the rationale that drives 
psychological and social work research; we need to know about the 
problem of child sexual abuse in order to better care for abused 
children. Yet the relationship between ethics and science, between 
care and knowledge, in this field problematises such a straight-
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forward understanding. In light of this, it is interesting to note the 
comment made by Elizabeth in the focus group: 
 
ELIZABETH   But I think in response to your question 
[to JASON], you know, what is the therapeutic point 
[of administering standardized psychological tests] for 
the child, I’d say none.  
 
CB In doing tests? 
 
ELIZABETH   Yep. I would say it’s to assist the 
therapist. I think parents might get, feel a bit more 
settled or something about hearing well this test says 
that you, you know, your child’s emotionally and 
behaviourally going along OK,  
 
KATE   Hmm, hmm 
 
ELIZABETH   So you know, you can have parents out 
there that search for a diag…not even a diag…, yeah 
well a diagnosis, but you know, just to, that might help 
settle some parental anxieties. But I would say 
therapeutically there’s probably none for the child.  
 
“Therapeutically there’s probably none [benefit] for the child”. 
There is a practice of knowledge occurring (the psychological test), 
and Elizabeth suggest it may have some value for the therapist, and 
perhaps for the parents. I am presenting this as evidence for my 
argument that the use of psychological testing can be thought of as 




I suggest that contemporary practices of the self within therapeutic 
and research milieux contain evidence of ethical and medical-
scientific discourses. The texts I examine and the counsellors I 
spoke with constitute the self via the deployment of both a truth 
about and a care of the self; at least that is what I contend. In 
addition, the discourses of knowledge and care through which the 
counsellors constitute their clients, also produce a relationship to 
themselves as ethical and knowing subjects. As McNay states, 
these techniques of subjectivization inevitably entail the operation 
of power relations that are of particular importance for counsellors: 
“Practices of the self are situated at this level of power relations [as 
opposed to domination where relations are asymmetrical and 
irreversible], at the point where individuals autonomously order 
their own lives and, in doing so, attempt to influence other 
individuals” (McNay, 1992, p. 67). 
 
It is the practice of caring for others to which therapeutic 
knowledge is deployed; however, a certain kind of self is needed to 
perform this disciplinary function. The technique of training, 
especially when used in the group, is another example of a 
technology of the self, aimed at reshaping the subjectivities of 
helping professionals. This technique enables the dispersion of psy 
expertise over vast distances and into the lives of both the clients 
of the professionals, and the professionals themselves. Using as a 
case study the UK Tavistock clinic, Miller and Rose (2008) point 
out that the training ‘group’ becomes the transformative experience 
itself; it is through attending training and participating in groups 
that professionals learn not only about ‘group processes’ and 
dynamics, but these training events also become sites for the 
subjectivization of professional identities. Professionals expect not 
only to learn something about how their clients experience groups, 
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but also to learn something about themselves on both personal and 
professional levels. Thus, in terms of the professionals themselves, 
the training group can be thought of as a ‘technology of 
subjectivization’.  
 
Along these lines, the focus groups I conducted with counsellors 
might be analysed similarly, as an event or occasion in which the 
participants subjectivized themselves as counsellors by ‘being 
performed’ through therapeutic discourse. Using the notion of 
‘iterability’ developed by Butler (Butler, 1997b, 2005), I can 
analyse the text of the focus groups by asking what strategies of 
subjectivization are evident in the fabrication of the subject, child 
sexual abuse counsellor? Of course, I am also claiming that what 
the counsellors have to say about their relation to testing, and also 
the texts on conducting psychological measurement, offer 
prescriptions for a proper ethical subjectivization of the counsellor-
self. I should point out that I have just included the focus groups, 
alongside the conduct of psychological measurement, as a site for 
investigating measurement as a practice of the self.  
 
Professionals very much engage with the question of what it is that 
gives them the authority to intervene in the lives of others (Miller 
et al., 2008), a point confirmed in my focus groups. The Tavistock 
clinic succeeded in making this authority linked to technical 
expertise, by promoting the helping professions as a vocation, as 
something of a way of life which entailed obligations upon those 
engaged in the ‘conduct of conduct’ to undergo individual 
transfigurations of their own subjectivities. The notion of the 
‘scientist practitioner’ is instructive here. This phrase is frequently 
used by psychologists in particular to describe just this 
interrelation between a certain kind of knowledge and a practice of 
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care through which one constitutes oneself as psychologist or, 
more frequently in the domain of evidence based practice, social 
worker. By producing and using knowledge in a technical way, 
researchers and counsellors are incited to become ‘scientific 
selves’ (Morawski, 2007). 
 
Just as the ‘technologies of the self’ notion can include both 
knowledge and care, it can also refer to heterogeneous ends of such 
care. For example, Foucault (2005) contrasts conversion as a 
Christian practice of the self with earlier, more overtly political 
forms. In the conversion idea, the self is turned only to the self as 
both object and subject of knowledge; in earlier forms (in the 
Socratic dialogues, for example), the care of the self is required in 
order to govern others as an explicit objective. Through 
conversion, the subject is always being turned inward towards 
oneself; there is no goal to change or direct the actions of others, 
except perhaps in the role of assisting a student to turn their self to 
their self. To give another example of the lack of unity amongst the 
different forms of care of the self, different ‘ethics’ (schools of 
thought, traditions of philosophy, etc.) produce different relations 
between knowledge and the self.     
 
 I offer the above comments as a justification for my use of the 
language of technologies of the self in the present text. This 
follows the use of this aspect of Foucault’s later writings by writers 
such as McNay who, despite these studies being centred on 
historical cultures, see “…practices of the self as a suitable 
analytical category to understand the way in which people act in 




Some social work texts have sought to utilise this aspect of 
Foucault’s research to resuscitate a critical social work practice. 
For example, Rogerson’s thesis (2001, concerned with the 
production of the 'best interests of the child' in child protection 
texts), proposed that the practice of parrhēsia (an example of a 
‘technology of the self’) could produce the kind of ethical 
subjectivity suitable for social work practice. Parrhēsia was a topic 
discussed during Foucault’s last courses at the College de France 
before his death (see Flynn, 1988 for a further discussion; 
Foucault, 2005). According to this practice, located in ancient 
Greek culture (but possibly, presumably, having yet earlier 
historical antecedents - see Hutton, 1988 for a brief discussion of 
the methodology of Foucault's research in classical and ancient 
'technologies of the self'), the parrhēsiast was a truth-teller who 
speaks ‘freely’ despite the danger this might precipitate to 
themselves from someone in authority. The parrhēsiast thus not 
only speaks the truth73 in spite of danger, but through this act also 
shows himself or herself to be ‘true’ in the sense of “independence 
and even authenticity: the individual has constructed her own 
truth-self bond that stands outside the dominant one” (Ransom, 
1997, p. 164). Foucault elaborates on this quality:  
 
Parrhēsia is a quality, or rather a technique, used in 
the relationship between a doctor and patient, between 
master and disciple: it is the free hand, if you like, 
which ensures one’s ability to select from the field of 
true knowledge that which is relevant for the subject’s 
                                                 
73 Of course, this begs the question of ‘truth’ itself. Briefly, the suggestion is that 
the parrhēsiast establishes or maintains a commitment to a ‘truth’ regime that 
runs against dominant discourse, that operates according to a different regime of 
knowledge/power, and in speaking this truth “puts herself on the line” (see 
Ransom, 1997, pp. 164-165 for further discussion). 
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transformation, change and improvement (Foucault, 
2005, p. 242) 
 
Rogerson (2001) argues that “familiar social work skills including 
empathy, community work, political activism, social assessment, 
negotiation and mediation” (2001, pp. 194-195) can be deployed in 
this kind of practice of truth-telling. Rogerson’s suggestions 
resonate with other similar proposals for a social work based on 
‘virtue’ (Webb, 2006). 
 
My use of ‘technologies of the self’ 
 
My project differs slightly from Rogerson’s, although saying this is 
in no way intended to dispute the usefulness of that text. Given the 
extensive use of the work of Foucault and commentators, and the 
interest in the topic of child abuse, it may be useful to outline some 
differences. First difference; I am interested here not so much in 
the particular exercises and techné of self-care from the classical 
and ancient periods (such as parrhēsia), and ways in which they 
may be useful for social work practice. My interest is on the 
general metaphor of counsellors undertaking various kinds of 
activities as continual and considered acts of self-constitution, as 
technologies of the self. In particular, 1) in what ways do practices 
of psychological measurement (objectivity) constitute subject 
positions for counsellors, and, crucially 2) how do counsellors use 
these practices, OR, their resistance to these practices, to produce 
an ethical self? By examining the texts of child sexual abuse 
research and the focus groups with counsellors, a limited set of 
practices centred on objectivity associated with psychological 
measurement have been identified. I suggest that these are 
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practices that can be analysed as a kind of practice of the self 
through which social workers and psychologists can become 
ethical subjects. 
 
Second difference; while Rogerson’s (2001) text explicitly aims to 
produce a ‘post-structural’ social work practice based on the 
deconstructive skills of a discursive practice—for example, by 
resisting social work’s grand narrative, in the belief that “social 
work can resuscitate itself” (see pp. 195-196)—the intentions here 
are more limited.  I am more sceptical of the value and possibility 
of prescribing a way of doing social work that would make it more 
virtuous (c/f Webb, 2006). I am more influenced by the position of 
authors such as Luepnitz, who, writing about family therapy, 
states: “A Foucauldian ‘impact’ on family therapy would not have 
to do with practising different techniques, nor would it mean 
necessarily the end of practice. The point would be to understand 
ourselves differently as practitioners” (Luepnitz, 1992, p. 284). 
While I would agree with Rogerson that the techniques of 
deconstruction and ‘post-structural’ practices of the self might 
offer productive possibilities for social work, my research limits 
itself to analysing what is said in the texts, and attempting to avoid 
prescriptive suggestions on how (or if) social work should be done.  
 
The objective tester? 
 
CB So um, when you were talking about the manual 
saying you’re not supposed to do things like unpack or 
ask the questions, what are people’s understandings of 




SALLY Well because you might influence one way or 
another  
 
KATE Influence the answer 
 
CB And is that seen as something that you’re meant to 
avoid? 
 
ELIZABETH Hmm.  
 
SALLY Yeah, My understanding of standardised testing 
is that that’s an important thing to avoid in order to do 
it properly.  
 
ELIZABETH It would be like doing the [work?] and 
saying ‘No you’re doing it wrong, let me put in the 
sequence for you, like, you’re not, yeah. 
 
DAVID OR you’re going hmmmm [shaking head ‘no’] 
[laughter- others join in saying hmm, mmmm, etc] 
 
NANCY But how can it, how CAN it be avoided, how 
can the environment and you sitting in the room be 




NANCY On what the child puts down in the test. 
They’re coming in here [to the counselling centre], 
they might have had a shitty day, blah blah blah, 
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you’re sitting there, you’re watching them, it’s gonna 
have an impact.  
 
LAURA Yeah, they’d have to be in the room, by 
themselves, completely isolated, in order to have… 
 
DAVID And maybe not even … here. [laughs] 
 
LAURA Not even in the room. In a sensory deprivation 
tank. 
 
NANCY But still the notion of TESTING comes… 
 
McClure (1999) refers to the ‘vanishing subject’, the idea that 
human subjectivity is not the correct ‘method’ for attaining 
knowledge. Given that psychological tests claim to be scientific 
tools of measurement, the technically competent ‘tester’ should 
have minimal impact on the results of a test, just as the objective 
sociological observer would be assumed to have no impact on the 
social phenomenon being observed. This has been a problem 
addressed by psychologists since at least the start of the 20th 
century (Morawski, 2007).  The extract above documents some of 
the research participants discussing how they might need to 
conduct themselves in the process of administering a psychological 
test.  
 
Although the word ‘objective’ does not appear here, I have 
interpreted the above discussion as a problematisation of 
objectivity, in the sense of the observer having no influence on the 
results. What I wish to point out is that the counsellors do not 
necessarily believe that (this ideal of) objectivity is attainable, but 
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it may nonetheless act as a regulative ideal for some (not all).  In 
this, they are joined in a long tradition of scientific practices where 
“objectivity was an ideal…never perfectly attained but 




Véronique Voruz (2005) argues that key intention of genealogical 
analysis is to demonstrate “how the contingent has become 
‘objective’, unquestionable ‘truth’” (p. 167). Furthermore, the 
(subject) interpreter is also “constituted through the historical 
processes within which he (sic) is inscribed”, rather than “a self-
conscious, reflexive subject that stands outside of the field of 
discourse which he interprets” (p. 167). This consideration can 
apply equally to the researcher/author as to the participants in the 
focus groups, who are in effect constituting their ‘selves’ by 
producing knowledge-claims about child sexual abuse therapy. If, 
as Voruz states (following Foucault), “the degree to which a 
subjective interpretation appears objective is in fact a measure of 
the success achieved by a given hegemonic discourse in its 
construction of the interpreting subject” (p. 167), I will be arguing 
here that if—and it’s a big if—the ‘measurability thesis’ (Michell, 
1999) constitutes a dominant discourse within the field of child 
sexual abuse therapy and research, it nonetheless fails to achieve 
hegemony. This, of course, is not to argue that it is not influential. 
 
Furthermore, the very notion of objectivity itself is questioned. If it 
is possible to be ‘reflexive about reflexivity’, there is also a 
possibility of being ‘objective about objectivity’, where the 
practice of objectivity is understood as dependent upon historical 
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contingencies and epistemological assumptions. One might say, for 
example, that objectivity exists, but understand that “objectivity 
has been found to entail a masculine subjectivity, obfuscated by 
sanctioned proclamations of neutrality” (Hawes, 1998, p. 95). One 
can still speak of objectivity, but in an ironic manner which 
subverts the intended meaning and authority normally entailed. 
The pursuit of objectivity might, in fact, be openly disavowed as a 
way of knowing about the world. Alternatively, reconfigurations of 
objectivity might be pursued which privilege accountability, 
entanglement and embodiment rather than distance and separation 
(Haraway, 1991; Barad, 2007). 
 
In their book titled simply Objectivity, Daston & Galison (2007) 
treat objectivity as an historically situated concept formed by 
scientific and epistemological practices. They argue that from our 
modern vantage point, the concepts of science and objectivity are 
so close to being synonymous that the formation of objectivity as a 
particular approach to knowledge is all but obscured. They 
demonstrate their point by showing how what might now be called 
objectivity has a fairly recent history, which they trace to 
nineteenth century science and to Kant in the field of 
epistemology. Yet, recognizable science was being practiced many 
centuries before this notion of objectivity was developed. The 
point is simply that science did not have to ‘wait around’ for 
objectivity before it got started. 
 
Daston and Galison delineate four styles of scientific objectivity, 
or relationships between science and objectivity: 1- truth-to-nature, 
2- mechanical objectivity, 3- structural objectivity and 4- trained 
judgement. Although emerging in historical succession, the 
paradigms inform, merge and re-define each other rather than 
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replace, so that traces of truth-to-nature might continue to inform 
some practices of structural objectivity, for example. The authors 
look at scientific atlases to interrogate the styles of representation 
current at various historical periods from the 1700s through to late 
twentieth century. In the truth-to-nature paradigm, naturalists (or 
other scientists) collaborated with artists to produce illustrations of 
scientific objects (e.g. leaves, plants, skeletons). These 
collaborations were rife with political, social as well as 
epistemological implications. The authors call this collaborative 
way of seeing ‘four eyed sight’. The scientist knew that the artist’s 
skills were indispensable, but imagined that their job was to put 
onto paper what the scientist had learned to see by their training in 
observations. The illustrations would be based on an actual 
example or specimen, but would be ‘smoothed out’ to represent an 
ideal type, an image of which was held in the mind of the scientist 
on the basis of their extensive observations of numerous individual 
examples of that type. Thus, the image produced by the artist 
represented truth-to-nature, nature being the ideal type rather than 
any actual specimen. (This is resonant with Plato’s ideas about 
Truth, Beauty, etc). Intervention between object and image is 
valued. Implicitly, a certain kind of scientific self is produced, one 
that is actively trying to produce objectivity. 
 
In the ‘mechanical objectivity’ paradigm (emerging mid-nineteenth 
century, and firmly established by the end of that century), 
intervention is to be avoided. This style of objectivity is defined as 
follows: “By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent drive to 
repress the wilful intervention of the artist-author, and to put in its 
stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, move nature to the 
page through a strict protocol, if not automatically” (Daston & 
Galison, 2009, p. 121). The move was consequently away from 
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types and towards individual examples. “Depicting individual 
objects “objectively” required a specific, procedural use of image 
technologies” (p. 121). Mechanical objectivity also meant a “newly 
disciplined scientific self bound to a highly restrained way of 
seeing” (p. 122), one that was committed to restraint from 
intervention. The way of seeing here is described as ‘blind sight’ 
(rather than the ‘four eyed sight’ of truth-to-nature). Thus, the 
emerging scientific self on the late 1800s was a self that could be 
eliminated from the image or measurement. (Recall McClure’s 
‘vanishing subject’ (1999)).  The virtue of restraint neatly 
illustrates the way that “mastery of scientific practices is inevitably 
linked to self-mastery, the assiduous cultivation of a certain kind of 
self” (Daston and Galison., 2007, p. 40).  
 
Daston and Galison identify two divergent trajectories in response 
to mechanical objectivity. Structural objectivity was uncomfortable 
with the use of images tout court, as they are inevitably reliant on 
visual sensory perception. As this is held to be an innately 
individual and therefore subjective way of knowing about the 
world, whose independent existence can never be finally 
established, the visual medium is unsatisfactory as a means of both 
comprehending and communicating about the external world. 
Structural objectivity holds particular relevance for the topic of 
psychological measurement, as much early psychological 
experimentation was concerned with the measurement of 
perception. Along with the work of ethnologists during the mid-
late 1800s, such research established that sensory perception was 
quite variable from individual to individual, and across cultures.  
 
Structural objectivity led to a search for Truth not in the essence or 
nature of objects themselves, since these were inaccessible to the 
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senses, but in relations between objects. Truth here was to be 
discovered in stable and universal structures that remained intact 
despite differences in content. This entailed a turn away from 
images, and towards a way of communicating that was not 
dependent upon individual or culturally specific perception, that 
would be non-empirical. What was needed was a kind of language 
that could be universal, even enabling communication between 
humans and yet-to-be-encountered alien species. Numbers, 
specifically the laws of arithmetic, promised such a structural 
language. Frege outlined his intention in creating such a universal 
language:  
 
Whereas each [person] can only feel his pain, his 
desire, his hunger, can only have his sound and color 
sensations, numbers can be the common object for 
many, and indeed are exactly the same for all, not just 
more or less similar inner states from various [people] 
(Daston et al., 2007, p. 281, citing Frege, 1884). 
 
 For Frege, it was precisely the fact that reason did not require 
empirical data that made arithmetic objective. The kind of self that 
this ideal produces was parallel to the world it described. Only 
reason itself was valued, the self and the world both “stripped 
down to skeletal relations, nodes in a network, knower and known 
admirably adapted to each other” (Daston et al., 2007, p. 302).74 
The irony of Frege’s project of creating such a universal language 
is that it was found to be inaccessible, even to his learned 
contemporaries such as Bertand Russell.   
 
                                                 
74 This image recalls Deleuze’s use of the rhizome as an image for thought, 
although he claimed he was an empiricist and not a structuralist. 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to suggest here a kind of emergence of 
an epistemological condition that would later make possible 
Steven’s definition of measurement (assigning numbers to objects 
according to a rule). Measurement produces relations between 
objects. The existence of the relations themselves depends upon 
the practice of measurement, the technologies and rules used, but 
in no way relies upon fixing the nature of the objects themselves. 
For instance, when measuring aggression, an instrument (such as 
the BASC) only has to maintain that the rule it uses to assign 
numbers (i.e. the questions it poses, the answers it receives, and the 
relationship between these and the construct ‘aggression’) is 
internally valid as a procedure of measurement. It does not have to 
establish whether or not person A’s aggression is qualitatively the 
same as person B’s, only establish a relation between them. The 
practice of measurement literally objectifies aggression so that 
each person’s individual experience of this construct is irrelevant. 
What it does produce is a relation between person A and B, 
through the relation of each to the norm. 
 
The fourth kind of objectivity, also a response to the perceived 
failures of mechanical objectivity, is trained judgement. Rather 
than fleeing ever further from empiricism and individual 
interpretation, as with the structural objectivists, trained judgement 
sought a way to combine the virtues of mechanistic image making 
with the training and expertise of the scientist. Images are not 
necessarily idealised, as in truth-to-nature, nor left to speak for 
themselves, as in mechanistic objectivity. Trained judgement 
resonates with the notion of clinical expertise; scientific data is not 




These four kinds of objectivity in representation hold some 
parallels with Rose’s description of images of children in 
developmental psychology. While in Rose’s account (1996) the 
graph becomes the ultimate image for representing the child 
(structural objectivity), there is a very current resurgence of the 
image; specifically, images produced through brain imaging 
technology and interpreted for the practitioner by the 
neurobiological expert (trained judgement).  
 
Daston and Galison (2007) convincingly demonstrate that 
objectivity is a scientific practice, and not a unitary or fixed 
abstract ideal. Furthermore, objectivity involves very particular 
ways of conducting the self. This recognition ties in with the idea 
that objectivity, rather than being a matter of a disembodied 
vantage point which subsequently entails no responsibility for how 
one sees, can instead be reworked as a ‘situated knowledge’ 
(Haraway, 1991, Ch. 9, pp. 183-201). The acknowledgment of the 
entanglement of the subject and object of knowledge, and 
subsequently the intra-action of each with the other (as parts of the 
one system), demands accountability for one’s practices within 
those entanglements (Barad, 2007). When this entanglement 
involves quantification, those “…who use these statistical and 
calculative methods are themselves constrained by the calculative 
apparatus they use. And this means that quantification produces a 
certain kind of objectivity” (Rose, 1999, p. 207). 
 
Having established that objectivity is neither unitary nor abstract, 
but is produced through material practices in specific situations, I 
am now entitled to ask: what kind of objectivity does 
psychological measurement produce in the case of child sexual 
abuse research, and in counselling? 
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Knowing subjects and objects 
 
One of the epistemological dilemmas raised by scientific 
knowledge about humans is that the knower becomes both subject 
and object of knowledge: the knower as well as the known. In the 
natural sciences (e.g. biology) the scientist can remain 
conceptually removed and distant from the ‘object’ of study. This 
breach is clearly more difficult to maintain in the human sciences. 
In the case of a psychological measuring device such as the 
Behaviour Assessment System for Children (BASC), this becomes 
a problem to be managed. (For a history of the development of the 
BASC, see (Rescorla, 2009). The BASC is the main test used by 
the counsellors in my focus groups. Its use with children who have 
been sexually abused is recommended in practice guides (e.g. 
Johnson et al., 2007). This test asks the child and/or caregiver to 
rate the frequency with which the child engages in a list of 
concerning behaviours. Children report on themselves, and are also 
reported on by their parent/caregivers, and teachers. (Children 
under a certain age are reported on only by their parents, not 
themselves).  
 
Once these reports are completed, the BASC software calculates in 
each case the likelihood that the report is reliable, or whether it is 
unduly tainted by factors such as a parent’s negative disposition 
towards the child. The child and/or adult report the data; their 
reports may be deemed more or less reliable. The expert, in both 
cases, is left to interpret the results, the veracity of this 
interpretation is ensured not only by the expertise and authority of 
the counsellor, but importantly in conjunction with the processes of 




There is actually a chain of observer/observed relations with the 
BASC. The clinician (counsellor) is not called upon to observe the 
child directly. These observations are made by the child and their 
parents and teachers. This chain is productive for the counsellor, 
because they are able to maintain a degree of separation from the 
child’s behaviour (which is the object being observed), as well as 
maintain a distance from the observers. In effect, the counsellor 
using a BASC assessment is working with the observations of 
observers.  
 
The BASC authors credit parents and teachers with being the 
“behavioral experts” regarding the specific child (Reynolds et al., 
2002, p. 2). This is significant in light of the fact that observation 
itself is considered a technical skill in the discipline of social work 
(Le Riche et al., 1998). In the BASC, the expertise of the 
counsellor lies elsewhere, in the interpretation and application of 
these observations. Yet I want to stress that despite Reynolds and 
Kamphaus claim, the ‘behavioral experts’ are not actually granted 
expertise in observing the child, and are in need of a disciplinary 
instrument (i.e. a checklist and questionnaire) in order to observe 
scientifically. Furthermore, the website for the (revised) BASC II 
advises teachers that:  
 
A score in a shaded area of the table or chart does not 
necessarily mean that your child has a problem that is 
unusual or that requires treatment. Such a conclusion 
must be made by a psychologist or other qualified 






Who is a measurer? 
 
NANCY:  [laughs] Like I mean I just think questions 
like ‘----------------?’ and ‘------------’75 really disturb 
me in the BASC testing, some of the individual 
questions. And the repetition of questions also disturbs 
me as well, and um, is um, quite perplexing to some of 
the clients, around, you know ‘I’ve already answered 
this question, this is the same as the other one’. Also 
the notion of true or false, and there’s no in between.  
 
KATE:  I think and that’s where, yeah, a lot of the kids 
it become like a right or wrong thing, like it’s a…I 
mean I try and spend a bit of time before I give it, 
because- and explaining that- because [they might 
think?] ‘If I do that, that’s wrong’. And you know, 
what’s a right or wrong, and then you’re creating this 
anxiety around something which is… 
 
NANCY:  Hmmm 
 
KATE:  …Not about that and you know they think ‘oh 
this is a test’,  
 
NANCY:  Hmmm 
 
KATE:  Again, I’m gonna be right or wrong, I’m 
gonna get a mark out of this, and what does that 
mean? So… 
                                                 
75 Due to copyright restrictions, it is not possible to reproduce the wording of 






KATE:  Yeah, it’s an issue. 
 
CB And, I think that ‘true or false’ is really interesting. 
Is that something else that people think about or talk to 
their clients about? About why [they answer?] true or 
false? 
 
NANCY:  Well, you know, I mean I have had a couple 
of little boys who said that ‘I can’t…you know, it’s 
both’. It’s true AND false, and so I can’t push them 




NANCY:  And so I just leave it, and then I circle one of 
them later… 
 
I want to try and delineate what qualifies one as a measurer. In 
light of the analysis that has been unfolding in this thesis, I can 
examine a number of statements: 
 
a- A measurer must utilise a measuring device- without this, 
there is no measurement.  
b- The device must be practicable in the situation (or 
phenomenon, to use Barad’s term) 
c-  The phenomenon must produce measureable traits or 
objects 
d- The agential cut designates one subject as the measurer.  
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If these statements are right, I argue that identifying the measurer 
within any particular phenomenon depends very little on the will or 
intention of the subject. She or he must become entangled within 
the situation and follow the order of things set out for them, or else 
cease to be a measurer. The agential cut designates relations of 
power/knowledge involving all actors (human and non-human) in 
the situation. 
 
And here is the dilemma facing researchers and counsellors in the 
field of child sexual abuse. In this field, unequal power relations 
are highly problematic. This lies behind the feminist objections to 
the use of measurement and statistics, for example. Yet in order to 
participate in the practice of psychological measurement, one has 
no choice but to enter into these relations of power with children. 
The above extract demonstrates the counsellors’ engagement with 
this problematisation.  
 
It can be argued that measurement is a way of seeing. The terms 
‘observation’ and ‘measurement’ are almost synonymous in 
physics. In this context, to see is not to passively perceive, but to 
actively observe (Crary, 1990). My emphasis here is on the 
specific kind of agency and subjectivity demanded of the observer 
in order to see what is made visible by the research or therapeutic 
situation. This includes taking into account the assemblage of 
technologies, objects, institutions, bodies, and other materials 
entangled in the observation/measurement.  
 
The BASC clinician’s guide is clear about this intention that the 





The SRP [Self-Report of Personality] provides a view 
of how the child experiences his or her behavior, 
feelings, attitudes and cognitions. The PRS [Parent 
Rating Scales] and TRS [Teacher Ratings Scales] 
provide impressionistic, holistic summaries of behavior 
as seen through the eyes of behavioural experts 
specific to the child in question. The SOS [Student 
Observation System] provides direct observation and 
counting of behavior, believed by many to be the sine 
qua non of behavioral assessment (Reynolds et al., 
2002, p. 2, all emphases added). 
 
The observer must link up with the various forms and instructions 
of the BASC to form what Deleuze and Guattari might call a 
‘measurement machine’. I think the researcher or clinician (the 
BASC user) is more of an ‘orderer’ of vision, including the 
observations of others who complete the forms. The professional 
BASC user calculates the observations of others, while never 
having to directly observe anything the child does.  
 
The question to be asked of this arrangement is how this could be 
regarded as objective. As I have argued, the use of measurement 
instruments in the research on child sexual abuse and in therapeutic 
contexts, are lauded primarily for their capacity to provide 
objective knowledge. I suggest that it is a particular kind of 
objectivity at work that most closely resembles the trained 
judgement described by Daston and Galison (2007), with elements 
of structural objectivity. This kind of objectivity functions as a 
regulatory ideal for the conduct of the enlisted observers as well as 
the clinician.  That is, it is not that objectivity means having no 
influence on the measurement situation; the impossibility of this 
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was clearly articulated by the counsellors in the focus groups. 
Rather, objectivity calls for close attention to how one conducts 
oneself in order to produce both a particular context of knowledge 
production, and a particular kind of knowledge. 
 
Subjects and objects of knowledge 
 
This enquiry also allows us to ask about the different kind of 
relationships that are possible between a knower (the subject of 
knowledge; the researcher/counsellor) and the known (the object of 
knowledge; the child victim of sexual abuse). Specifically, the 
possibility of objectivity as a feature of classical scientific method 
in the natural sciences depended on a dichotomy between the 
scientist and the natural world (Keller, 1985). In the social 
sciences, there is a strong feminist tradition of critiquing the notion 
of objectivity as “…an excuse for a power relationship every bit as 
obscene as the power relationship that leads women to be sexually 
assaulted, murdered and otherwise treated as mere objects” 
(Stanley and Wise, 1983, p. 169, cited in Oakley, 2000, p.35)  
 
However, work in science studies, particularly since Latour, have 
stressed the constructed nature of this dichotomy between scientist 
and the natural world; “…applied to history of psychology, this 
work would imply the analytic value of breaking down distinctions 
between the natural world described by psychology (the human 
mind) and the minds and social worlds of psychologists 
themselves” (Cohen-Cole, 2005, p. 108). While some traditions of 
scientific psychological enquiry inherited the ideal of this style of 
relationship—psychologists were to be ‘scientific selves’ 
(Morawski, 2007)—other traditions of psychology maintained a 
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commitment to scientific method, but through their method 
disrupted the absolute separation between subject and object (for 
example, by a team of researchers interchanging roles in an 
experiment; Danziger, 1990). Social work, with its historical 
emphasis on styles of relationships between worker and client, 
offers further possibilities for ‘subjectivization’, as do the various 
schools of psychoanalytic practice where the therapist-patient 
relationship is the means of insight and change.  
 
To make this inquiry specific to the problem of psychological 
measurement, one way of analysing this process is through 
understanding tester’s instructions as attempts to standardize the 
tester. This is a key point of a disciplinary analysis of 
psychological testing of clients or research subjects. Through 
presenting a standardised field of possibilities (which can be 
presented in the visual form of a graph) in which any individual 
may be located relative to the norm and the rest of the population, 
psychological measurement and testing can be seen as a 
disciplinary tactic of standardisation. Just as such an analysis can 
be challenged through examining the resistance to such attempts at 
standardisation by research subjects or clients, the present text 
aims to investigate the means available to counsellors to resist (or 
indeed to enact) standardisation of their practice or subjectivity as 
counsellors. In saying this, it is important to make clear that 
resisting one form of power/knowledge is not synonymous with 
freedom from disciplinarity in its entirety (Rose, 1999). It is argued 
here that the focus group discussions provide empirical evidence 
that resisting one mode of disciplinary practice depends upon the 
working of other discourses (which may or may not constitute 




The knowledges and practices of psychological measurement both 
produce and require particular kinds of relationships between the 
subject and object of knowledge. Of particular interest is the ideal 
of objectivity. Standard texts and manuals for practitioners using 
psychological tests stress the importance of the tester having the 
minimal influence possible on the results, which is often called 
objectivity. To take a local example, the study guide on 
Psychological Testing and Measurement produced by Deakin 
University Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural 
Sciences (Miller, 2007) states that the human interaction between 
examiner and examinee can produce error in the results when 
administering psychological tests. Thus, the examiner should “put 
examinees at ease and establish rapport before launching into 
testing” (p. 4). The presence of the ‘examiner’ should have a 
particular effect, rather than a minimal effect.  
 
Viewed from my analysis of subjectivation of the counsellor, this 
directive calls for anything but ‘invisibility’ (McClure, 1999), as 
the examiner should be active in seeking to create conditions that 
minimise the client’s “feelings of apprehension and uncertainty 
that can degrade performance” (Miller, 2007, p. 4). Put another 
way, the ‘examiner’ is called upon not so much to be objective, but 
to use their subjectivity in such a way as to promote a certain, 
preferred kind of testing environment.  
 
In their ‘clinicians guide’ to the BASC, Reynolds and Kamphaus 
(2002) advise that a combination of “measurement science, 
common sense, and accumulated experience” should inform the 
use of this piece of “child assessment technology”, “with the flaws 




In their case study, Khalily and Hallahan (2011) documented that 
filling in psychometric tests contributed to the research 
participant76 becoming “agitated and tremulous” (p. 340). These 
authors did not offer any information about their own responses to 
their research participant’s distress, how the conduct of the 
researchers may have contributed to these feelings, or how these 
feelings may have played their part in the research participant’s 
responses to the psychometric instruments. One possible reading 
would be that the researchers failed to adhere to proper procedures. 
However, the researchers, by noting the effects of the measurement 
process on the young women, presumably intend to convey some 
kind of significance to the audience.   
 
Note the difference between the case study reported above, a 
research context, and Kate’s account of using a test in a therapeutic 
context. The intention of standardised testing instructions and 
practices to minimize the influence of the counsellor paradoxically 
heightens counsellor’s awareness of their ‘use of self’. Kate’s 
account (below) demonstrates the extent to which the use of testing 
can produce the counsellor’s awareness of their influence and 
responsibility in conducting a therapeutic counselling session: 
 
CB … I just want to go back to something Kate said, 
she said that it can be a torturous process. Do you 
mean just for the child, or as a therapist? 
 
KATE: No. Both. I was feeling, by the end of it, I was, I 
felt, I felt bad, ‘oh come on’ you know and I thought 
‘this is not what this is supposed to be about’, and that 
                                                 
76 Their participant was an 18 year old woman who had been subject to 
childhood sexual abuse when she was considerably younger. 
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was not her experience of previous sessions with me 
either, so it was back to that, the difference between 
the way you run your sessions normally as opposed to 
when you’re trying to do that testing process, because 
she was like, you know, ‘really, what is the deal with 
this?’ We don’t, you know, normally we do do a 
number of different things, because that’s the way I’ve 
been able to structure, the way for her to able to be 
with me within that therapeutic space. So it was 
torturous for her, she was bouncing off the walls, and 
then it was a bit, like you know, it was hard work on 
my part to try and get her to do that, but then I was 
also feeling kind of responsible for getting to that point 
too. Umm, yeah, so probably all of those things, I 
think. 
 
This capacity for reflection calls into question Foucault’s reference 
to psychologists as “servants of moral orthopaedics” (in Discipline 
and Punish, cited in Hook, 2007, p. 40). It is surprising that 
Foucault would characterise the deployment of psychological 
expertise in such a manner that effectively whitewashes the 
internal contradictions and struggles involved. This whitewashing 
obscures not only the subjectivizing effect of expertise on experts, 
but as Michell (1999) details, the discursive battles involved in 
establishing the legitimacy of practices like psychological 
measurement. Regarding the former issue, it is this simplistic 
portrayal of psychologists and social workers that I want to 
question in this section (the latter issue of the politics of legitimacy 
have already been discussed). Such a project can draw upon 
(among others, of course) the later work of Foucault on ‘ethics’, 
where much more attention is given to the ways in which 
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individuals take up bodies of knowledge and systems of ethics in 
order to actively work on their ‘self’; specifically, to work at 
becoming an ethical self, a phrase that holds some resonance for 
the ways in which counsellors attempt to conduct themselves. 
 
Kate’s comments say something about objectivity as well as 
reflexivity, showing them to be entangled practices. Barad’s (2007) 
notion of objectivity sets itself against a classical scientific image 
of an external object (to be measured) and an internalised and 
contained subject (to observe). Barad’s ‘agential realism’ reworks 
objectivity from the Borhian insight that it is the apparatus that 
enacts and produces such ‘cuts’ between objects and subjects. Such 
relations between the observer and observed exist, but they are not 
pre-existent outside of the particular phenomenon being observed. 
Barad argues that “Objectivity means being accountable for marks 
on bodies, that is, specific materializations in their differential 
mattering. We are responsible for the cuts we help enact…because 
we are an agential part of the material becoming of the universe” 
(ibid., p. 178, italics in original).  Barad argues that it is possible to 
understand phenomenon objectively, but not objects and 
properties; “…the objective referent is phenomena, not the 
seeming ‘immediate givenness’ of the world” (Barad, 2007, p. 
244).  
 
Remembering again that Barad bases her theory on physics77, this 
notion of objectivity nonetheless holds some resonance for Kate’s 
dilemma. I am taking on the implications for measurement as a 
practice, not any direct correlation between children and particles 
                                                 
77 In linking measurement in physics to measurement in psychology, I am doing 
no more than following the lead of the founder of quantitative psychology, 
Fechner, a physicist. (Michell, 1999). 
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as objects of scientific research. I would argue that one way of 
understanding Kate’s comments, using Barad’s objectivity, is as an 
attempt to grapple with her ethical responsibility for the manner in 
which this cut between herself and her client is being enacted and 
the apparent effect this has on both herself and her client.  
 
The question of whether a psychological test can be objective or 
subjective appears throughout the focus group discussions (see also 
p.38). The following extract flows from a discussion of a scenario 
in which the re-application of a BASC test shows that anxiety 
levels for a child have decreased over a 12 months period of 
therapy.  
 
KATE This was really high, you know, by closure it’s 
not because, you know, at the time this, this, and this 
were happening, the writer notes now that, you know 
these things are no longer present, however there are 
still concerns around x, y and z that might explain the 
high score, you know that’s how, and I would, yeah. 
And I think that’s the important part, you can do a test 
for anything, but if you don’t, the important part is the 
interpretation and what you put to that, so… 
 
NANCY    So then it’s really subjective, isn’t it? 
 
KATE   Well of course it is. 
 
NANCY   Yeah. 
 




NANCY  Hmmm, yeah.  
 
KATE   Your individual assessment will be subjective, 
probably, you know, we would hope… 
 
NANCY  So what’s the purpose of the test? 
 
KATE   we would hope we would get significant…are 





CB This is why we have focus groups. 
 
NANCY    No, but really, you know if it’s so subjective, 
if we’re making….I’m not arguing against you, I’m just 
asking, saying that if it’s so subjective… 
 
KATE   I think it’s part of that, I think it [couples?] 
part of those things and I think sometimes that using it, 
it’s a part of, it’s not, it’s not a, I don’t think it’s a 
thing in and of itself 
 
JASON   Not the be all and end all 
 
KATE   It’s not the be all and end all and it’s not, um, 
you know. Like you get those pieces of clay, well we 
could have decided many things of what some of those 




ELIZABETH   We could have  
 
NANCY    That’s very subjective too 
 
KATE   That’s what I’m just thinking like, you know 
you get those things and you’re interpreting them and, 
you know, some of those things we were looking at 
were… 
 
JASON   So, is it about interpretations? You know, like 
what’s the best therapeutic value for a child in the 50 
hours that you see them, and is a test, however long 
that takes, um, what does that do…what benefit is that 
for the child therapeutically? [pause] if you’re saying 
that’s subjective and that’s subjective, if everything’s 
subjective well let’s just do, spend time with something 
that works for the kid, then.  
 
CB  Yeah, that’s one of the, I think one of the most 
interesting points, is that the whole purpose of people 
designing and making tests is to supposedly achieve 
some kind of objectivity or scientific…I mean these 
guys talk about this work as being scientific, and based 
on scientific method because it’s supposedly objective. 
Um, but what I’m hearing quite strongly, and last time 
as well, is that people don’t really treat them as 
objective. Like, people don’t treat these as an impartial 
kind of truth about the child. 
 




ELIZABETH  But I think in response to your question 
[to JASON], you know, what is the therapeutic point 
for the child, I’d say none.  
 
CB In doing tests? 
 
ELIZABETH  Yep. I would say it’s to assist the 
therapist. I think parents might get, feel a bit more 
settled or something about hearing well this test says 
that you, you know, your child’s emotionally and 
behaviourally going along OK,  
 
KATE  Hmm, hmm 
 
ELIZABETH  So you know, you can have parents out 
there that search for a diag…not even a diag…, yeah 
well a diagnosis, but you know, just to, that might help 
settle some parental anxieties. But I would say 
therapeutically there’s probably none for the child.  
 
The above extract evinces quite a different attitude towards the 
importance of objectivity than that articulated by Rind et al.. Rind 
et al. privileged their quantitative meta-analysis of the harm of 
child sexual abuse in large part because qualitative approaches are 
subjective. The extract, in contrast, seems to suggest the 
productivity of not seeing the practice of psychological 
measurement as objective (even if some version of classical 
objectivity is at work as a regulative ideal). In fact, what is being 
articulated is precisely the therapeutic practice issues entailed in 
the process, rather than the outcomes, of measurement. The 
process of measurement is what the classical notion of objectivity 
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wants to account for only on the basis that there would still be an 
object to measure without the process. If the classical scientific 
purpose of measuring is to ‘mark bodies’ in a way that takes the 
mark and the object as representing something about the world that 
would be true if the measurement had not taken place, here 
attention is being paid to the way the process of measuring itself 
can mark both children and counsellors. To reiterate a point made 
above, the counsellors are deeply engaged in wrestling with their 
agential responsibility for the situation in which such ‘marks’ are 
made possible. 
 
Resisting one kind of expertise 
 
In hearing Nancy, in particular, describe a general disregard for the 
usefulness of psychological testing and measurement for her 
therapeutic practice, I became interested in trying to understand 
how her position is also produced by a set of conditions for 
knowledge. In rejecting the subject-position of ‘measurer’, Nancy 
inscribes her practice within a different set of priorities and 
statements about knowledge and expertise.    
 
CB to NANCY   Can I ask you, cause you’ve expressed 
that you hardly use it or place a great deal of faith in 
the testing,  
 
NANCY   No 
 
CB What do you do with the results of the report that 




NANCY   I put them in the computer, and they spill 
them out for me, and then I look at them, and then I go 
“oh yeah. OK”. Sometimes I bring KATE    over 
[laughter], but she’s getting sick of me doing that so I 
don’t bring her over any more. [more laughter].  
 
ELIZABETH   So you get David [more laughter] 
 
KATE    No no no, I just, I read it through and I think 
“oh yeah”….[laughs] 
 
CB and do you share it with the child or the parents? 
 
ELIZABETH   What, the ‘oh yeah’? [laughter] 
 
KATE    ‘We did the test. yeah’. 
 
ELIZABETH   ‘I had a glance. Nn..oh yeah’ 
 
CB ‘Thanks for filling out those 152 questions’ 
[laughter] 
 
ELIZABETH  For taking the time.  
 
NANCY   Well, yeah I know, it sounds interesting. I do 
have actually other things that I draw on, apart from 
the tests, [laughs] and yeah, so, look I look at it, 
KATE’s helped me understand that, um, with a few of 
the ones I’ve done there’s you know, there’s nothing 
that’s um, clinically worrying, or whatever, Um, so, I 
think I just…I really don’t place a lot of emphasis on it, 
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I suppose if I saw there was a star up in the area where 
it wasn’t meant to be I’d have a look at it, and I’d 
probably think I’d typed in the wrong numbers, that 
are not right, because I don’t really, I have a lot of 
faith in my own attunement to the child, so um, and you 
know, but, I must say that once I read out a few of the 
questions to one of the little boys that I was seeing, and 
then that provoked a whole lot of discussion. So some 
of the questions were quite interesting, so that 
provoked discussion but that’s not in any way you 
know like a, you know a proper administration of the 
test really.  
Because it’s, I mean I took it my way, and went off on 
an area and started talking to him about it “oh you 
know so, tell me a little bit about that” and so that kind 
of promoted some discussion, but um, yeah, 
basically…there was another test that I did there was a 
father who did the test and the child, the young woman 
who did the test, and you know she said ‘yes I have 
thoughts about harming myself’, he said ‘she’s never 
harmed herself in her whole entire life’, so that just 
reinforced that they’re poles apart. But that was in the 
test, um, and that said something to me about what I 
already knew, but I suppose it was reinforced in the 
test. Yeah. but I don’t go back and give them feedback. 
Sometimes in the assessment part where I met with the 
parents, I might say that, you know, we filled out the 
forms, those tests, and um, you know I might highlight 
a couple of things that came out of that but only if 




CB So, you’re first thought that if it was very different 
to what you’d thought before, that something had gone 
wrong,… 
 
NANCY   The wrong numbers for the wrong thing. 
Yeah, yeah. I’d be shocked if anything that came out of 
the test was different to my own perception….I mean, 
that might sound, you know, but it’s, yeah, and I have 
my own theoretical framework of how I’d support the 
experience that I have with the child, that goes quite 
counter to the test, I suppose.  
 
JASON  So why do you do the test then?  
 
NANCY   Because, uh, I have to. [laughter] 
 
The technical notion of expertise embraced by the evidence based 
movement practice, and the associated therapeutic modality of 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), is challenged by different 
notions of expertise. There is also a productive distinction between 
expertise as a researcher and expertise as a counsellor. In the field 
of child sexual abuse treatment, it has been argued that there is no 
current accepted definition of what qualifies anyone to be an expert 




Resistance to quantification 
 
There is evidence of a certain discomfort with the representation of 
people with numbers throughout history. Even in the Old 
Testament, “numbering the people” is a great sin committed by 
David, resulting in the death of 70 000 people by plague (Cohen, 
2005).  Various professional groups claiming expertise in 
particular social problems have espoused resistance to the 
quantification of their work at various historical junctions. 
Certainly the idea that psychological attributes are suitable for 
measurement is not, and has not been, without controversy: one 
theorist even coined the term ‘quantofrenia’ as a kind of satirical 
diagnosis of the tendency in psychological research to “quantify all 
and everything” (Sartori, 2006, p. 409, citing Sorokin, 1956). A 
range of professions concerned with the conduct of human affairs 
have resisted quantification in various ways. I will outline some of 
these here to demonstrate that although quantification and 
measurement may constitute hegemonic discourses in many areas 
of the human sciences, they are rarely, if ever, totalizing. 
The resistance of doctors 
 
Stigler (1992) identifies resistance to statistical methods in 
European medical texts as far back as the 1690s. The medical 
profession’s objections to the quantification of understandings of 
human illness also appear during the 1800s, where they “… 
maintained a case that looks very like the later feminist one: that 
each patient is an individual, whose situation and history can only 
be taken into account during a clinical interview; thus the value of 
‘aggregative thinking’ destroys the essential, individualized basis 
of the medical art” (Oakley, 2000, p. 110). Statistical aggregates 
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obscured the mechanics of cause and effect in individual cases 
(Cole, 2000). Some medical practitioners objected to the collection 
of statistics from their patients, as this was irrelevant to the 
treatment of the individual patient being treated (Hacking, 1990, p, 
86). Debates between French doctors and statisticians in 1837 
revolved around the two issues of ‘minority facts’78 and defence of 
the medical practitioner as an expert subject of knowledge (Cole, 
2000); it was the possibility of their expert judgment being 
rendered unnecessary, or worse, as unreliable and prone to error, 
that prompted the resistance of some doctors. They perceived the 
danger that, in a knowledge regime ruled by statistics, they might 
‘vanish’ as subjects of knowledge (McClure, 1999). 
 
Porter (1995) stresses this dimension to the resistance of doctors 
(discussing specifically US doctors in the 1940s-50s) to statistics 
as a basis for decision making. They feared that their expert 
clinical judgement would be displaced. “…the ideal of objectivity, 
as the statisticians conceived it, was difficult to reconcile with 
clinical judgement” (p. 204, referring to Austin Bradford Hill’s 
reflections on his lectures at medical schools during that time. Hill 
contributed statistical expertise to some of the first large scale 
controlled clinical trials, especially on the relation between 
smoking and lung cancer). Statistics were related to a notion of 
objectivity that minimised (ideally, did away with) the need for the 
exercise of judgement.    
 
According to Porter the purpose of double-blind methodology in 
medical research was mainly to “neutralize the effects of expert 
                                                 
78 Minority facts were those cases that were inconsistent with statistical 
aggregate. This debate pointed also to political concerns related the dangers of a 
democracy based on majority opinion (Cole, 2000, p. 88) 
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discretion without disbarring it” (Porter, 1995, p. 205). That is, 
when new treatment approaches were being trialled, and doctors 
were instructed as to what course of treatment to prescribe to their 
patients, doctors felt that their professional expertise was 
neutralised. 
Porter (1995, p. 202) suggests it was also the imposition on the 
trust with patients that led doctors to be resistant to numbers and 
the use of instruments in treatment, especially those that left a 
record of their measurements. The title of Porter’s book, Trust in 
Numbers, points to this displacement of trust, from the relationship 
between doctor and patient to the claimed objectivity of 
quantitative methods (although the argument in Porter’s book 
reaches farther than the medical profession alone). Doctors’ view 
of their work was not compatible with a mechanised application of 
interventions. They shared a privileged relationship involving a 
significant degree of trust with their patients, which they felt 
contributed to a thorough understanding of their patient’s needs 
and circumstances. This was indispensable to an accurate diagnosis 
and treatment.  
 
Of course, with trust came authority, and some 19th century British 
doctors argued for the necessity of the ‘gentlemanly’ standing of 
physicians as necessary for exercising the requisite authority over 
patients, not to mention defending their own elite status in society 
(Pernick, 1985; Daston et al., 2007). 
 
With contemporary developments in biomedicine and its 
technological apparatus, challenges to the authority of the clinical 
judgement of medical practitioners have intensified over recent 
years. “Doctors have lost the monopoly of the diagnostic gaze and 
of the therapeutic calculation: the clinical judgement of the 
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practicing physician is hemmed in and constrained by the demands 
of evidence-based medicine and the requirements for the use of 
standardized, corporately framed diagnostic and prescribing 
procedures” (Rose, 2007, p. 11). However another practice of 
objective knowledge, ‘trained judgement’ (Daston et al., 2007), 
does not directly oppose such technologies, but embraces them in 
combination with the expertise required to make accurate and 
proper use of the information so garnered.  
 
It is worthwhile noting D’Amico’s (1989) discussion of Foucault’s 
Birth of the Clinic regarding the conceptual schema of 
classificatory (as opposed to clinical) models of disease in the 
classical era. According to the classificatory schema, disease 
belonged to a familial ‘space’, in which disease has properties 
proper to itself, and not restricted to locations or manifestations in 
particular patients. In fact, manifestations in individual patients are 
more like distortions of the disease itself, as an entity. Thus, in 
order to understand disease in this schema, case histories of 
individuals are not part of the diagnostic ‘gaze’. “If one wishes to 
know the illness from which he is suffering, one must subtract the 
individual, with his particular qualities” (Foucault 1963 p. 14, cited 
in D’Amico, 1989, p. 14). This suggests the linking between 
statistical analysis of psychological traits and the classical 
classificatory schema of disease. Borsboom’s (2005) description of 
classical test theory is resonant here. In classical test theory, the 
concern is with populations, not the 'idiosyncrasies' of individuals. 
"So, the individual subject must receive a probability distribution, 
but only in order to make him disappear from the analysis as 






One might think at first that actuaries would be amongst the most 
fervent advocates of quantitative approaches to their subject. 
Actuaries were employed by life insurance companies. Their job 
was to calculate the appropriate premiums that should be paid by 
individuals in a fund so that the fund could remain solvent. They 
were also responsible for choosing ‘selected lives’–those lives that 
the insurance agency would consider a sound investment. 
Actuaries were responsible for developing tables of calculations 
indicating the appropriate premiums for a variety of lives that 
insurance agencies might insure. 
 
However, Porter (1995) traces the resistance of actuaries to the 
strict quantification of their profession. They objected to a wholly 
routinised practice, which would involve a denial of trust in their 
positions as gentlemen of integrity and judgement. They also 
argued that the ‘selection of lives’ for insurance policies required 
‘real world’ experience and judgement not possible with 
mechanically applied statistical laws. 
 
Part of the actuaries resistance to a completely technical 
mathematical approach to their profession stemmed from the belief 
that “knowledge is local, and that even general rules are useless 
except to those who understand the conditions under which they 
should be applied” (Porter, 1995). The resonance of this sentiment 
(the period Porter is discussing is around the 1860’s) with 
contemporary post-modernist and feminist critiques of scientific 




Part of their resistance was based on their perception of their 
position as trustworthy and gentlemanly members of the 
community, whose integrity ought to be guarantee enough that 
they did their job accurately and honestly. There was a definite 
elitist sentiment to their resistance. Their message was that a good 
actuary is better than a good set of rules for calculation. There is an 
argument to be made that this was an instance where quantification 
may have aided the democratic demand for transparency, and was 




There is an analogy to be made with the ostensible focus of this 
paper. Many may feel that a good counsellor is better than an 
empirically proven intervention. According to Hand (2004), the 
debate over clinical vs. actuarial approaches in psychology can be 
traced back at least to 1925 (citing papers by Freyd and Viteles of 
that year). These debates resemble that outlined above in the 
discussions of doctors: statistical methods were fine for 
understanding populations of people, but the treatment of the 
individual patient or client required nuanced clinical skills. In fact, 
contemporary counsellors could even cite a body of quantitative 
research which indicates that it is these very relational practices 
which are necessary for effective therapy (Campbell, 2002). Whilst 
there is a strong tendency in some child sexual abuse research to 
argue for the increased precision offered by statistical and 
quantitative knowledges (Rind et al., 1998; Freyd et al., 2005; 
Tonmyr et al., 2011), others counter that techno-scientific modes 
of knowledge are actually less likely to produce accurate 
understandings in welfare decision making (Taylor et al., 2000); a 
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position that echoes the critique of scientific objectivity developed 
by feminist writers such as Harding (1986). 
 
Charges of elitism (such as those levelled at Porter’s 19th century 
actuaries), one feels, would not sit well with counsellors in general 
and social workers in particular, who tend to privilege the 
espousing of egalitarian values. The arguments put by the doctors, 
about the importance of trust and the intimacy of the relationship 
with the patient/client would, it might be expected, sit better with 
most counsellors than the distinctly superior tone of the insurance 
actuaries. Evidence of this kind of statement is at hand. The 
following extract from the ‘focus groups’ shows that NANCY does 
not eschew the notion that she possesses expertise as a counsellor, 
but puts forward a clinical notion of expertise that is ‘counter’ to 
measurement (the group is discussing the problem of a child who 
asks for advice in answering a question in a test):  
 
CB So how, when a child says that, like ‘I can’t say if 
that’s true or false’, what… do you talk to them about 
that, how do you respond to them? 
 
NANCY I try and unpack it with them, but if they can’t 
come to a, you know, a either/or, then I let it go, ‘cause 
that’s where they’re at. I don’t want to be putting them 
into a true or a false when I, well…I don’t believe, I 
don’t like the testing, so I’m not wedded to the testing, 
and um,  
 
SALLY? Kind of runs counter to the rest of the stuff you 




NANCY It’s totally counter, and I’m a process 
orientated counsellor and when we’ve just got a 
content, you know, 152 questions that are content, a lot 
of content based questions, then philosophically it’s 
difficult for me to give the tests, so that’s why I’m not, 
you know…I might, sometimes I might even read out 
the questions and get them to tell me what the answer 
is so I can engage with them in some way. 
 
Again, later during a discussion about the evaluative 
connotations of the word ‘normal’ in psychological 
testing, Nancy cites her clinical skills as enabling her 
to understand the child she is working with: 
 
NANCY I don’t go for the graph myself  
 
KATE But if we’re talking about a graph 
 
NANCY I kind of,…sorry? 
 
KATE No but if you’re talking about a graph 
 
NANCY Yeah, and when I do the BASC I look at the 
graph and I see that it’s all in the lines, well [laughs] I 
just 
 
KATE I don’t see that there’s something wrong with 
that, I mean if you’re saying Ok it’s within that, and 
you know that’s where there’s concern that there might 




NANCY I can’t, well…for me I think that I would pick 
it up anyway when I’m working with the child. I don’t 
need a, I don’t need the test to be able to support my 
understanding of what the child is like. 
 
Note that in relation to Nancy’s last statement above that 
psychometrics has a concept of ‘incremental validity’ to describe 
this situation, where a test does not furnish any new information 
over and above the clinical assessment (Lilienfeld, 2006). Thus, 
one could interpret Nancy’s statement as an indication that for her, 
the BASC generally lacks incremental validity.  
 
For the current purposes, however, two general points can be made 
in relation to these discussions. The first is simply that therapy, or 
more specifically child sexual abuse counselling, is a 
heterogeneous collection of discourses and practices that 
participate in the production of an object of knowledge and subject 
of intervention: the child victim of sexual abuse. Neither Nancy, 
nor Elizabeth, nor Kate claims a monopoly on therapeutic 
knowledge per se. The second point is methodologically 
instructive. Following the notion that power is not a possession or 
a substance, but is more a flow of relations, of forces, one can 
speak of various ‘apparatus’ through which power is dispersed; a 
rationality, a network of ‘broader political logics’ (Hook, 2007, p. 
234). The use of electrical current metaphors for the flow of power 
can be found in Foucault’s lectures on psychiatric power 
(2006/1973-74).  Within disciplinary apparatus of therapy, the 
counsellor is a kind of ‘node’ or relay point through which 
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power/knowledge flows79.  Whilst relay points are necessary 
components of the networks of disciplinary power, they also 
represents points of potential resistance or disruption; whilst the 
image of a power that ‘flows’ is useful, the flow is not always 
smooth. In relation to this point, consider that Foucault explicitly 
stated that he intended his work to promote ‘paralysis’ in social 
workers (Foucault, 1991c; this discussion will be referred to later 
in relation to a different point). Rather than being a simple conduit 
of disciplinary power (as suggested in the term ‘anaesthetised’), 
the paralysed social worker clearly represents a point of disruption 
for the flow of power. This notion has implications for the ways in 
which the subjectivity of counsellors can be analysed; if it is 
possible for a social worker to be paralysed (in the sense, described 
by Foucault, of not knowing what to do), it is clear that subjectivity 
is not a straightforward or rational process of either infolding or 
transmitting knowledge/power relations. 
 
Summary of Chapter 7 
 
In this chapter I have examined more closely the effects of the 
claim that psychological measurement is an objective practice for 
investigating the effects of child sexual abuse. I have attempted to 
demonstrate that objectivity is not a homogenous concept, but is 
historically constituted in material scientific arrangements. I 
suggest that objectivity has a specific meaning in the practice of 
                                                 
79 Hook (2007) uses the term ‘micro-sovereignties’ to describe these ‘officers or 
agents’ (p. 244). Yet the term ‘sovereignty’ would appear to run contrary to the 
point he is making, in the sense that, while stressing the agentic subjectivity of 
these agents, he nonetheless refers to them as what “makes the broader 
architecture of state control possible” (p. 245), which would appear to imply a 





psychological measurement that calls upon researchers and 
counsellors to conduct themselves in particular ways to create a 
specific context in relation to research subjects. My emphasis has 
been on the entanglement of the researcher/counsellors—and the 
measurement instrument itself—in the measurement phenomenon, 
rather than their separation as espoused in some classical versions 
of objectivity. 
I have also provided some historical context for the resistance to or 
discomfort with objectivity, measurement and statistics in the 
professions of medicine, insurance and counselling. I did this to try 
and suggest a sense of both continuity and specificity in the 
difficulties faced by the counsellors in the focus groups. Resisting 
one kind of expertise necessarily entails another preferred set of 
expert claims, as was evident in the historical examples and the 






The end of this thesis is a kind of enacted, agential cut (Barad, 
2007). I am in a position to take responsibility for this decision, in 
the context of the pragmatic demand that this text be wrapped up, 
bounded and passed on as a fixed document. I am aware at this 
moment of the threads I have not picked up, or not followed as far 
as perhaps they might have been. To give one example; I would 
like to explore further the ways in which statistics have enabled the 
actualisation of elements of ‘societies of control’ (Deleuze, 1992) 
in the name of preventing men’s violence against women and 
children. The technologies of risk management described by Castel 
(1991) are becoming more evident in the field of violence 
prevention, with particular consequences for children who have 
been subject to abuse (including sexual abuse); such children, 
particularly boys, are configured as at-risk for committing future 
violence (Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2007). This 
depends on the privileging of statistical ways of knowing. This 
angle of analysis would provide a way of approaching the question 
about the ‘cycle of abuse’ I posed at the very beginning of the 
process (as I discussed in Chapter 1).  
 
Another thread to follow would be the ways in which scientific 
practices of measurement are being implicated in the contemporary 
efforts to locate trauma ‘in the body’ (Baldwin et al., 2004). I 
briefly discussed brain imaging technology as one example of this. 
Research in the fields of neurobiology and physiology is 
increasingly being taken up by professionals in the treatment of 
those who have been subjected to child sexual abuse. Much of this 
research is concerned with measuring substances in the body, such 
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as the flow of blood in the various regions of the brain, or of 
particular chemicals in the bloodstream itself. 
  
Despite what I may be leaving ‘undone’, I think I am in a position 
to provide some tentative answers to the questions I posed at the 
start:  
 
How have techniques of psychological measurement and 
statistical analyses been made to function as objective methods 
for determining the effects of child sexual abuse? 
 
Appeals to objectivity are repeated throughout the research 
literature on the effects of child sexual abuse, including early work 
by the likes of David Finkelhor (Finkelhor, 1986). Objectivity is 
widely regarded as an essential trait of scientific work, and science 
is regarded as the premier means through which knowledge claims 
establish legitimacy. The linking of measurement and science has 
played an important part in the proliferation of psychological 
measurement, including in the field of child sexual abuse. This is 
despite a number of obstacles, including: 1) the contested claims 
around whether or not psychological attributes are technically 
amenable to measurement; and 2) criticisms of the very notion of 
objectivity as inherently problematic.  
 
Even at this point, having investigated this very question, I admit 
to struggling to understand the imperative that research in the field 
of child sexual abuse should be objective, if ‘objective’ means 
dispassionate and non-influential. Surely compassion, not 
dispassion, is called for? It seems even stranger to me now that 
there are calls to specify precisely ‘how much’ harm child sexual 
abuse might cause. At the same time, it has been important to 
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acknowledge that these very efforts, to establish how much harm, 
have constituted an integral component of the professional 
response to the suffering endured by those who have been 
subjected to abuse. Whatever the shortcomings of claims to 
objectivity and practices of measurement, and however 
successfully or otherwise these ideals and practices have been 
performed, they have been crucial elements of establishing the 
legitimacy of this suffering. 
 
What relations of power/knowledge do practices of 
measurement require and produce? What are the ‘conditions 
of possibility’ for psychological measurement? 
 
The question of power has been made extremely complex and 
slippery through the work of Foucault and the development of an 
analytics of power. There can be no scientific knowledge of child 
sexual abuse without relations of power, and these relations are 
made relatively visible in psychological measurement. This raises 
difficulties in the field of child sexual abuse, where the 
understanding that power relations can be harmful is influential.  
 
Any practice of measurement in the classical sciences contains a 
set of implicit assumptions: the separation of agent and object; the 
existence of discreet properties and traits; the presumption that 
properties found through the phenomenon of measurement pre-
exist the measuring; and the ability of the measuring device to 
measure what it is intended to. The contributions of authors in the 
field of science studies (I have drawn particularly on Karen Barad) 
question these assumptions while offering productive alternatives 
as to how to analyse practices of measurement. The notion of 
entanglement (Barad, 2007) has been particularly useful in 
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analysing the attempts to measure the harm of child sexual abuse, 
and how this implicates researchers and counsellors, as well as 
children and adults who have been subjected to sexual abuse, in 
relations of power. If it is feasible to suggest that all attempts to 
gain knowledge depend upon relations of power, I think the notion 
of entanglement provides a helpful way to investigate how 
counsellors try to account for their involvement in situations that 
are sometimes in conflict with their preferred ethics or practice as 
professionals in the field of child sexual abuse.   
 
This leaves the problem of whether power relations themselves 
should always be contested, as they are implicated in abuse; or 
whether some relations of power are legitimate, either for 
ontological reasons (e.g. child development perspectives), for 
therapeutic reasons (therapists exercise power benignly), or for 
epistemological reasons (relations of power are justified on the 
grounds of better knowledge). Or, if power is understood more as a 
productive force that enables rather than oppresses, there is no 
need to oppose power per se. In this case, one is left to grapple 
with the complex debates around power and domination, which has 
the effect (for me, at least, in this thesis), of unsettling the grounds 
upon which many claims about the harm of child sexual abuse are 
made in therapeutic and research settings. 
  
What kinds of individuals are ‘produced’ by psychological 
practices of measurement, in the study and treatment of child 
sexual abuse? 
 
The two main kinds of people that emerged through this 
investigation are, simply, those who are in the category of normal, 
and those who are not. Although statistical normality technically 
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has no moral judgement attached to it, statistics do not exist in a 
vacuum. The measuring research on child sexual abuse constantly 
compares the abused child (or the adult abused as a child) to the 
statistically normal child (or adult). Historically, sexually abused 
children have been deemed abnormal in varying ways via legal, 
medical, child protection and ‘psy’ disciplines, with responses 
ranging from punishment and separation (Armstrong, 1996; Smart, 
1999), to caring and compassionate efforts to ameliorate their 
suffering (as evidenced in my focus groups). Although of course 
there are range of forces and discourses at work here (other than 
psychology and measurement), I suggest it is helpful to revisit the 
historical context whereby statistical differences from the norm 
were conceptualised as errors to be corrected.  
 
A second way of describing kinds of people, following Hacking 
(1995, 2004), is to look at the attributes that a particular instrument 
uses to define people. People are anxious or not anxious, people 
are depressed or not depressed, children suffer from traumatised 
sexuality or they do not. Through measuring a conglomerate of 
attributes, people are produced in the terms of such research not as 
‘memorable persons’, but as a set of calculable traits locatable in 
reference to the norm (Hacking, 1991, 1995).  Identifying people 
along these lines, within a scientific ‘style of reasoning’ 
(Davidson, 2001) makes it possible to legitimise therapeutic 
intervention into their lives, whether this is sought by the 
individual themselves (Rose, 1998) or not (Ashenden, 2004; 





How do techniques of measurement govern the activities of 
counsellors in their work with children who have been sexually 
abused?  
 
As I just mentioned, objectivity is a commonly made claim in 
support of the use of psychological measurement as research 
practice. While it is possible to be critical of this claim by 
undermining the notion of objectivity as separatism, I have 
suggested in this thesis that objectivity can be understood as a way 
of conducting oneself. Furthermore, by following the suggestion 
that objectivity itself is an historically constituted material practice 
(Daston et al., 2007), rather than a timeless, placeless ideal, it is 
possible to identify how objectivity works in specific settings (such 
as conducting a psychological assessment using a standardised 
instrument in a counselling setting).  
 
As my focus groups demonstrate, objectivity is sometimes an 
uncomfortable way of conducting oneself. This is especially so 
when this contributes to the apparent distress of the child sitting in 
the counselling room. Yet, in order to utilise the measuring 
instruments, the counsellor must engage in some way with the 
directive to be objective. This may take the form of outright 
resistance by constituting one’s self through a different set of 
knowledge claims about good therapy, or it may entail attempting 
to grapple with the tensions inherent in the phenomenon, perhaps 
making compromises here and there while understanding that such 
relations of power may be productive for therapeutic work. What I 
have tried to contest is the view that the counsellors I spoke with 
are simply “servants of moral orthopaedics” (Foucault, 1977, cited 
in Hook, 2007, p. 40). I have attempted to convey a much greater 
322 
 
sense of agency and ethical commitment than this characterisation 
would suggest.  
 
By following the principle of trying to account for the phenomenon 
of psychological measurement as a legitimate way of knowing 
about the effects of child sexual abuse, very little can be taken for 
granted. Surprising continuities and discontinuities appeared 
throughout the course of my investigations. I have argued that it is 
possible to identify two theoretical systems with the effects of 
child sexual abuse as their object (post-structural feminism and 
scientific psychology), enabling Barad’s diffractive reading 
(2007). At the same time, it is not possible to step outside the 
èpistèmé that is capable of producing both these systems 
(confirming Foucault’s position that one cannot grasp the current 
èpistèmé). Both systems are influential and legitimate ways of 
producing and speaking about child sexual abuse, despite being in 
disagreement over some significant questions. As I have traced in 
this thesis, a key area of difference is regarding the importance of 
measurement. The ongoing engagements between these systems 
will continue to produce and shape the field of child sexual abuse. 
 
However, having reached this juncture, I should stress here that I 
do not claim to have established any fixed answers about the ‘best’ 
way to understand and respond to the effects of child sexual abuse, 
but I rather hope to have produced some unsettling yet relevant 
questions about the ways this work is currently understood and 
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APPENDIX ONE- LIST OF CONSTRUCTS 
IN THE BASC 2, AND BRIEF OUTLINE OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASC 
 
The original BASC (Behavior Assessment System for Children) 
was first released in 1992 by Reynolds & Kamphaus. It consists of 
several different sets of questions regarding a child’s behaviour: a 
Parent Rating Scale (PRS), a Teacher Rating Scale (TRS), a Self-
Report of Personality (SRP), a Structured Developmental History 
form (SDH), and a Student Observation System (SOS), to be 
completed by the appropriate person in each case (the parent, the 
child, the teacher, etc.). The Self-Report of Personality, for 
example, has 152-186 questions (depending on the age of the 
child), with each question to be rated on a 1-5 Likert scale 
corresponding to the frequency of the particular behaviour or 
thought.  The revised BASC 2 appeared in 2004, with some 
changes to the various scales and questions. (See Rescorla, 2009 
for more on the development of the BASC). 
Each question is connected to a scale, listed below. Each scale is 
considered as either an externalising problem, an internalising 
problem, or an adaptive skill. The total score on each scale will 
indicat whether the child will be considered to be in the normal, at-
risk, or clinically significant range for each construct. Statistical 
techniques are utilised to check the answers of the various 
completed questionairres for both internal validity (i.e. similar 
answers are given for similar questions), and for inter-rater 
correspondance.  
One reason for the use of the BASC in this agency is it’s ability to 
be administered by workers other than clinical psychologists. 
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However there was some dispute among the team as to whether 
other professionals (e.g. social workers) might be regarded as 
unqualified to adminster the test if it were to become a contested 






Adaptive Skills  
Hyperactivity  
Aggression  






Attention Problems  
Adaptability  
Social Skills  
Leadership  
Study Skills  
Functional 
Communication  
Activities of Daily 
Living  
 
Further detailed information on the BASC2 is freely available 









APPENDIX TWO: INFORMATION 
PROVIDED TO FOCUS GROUP 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
The research project is an investigation into how practices of 
measurement (i.e. the use of psychological/psychometric tests) are 
used in counselling or treatment in the field of child sexual abuse. 
The research will investigate how (if at all) practitioners link these 
types of measurement to their clinical work with child victims of 
sexual abuse. 
 
The results of the research are intended to be a theoretical 
contribution to the field in the context of growing demand for 
quantitative data about therapeutic interventions (e.g. evidence 
based practice, the increasing use of standardised testing in 
treatment). 
 
Invitations to participate in the focus groups will be extended to 
people currently working as counsellors, therapists or clinicians in 
the field of child sexual abuse. That is, purposive sampling will be 
the approach to recruitment of participants. A small token of 
appreciation (a book voucher) will be offered to participants. 
 
The plan is to conduct focus groups of 4-6 participants for sessions 
of 60-90 minutes.  
The focus group participants will be asked to explore the following 
questions and topics: 
 
x Identifying particular psychological tests that therapists use 
in their work with child victims of sexual abuse 
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x Discussing the details of these tests, such as what ‘traits’ 
they are used to measure, what kinds of clients they are 
used with and why they are used 
x Explore the details of how these tests measure the traits 
they claim to measure 
x Discuss how the process of testing is managed within 
therapy 
x Discuss how the therapists use the results of these tests in 
the formulation of therapeutic plans and goals with their 
clients 
x Discuss therapists views on the ethics of testing, for 
example, what considerations must one be attuned to in 
order to properly conduct psychological testing 
x Are there any particular organisational requirements related 
to the use of tests (for example, are the use of some tests 
routine with certain clients?) 
x Discuss the therapists views on the philosophical 
dimensions of psychological testing through prompt 
questions such as:  
o Are psychological attributes quantitative in 
structure? 
o What power dynamics are involved in administering 
tests? 
o What is the relationship between the use of 
standardised testing and the exercise of clinical 
judgement in therapy? 
o In what ways do therapists find the use of testing 
helpful or unhelpful in their practice as therapists 
with child victims of sexual abuse? 
o What are therapists views on how children might 





The nature of the information and opinions being sought is 
professional; no disclosures of personal experiences (i.e. outside of 
the professionals context) will be requested or expected. The 
names of individuals and organisations will be changed or 
excluded in any published material.  
 
The data from the focus groups will be analysed to identify the 
discourses available to counsellors, therapists and clinicians in 
their use of, or resistance to the use of, psychological/psychometric 
tests in their work. Thus, the intent is not to draw out certain points 
of view in order to criticise them, but rather to attempt to identify 
the various frameworks (be they theoretical, ethical, pragmatic, or 
administrative) that are called upon by counsellors, therapists and 
clinicians in their use of such tests. In other words, the style of data 
collection and analysis falls broadly under a ‘discourse analysis’ 
approach. 
 
The focus groups will be recorded with a mini-disc recorder, and 
the discs stored in accordance with Deakin University guidelines 
(which requires retaining the material for a minimum of 6 years). 
The focus group discussions will be transcribed by the research 
candidate, and distributed to participants to check for accuracy. 
When a correct transcription is achieved, the data will be analysed 
to identify themes which will be used to develop and support the 
overall theoretical position of the thesis. Quotes from the focus 





Participants are quite free to participate or not to any extent, and 
quite free to withdraw at any time. If participation is withdrawn, 
information gathered will not be used and either destroyed or 
returned or destroyed within a reasonable time thereafter. 
Participants will be given the opportunity, if so desired, to view the 
transcriptions of the focus groups and make any corrections 
regarding their contributions (e.g. misheard comments, inaccurate 
portrayal of comments made).  
 
